To what extent can international actors and movements from civil society influence water management? How and when is this beneficial/detrimental and how can these effects be supported/mitigated?
Key Question Categor(ies):Power and Politics
In attempts at resolving particularly contentious disputes, solving problems of politics and resource use is best accomplished in two mutually reinforcing tracks. The most useful lesson of the multilateral working group on water resources is the handling of water and political tensions simultaneously, in the bilateral and multilateral working groups respectively, each track helping to reinforce the other. This lesson has been learned after a long history of failing to solve water problems outside of their political context.
Chinese Authorities are hard bargainers and typically withhold information, keep secrecy around negotiations and favor a close decision-making process, but there are areas of opportunity in the enormous environmental problems China is facing nowadays, as a result of its rapid economic growth, mainly air pollution, land degradation, and water contamination. These pressing issues pose tremendous challenges for China’s continued economic development, political stability, public health and sustainability.
In its early stages, the TGD sought for participation and involvement of Multilateral Financial Institutions such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Export Credit Agencies such as the US Export-Import Bank and other investment banks and corporations were invited. However, the Chinese government refused to comply with the World Bank standards in environmental and social policy issues (particularly resettlement), so the World Bank refused to finance the project. This made potential investors to hesitate about the viability of the project, and increased their uncertainty with the way the Chinese government would be dealing with problems related to technical and management issues, both for water management and power generation. Other agencies like the US Ex-Im Bank walked out the negotiations. But Chinese ambitions were not to be discouraged since growing export reserves and a booming economy allowed the government to finance the project through China’s Development Banks.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000565-QINU`"'
In past decades, the World Bank used to be a big advocate of hydropower generation, and promoted investments for their construction as a solution to air contamination and reduced CO2 emissions, but perceptions of dams and dam building have changed. Dams today symbolize, for some critics, not progress but environmental and social devastation.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000566-QINU`"'
International pressures on environmental issues have found its way through international mechanisms aimed to provide standard regulations to the international community on critical issues as Agenda 21 emanated from the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. In recent years, China has started to shift its economic development toward a more environmentally sustainable environment, stimulated by mechanisms such as Agenda 21 and other international agreements.</ref> In the year 2000, the World Bank sponsored a World Commission on Dams study entitled Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-Making. It was the first comprehensive global and independent review of the performance and associated impact of large dams. The document summarized most of the mea culpa, pinpointing the flaws, omissions and errors undertaken by large dam projects.
As the TGD project continued, international media began to report on growing threats from landslides, pollution, flooding, as well as growing social and political unrest and dissatisfaction with relocating millions of people. Foreign public opinion and China’s international prestige play a significant role in the international scene, since Chinese foreign policy aims to lead the causes of the developing world. On that note, International Regimes have induced China to join multilateral efforts such as the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), the “Earth Summit”. As a result China incorporated some sustainable development policies in its Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000), and the Fifteenth Chinese Communist Party Congress (1997).'"`UNIQ--ref-00000567-QINU`"'
Multilateral negotiation forums typically offer mutual gain solutions with financial resources, technology transfer and important capacity-building (ex. Global Environment Facility) to entice participants and provide incentives to developing countries willing to address these problems. International negotiations have contributed to some remarkable adjustments on China’s policies and actions in this issue area towards sustainability. International environmental agreements can effectively exercise some influence in public policy, providing guidance for reform and strengthening the underlying capacity of the agencies and actors involved.
Furthermore, Chinese investments have been actively supporting numerous infrastructure projects in Africa,'"`UNIQ--ref-00000568-QINU`"' and increasing demands and critiques on Chinese practices in environmental issues have forced Chinese authorities to establish new domestic institutions and processes for managing those issues. These new institutions and processes favored environmental standards within China. For example, in 1995 the Air pollution Prevention and Control Law (first promulgated in 1987), was amended to include tougher regulations for controlling sulfur dioxide.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000569-QINU`"'
International Non-Governmental Organizations such as International Rivers, WIN, M-Power, WWF, etc. also contribute to knowledge sharing and actively push for greater transparency and accountability on behalf of affected minorities and vulnerable groups, to advance their agenda on broader environmental concerns and other uncertainty related issues.
The energy infrastructure sector is increasingly being opened up to private investors, few of whom have proved willing to invest in a project that carries high risks and low returns. Financial institutions have embraced international standards such as the Equator principles, a benchmark developed by the financial industry to judge, evaluate and manage risk in project financing, including social and environmental impact for investment projects to perfect financial risk evaluation and early warning mechanisms.
These efforts combined with international regimes and international organizations such as United Nations Environmental Program – UNEP that promotes environmental standards and best practices. The International Hydropower Association's (IHA) launched in 2011 the industry's Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol (HSAP) that enables dam builders to assess various sustainability topics, including biodiversity, erosion, infrastructure safety and downstream flow regimes. The protocol also includes guidelines on engaging with indigenous peoples and identifies the potential for reservoirs to produce greenhouse gas emissions.
The magnitude of the consequences of this controversial project has raised international concerns over appropriate water management and sustainability. All the initiatives discussed above emphasize mutual gains negotiations, joint fact finding, technical expertise, inclusion, transparency and collaborative adaptive management that are gradually improving governance in dam construction and water management in China.
This project effected a range of actors who were not consulted or otherwise included in the decision making process . However, their activism related to the project outcomes has contributed to promote inclusion, to some extent. Also, technical expertise from the local scientific community and international best practices has contributed to tackle the immediate consequences of the TGD. The following paragraphs describe their activities and their struggle for a comprehensive solution to the problems posed by the TGD.
Public Demonstrations and Protest – In general public opinion was excluded and never consulted about the project, particularly those affected for flooding and resettlement. In May 1992, the police arrested 179 members of the Democratic Youth Party and charged them with counterrevolutionary activities for sabotaging the progress of the TGD. To this day, their whereabouts are still unknown. Human Rights Watch Asia has condemned repression from the State and appealed to foreign governments and corporations to assist in discovering the fate of the dissenters.
Scientific and Expert opinion – Critics in China from scientific, engineering and environmental backgrounds who have attempted to raise technical questions about the project have been accused of counterrevolutionary intent and disloyalty. Opponents have been persecuted since 1956. Criticism of the dam is strictly forbidden. Books which contain such debates are banned. Experts and journalists who attempted such discussions were harassed, even jailed. Li Rui, Mao’s personal secretary and vice minister of water resources was the first to be purged during the Great Leap Forward. Years later, in 1989 a journalist Dai Quing, published the book Yangtze! Yangtze! a collection of articles by several scholars against the dam. After the Tiananmen debacle her book was officially banned and 30,000 copies were destroyed. The authors were accused of provoking chaos and riots. Dai was imprisoned for 10 months. The eminent scientist Qian Jiaju, who openly criticized the project, was forced into exile. The controversy over the dam, which began out of genuine concern over the environmental dangers and future economic health of China, turned into political fight.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000561-QINU`"'
Congress Representatives – Some have been prevented from expressing their opinions at meetings with the main government body planning the project. They have accused pro-dam Communist Party officials for employing unscientific methods and indulging impossible plans in their ambitions to build the world’s biggest dam. Censorship and lack of open discussion increased uncertainty concerns and diminished trust on government decisions preventing mutual gains for the entire society. Anti-dam lobbyists believed that public access to basic information about the dam would have helped to prevent flood disasters.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000562-QINU`"'
Research Institutions – Among other valuable attempts to implement follow-up efforts to obtain reliable information are those pursued by ecologist Chen Guojie and his colleagues at the Mountainous Disaster and Environment Institute in Chengdu and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) setting up seven experiment stations, one of them located at Wanxian, an area where some 800,000 residents are being relocated. The team monitored environmental changes during construction of the reservoir as well as the fate of the residents. Those stations feed into a broader network of several hundred scientists in 70 institutions who are part of a $110 million project to monitor a dozen aspects of the project’s impact. Such initiatives remained isolated from mainstream politics and management of the TGD and just gained notoriety in the last decade with government shifting leadership and enhanced professionalization of Chinese public service.
Government officials and bureaucracy – Lack of accountability from local, provincial, and central government prompts collaboration failure. Corruption and absence of transparency mechanisms hinder adaptive management and effective rapport from impacted populations and government authorities. In early 2000 the Chinese government released information that corrupt officials had embezzled $60 million (500 million yuan) from resettlement funds for the TGD. An official was sentenced to death for embezzling almost $1.5 million from the project.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000563-QINU`"'
The consequences of the TGD will continue to have significant impact in China and other countries (pollution and acid rain spreading towards South Korea and Japan). More actors (foreign and local) are involved to find solutions to their problems and make their claims be addressed. In terms of the decision making process some specialists argue that this has been a symbolic depiction of the power struggle between reformist and hardliners inside Chinese politics.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000564-QINU`"' It has been an ongoing process, even after the dam completion and it will continue until adequate solutions are accomplished.
Positive, active, and continuous involvement of a third party is vital in helping to overcome conflict. The active participation of Eugene Black and the World Bank were crucial to the success of the Indus Water Treaty. The Bank offered not only their good offices, but a strong leadership role as well. The Bank provided support staff, funding, and, perhaps most important, its own proposals when negotiations reached a stalemate.
Coming to the table with financial assistance can provide sufficient incentive for a breakthrough in agreement. The Bank helped raise almost 900 million from the international community, allowing for Pakistan’s final objections to be addressed.
Tensions are created when a country within a basin acts unilaterally without consulting other nations. Thailand and Myanmar have been working together for some time on the development of the Salween River basin, but China has been acting unilaterally, potentially constructing up to 13 dams on the upper stem of the river. Without working with the two downstream nations, China risks creating conflict with Thailand and Myanmar.
The greater the international involvement in conflict resolution, the greater the political and financial incentives to cooperate. The pace of development and cooperation in the Mekong River watershed over the years has been commensurate with the level of involvement of the international community. Early accomplishments were impressive, impelled in part by strong UN support and a "Mekong Spirit" on the part of the "Mekong Club" of donors. By the 1970s, the pace of cooperative development began to slacken, partly the result of decreasing involvement by an international community daunted by political obstacles and the size of planned projects.
Including key non-riparian parties can be useful to reaching agreement; excluding them can be harmful. Egypt was included in the Johnston plan era negotiations because of its preeminence in the Arab world, and despite its non-riparian status. Some attribute the accomplishments made during the course in part to President Nasser's support.
In contrast, pressure after the negotiations from other Arab states not directly involved in the water conflict may have had an impact on its eventual demise. Iraq and Saudi Arabia strongly urged Lebanon, Syria and Jordan not to accept the Plan. Perhaps partially as a result, Lebanon said they would not enter any agreement that split the waters of the Hasbani River or any other river.
Along with political entities, many interests affected by river management were not included in the process. These included NGO's, public interest groups, and environmental groups. Perhaps as a consequence, the entire river was allocated, without consideration of in-stream usage.
The principle of "parallel unilateralism" was developed here, allowing each collaborating pair of countries to work together, while coordinating the work of the countries which do not. Due to lack of movement from the three primary governments of the Kura-Araks River basin (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) towards working together in the management of the river, fifty NGOs came together to form the NGO Coalition of the Kura-Araks in order to start activities between the three countries by cleaning up pollution and educating the public about the current situation.
Lack of participation of all basin nations weakens the overall negotiations and creates opportunity losses for those not participating. Guinea, not party to the OMVS organization, has not experienced the development benefits of the other three countries in the basin. As a result, they are lacking water resource management infrastructure, a reliable energy source and water supplies.
Several important donors have been active in the Pilcomayo Basin. Also, there are budding initiatives by indigenous groups to organize. The question is, to what extent these forces from above and below are effective in asserting tighter control over pollution.
In order to manage a transboundary aquifer effectively, it requires coordinated collaboration, cooperation and communication between national and sub-national governments, as well as the private sector, international organizations and local civil society. With an integrated management strategy that affects international politics, economics, the environment and social well-being, it is necessary to include all stakeholders in the process from design to implementation to maintenance, in order for the program to be effective and sustainable. There needs to be a broad understanding of a common goal and a clear strategy and methodology to achieve that goal.
In this case, some internaitonal actors are allowing for more pressure on the littoral states, as they try to push their own agenda regarding the energy reserves. This is contributing to the parties hestiance in reaching an agreement.