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ASI:Collaborative Adaptive Management, Joint Fact Finding, and Mutual Gains: Aplication to Indus River

2014-01-16T16:16:28Z

Tahira:

{{ASI
|First Contributor=Tahira Syed
|Reflection Text='''Adaptive Management on Indus River'''

The key premises for the inter-provincial dispute over allocation of Indus flows dates back to the early 1990s when the ruling British Government of the then Indian Sub-continent started developing infrastructure to regulate Indus flows and introduced diversions through constructing barrages weirs and canals to irrigate largely arid areas for increasing agricultural production. The rapid infrastructure development gave rise to distrust in the Sindh province being the lower riparian on Indus. What started as a clear fear of losing out on its water share, the Sindh province openly blamed Punjab province (upper riparian) of water theft and usage in access to their allocations.

The 1991 Water Apportionment Accord (WAA) is therefore seen as a key agreement developed to address the deep rooted distrust between the Sindh and Punjab provinces. The WAA was a product of intense negotiations and remains as the key step taken by the provincial administrations for reaching consensus over equitable water distribution, planning for additional storage and water management infrastructure and maintenance of environmental flows. However, since the WAA formulation, no additional storage capacity has been added to the Indus Basin Irrigation System (IBIS) while other envisaged objectives of harvesting the potential of hydropower generation and effective and long term capacity for flood management have also remain underachieved.

To assess the adaptability of 1991 WAA, it is essential to look at the institutional arrangements and joint monitoring mechanisms agreed between the provinces in implementing the Accord. The key institutional mechanism established as a direct result of the WAA is the Indus River System Authority (IRSA) which was established in 1992. The perception amongst provinces – in particular Sindh – of the role of IRSA is also contested due to perceived influence of Punjab province given its size in terms of population, economy and representation in governing and policy making institutions.

On the other hand, and in presumed interest of retaining some flexibility, the WAA, like any other water agreement, contains broad definitions and guidelines for the participating provinces on various water management aspects. For instance, while the Para 7 of the WAA clearly stated the “….need for certain minimum escapages to the sea, below Kotri, to check sea intrusion…” the negotiations for reaching an agreement on the correct level of flows have not produced consensus amongst the two provinces. The matter of environmental flows (which refer to the amount of water needed in a watercourse to maintain a healthy, natural ecosystem) for the downstream and delta of the Indus is mentioned in the 1991 WAA at a proposed 10 MAF as per demand from the Sindh province. This volume however is contested by Punjab province and as a result a series of scientific studies and analyses have led to various additional proposals for setting the minimum flow levels.

However, the adaptability of the 1991 WAA just as the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 between India and Pakistan remains limited as it makes neither any provision for planning and/or responding to the variations in water flows as a result of climate change nor in addressing the water quality and pollution.

Another aspect of the lack of adaptability of the 1991 WAA can be assessed in the monitoring and data reporting provisions. Among the responsibilities of IRSA is to oversee the process of water allocation between provinces . However for fulfilling this responsibility, IRSA relies on the information provided by the provinces themselves on their predicted levels of water to be available each year. IRSA does not question the information provided by the provinces – partly limited by its own technical capacity. Instead, IRSA derives an average prediction based on the information received from the provinces and using its discretion proposes the final prediction of water availability in the system for the given season. While this process is monitored rigorously, the neutrality of the process is compromised as the provinces have to their discretion the data provided for this decision making process.

'''Joint Fact Finding for the Indus River'''

The 1991 WAA recognizes a fixed quantity of approximately 40 MAF as environmental flows to be released in a consistent way each year. However, these quantities are not released consistently. The continuing inconsistency in maintain environmental flows below the Kotri barrage structure are often justified on the grounds that “there is an average over time (when flood flows even out the dry years).”<ref name="Kugelman and Hathaway">Kugelman, M. and Hathaway R. M. (2009) ‘Running on Empty: Pakistan’s Water Crisis’, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC online: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/running-empty-pakistans-water-crisis
</ref> A regular, controlled, and monitored minimum flow each year, to be guaranteed through strict regulation has been difficult to achieve.

It was in the above scenario that the Indus River System Authority (IRSA) was eventually asked to convene the independent, third party mediation on combined analyses of the technical studies to make recommendations for a decision on environmental flow levels. This led to commissioning an Independent Panel of Experts (IPOE) comprising of renowned, international water practitioners and experts.

Through IRSA, the provincial representatives and water practitioners participated in the various consultations with the IPOE. The IPOE was given a detailed terms of reference which included review of the technical studies at relevant stages, in depth discussions with federal and provincial government officials and consultants, and analysis from international experiences and practices. The credibility for the recommendations provided by the IPOE was not contested by the provinces given their non-partisan and independent expert status.

The IPOE evaluated the three specific technical studies which were undertaken to assess a rational level of minimum environmental flows: (i) to determine the minimum flow below Kotri barrage to control seawater intrusion into the delta; (ii) to address environmental impacts from river water and sediment flows and their seasonal distribution below the barrage; and (iii) to address environmental concerns about a wide range of issues related to the management of water resources upstream of Kotri barrage. The studies verified data on salinity levels from waters entering the downstream Sindh province. The IPOE comprised of three members namely Fernando Gonzalez, Thinus Basson and Baart Schultz. The IPOE was assigned the tasks of: (i) reviewing consultants’ work on the technical studies at three levels – inception, midterm and draft final reports; (ii) reviewing the recommendations provided in the technical studies against the respective terms of reference; and (iii) analyzing the recommendations and compile final recommendations on the required escapages levels below Kotri.

In essence, the IPOE served the purpose of meeting agreed demands from Sindh and Punjab for scientifically and objectively evaluating the three studies to inform the decision for the involved parties. Also, as part of its terms of reference, the IPOE was mandated to undertake a series of stakeholder consultations.<ref name="Gonzalez et all 2005">Gonzalez F. J; Basson. T; and Schultz B. (2005) ‘Final Report of IPOE for Review of Studies on Water Escapages below Kotri Barrage’</ref>

'''Mutual Gains on the Indus'''

The Indus Basin management over the years has been aspired for primarily capturing its flows by the riparian’s sharing its waters. The concept of striving for mutual gains by maximizing the benefits to all stakeholders has not been the sole driving force behind all agreements reached on the Indus River management. For instance, the 1991 WAA was primarily developed to reach an agreement over ongoing inter-provincial disputes between Punjab and Sindh provinces over water distributions and the high levels of distrust each had over the other accruing more benefits than the other party. As neither Sindh nor Punjab seem to give way in their positions over what constitutes the optimal levels of allocation, both are equally disadvantaged at receiving additional benefits from the system. This disadvantage has become an increasingly vocal debate not only amongst the two provincial authorities, but also by larger groups of stakeholders including research bodies, academic community and civil society who point to the ‘lost opportunity’ for the country by not addressing the growing need for augmenting storage capacity since 1970s as well as reaching an agreement for maintaining environmental flows downstream of Kotri Barrage (the last structure on the Indus).

Attempts are resolving this stalemate through simulated stakeholder consultations (e.g. Imam and Lohani, 2012) are suggested amongst others, as proposed means to demonstrate the application of mutual gains approach to address the inter-provincial distrust. The multi-stakeholder (government, civil society and technical experts) and multi-tier (national, sub-national, and local) consultations for conducting open debates for Kalabagh Dam project were also held between 2004 and 2006 under the administration of President General (R) Pervez Musharraf. However, the consultations did not result in any consensus and were rather abruptly abandoned due to rising agitation by popular political groups as well as growing stance from the Sindh and Khyber Pkhtunkhwa provinces. In 2008, the incoming government of Pakistan Peoples Party formally announced the cancellation of the Kalabagh Dam Project (KBD). However, after the devastating floods of 2010, the Prime Minister from the same ruling government made a public statement referring to missed opportunity from the absence of Kalabagh Dam and that the “the deaths and destruction in the floods could have been averted if the Kalabagh Dam had been built.”<ref name="Daily Times 2010"> "Kalabagh Dam could have averted destruction of floods, says Gilani" Daily Times (Pakistan) 10 August 2010. Archived at : http://archive.is/cJsgP </ref>

'''Building Consensus'''

Consensus building on the Indus Basin management has been a slow process. While breakthrough agreements have been reached in the form of Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 between India and Pakistan and the 1991 Water Apportionment Accord between the provinces of Pakistan, the adaptive management of Indus Basin is yet to be fully operationalized by these accords. In particular, the 1991 WAA made several key provisions for inter-provincial distribution as well as for environmental flows and instituted IRSA as the key regulatory and decision making authority to oversee implementation of these provisions. However, the ensuing distrust between participating provinces has limited the effectiveness of the decision making process.
|Reflection Text Summary=The Water Apportionment Act of 1991 includes aspects that both increase and hinder flexibility or adaptability over time. This article discusses these aspects and also addresses how development of technical information was addressed for this process and opportunities for mutual gains and consensus building.
|Perspective=Practitioner, Observer
|ASI Type=Personal Insights
|Case Study=Pakistan: Inter-Provincial Relations on Indus Basin
|ASI Keyword=
|User=Tahira
}}

ASI:Collaborative Adaptive Management, Joint Fact Finding, and Mutual Gains: Aplication to Indus River

2014-01-16T16:15:27Z

Tahira: Created page with "{{ASI |First Contributor=Tahira Syed |Reflection Text='''Adaptive Management on Indus River''' The key premises for the inter-provincial dispute over allocation of Indus fl..."

Water Apportionment Accord 1991

2014-01-16T16:06:59Z

Tahira:

{{Agreement
|Agreement Type=national, sub-national, agreement
|Included Resource={{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Indus River
}}
|Included Riparian={{Link Riparian
|Riparian=Pakistan
}}
|Water Projects Included in Agreement=
|Related Initiatives=
|Projects Influenced by Agreement=
|Previous Agreement=
|Description='''Water Apportionment Accord of 1991'''

The Pakistan Water Apportionment Accord (WAA) of 1991 is essentially the legal instrument derived by the participating provinces to address the long-standing dispute over equitable distribution of Indus flows. The dispute over equitable flows from Indus remains an issues amongst the upper – the Punjab province – and the lower – Sindh province. The provinces have remained in conflict over reaching agreement on flow distribution since before the partition of Indian subcontinent into India and Pakistan in 1947.

The WAA has been seen as a key achievement since it defines, unambiguously and in perpetuity, the shares of available water which can be used by each of the provinces.<ref name="World Bank 2008a">World Bank. 2008. Pakistan - Water Sector Capacity Buildling and Advisory Services Project (WCAP). Washington, DC: World Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/02/9362354/pakistan-water-sector-capacity-buildling-advisory-services-project-wcap
Project Site (and more recent documents): http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P110099/water-sector-capacity-buildling-advisory-services-project-wcap?lang=en&tab=overview </ref> The WAA was based on the following parameters:

• Water entitlements were based on existing use of water that is actual average system uses for the period 1977 to 1982 where the ten daily uses would be adjusted pro-rata to correspond the indicated seasonal allocations of the different canal systems and would form the basis for sharing shortages and surpluses.

• An automatic process for adjusting entitlements depending on availability was specified where the ten daily uses would be adjusted pro-rata to correspond the indicated seasonal allocations of the different canal systems and would form the basis for sharing shortages and surpluses.

• Provinces were allowed to use their allocation in any way that they want where no restrictions would be placed on the provinces to undertake new projects within their agreed shares and the provinces will have the freedom within their allocations to modify system-wide and period-wise uses.

• The Accord implied that in major parts of the Indus Basin irrigation system there are, in fact, well-defined entitlements at all levels, from the international, through the interprovincial, down to canal commands, distributaries, outlets, and ultimately to each farmer on a water course.

'''Ambiguities of Water Apportionment Accord'''

The primary reason for the continuing distrust may be accrued to the interpretation of the WAA by the provinces. While the 1991 WAA provided a solid foundation for framing the disputes over Indus flows and equitable distribution of its waters, the practices of existing uses of water supplies to the provinces remained largely unchanged. Similarly, the adjustment of entitlements also prescribed that if a province is unable to make full use of its allocation, the surplus may be used by another province without acquiring a right to it. Additionally, the fact that the entitlements were explained as aggregates of specified historical uses in different canal commands meant that the Accord was thus implicitly specifying the distribution of the provincial shares to each of the existing canal commands, allocations which, in Punjab at least, are followed to this day. The role of IRSA was also contested due to perceived influence of Punjab province given its size in terms of population, economy and representation in governing and policy making institutions.

The WAA and IRSA have been seen as key steps to strive for reaching consensus amongst Sindh and Punjab over water distribution and planning for additional storage and water management infrastructures. However, to this date the distrust continues as the two provinces laying blames of water theft and usage in access to their allocations. As a result, no additional storage capacity has been added to the system since 1970s and the potential of hydropower generation as well as optimal flood management remain underachieved. Another complexity adding to the continuation of provincial distrust is embedded in the nature of WAA, which by design retains ambiguities that cannot anticipate future scenarios for instance in the face of climate variations and other externalities.
|External Links=
|Case Review={{Case Review Boxes
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Pakistan: Inter-Provincial Relations on Indus Basin

2014-01-16T15:48:09Z

Tahira: Created page with "{{Case Study |Geolocation=26.9346737, 68.72907050000003 |Water Feature= |Riparian= |Water Project= |Agreement={{Link Agreement |Agreement=Water Apportionment Accord 1991 }} |R..."

{{Case Study
|Geolocation=26.9346737, 68.7290705
|Water Feature=
|Riparian=
|Water Project=
|Agreement={{Link Agreement
|Agreement=Water Apportionment Accord 1991
}}
|REP Framework='''Water Distribution amongst Indus Riparians'''

The infrastructure development over the Indus Basin in early 1900s by the then governing British was intended to provide irrigation for increasing agricultural production. The infrastructure development on Indus Basin while changed the agri-based economy of the region, it also gave rise to a deep sense of distrust in the Sindh province over the actual extent of effects the infrastructure development would have over longer term on the flows to the Sindh.

Distribution of Indus waters amongst various riparians has remained an area of large interest. This interest is partially drawn to the issue of inter-state water allocations between Punjab and Sindh provinces of Pakistan. However, the inter-state distribution of water over Indus and the ensuing differences of opinions pre-date the modern history of the division of Indian subcontinent into India and Pakistan in 1947.

The disputed status of water entitlements between Punjab and Sindh provinces have remained a point of discourse due to the desire to augment irrigation infrastructure for capturing Indus flows. As this infrastructure developed into more complex and intricate over decades since mid-20th century, the opposition by the lower riparian also grew in voice and frequency. The plans by Punjab Government to construct additional storage and regulatory infrastructure have remained the center of this opposition by Sindh province.

The early attempts to address the disputes resulted in the 1945 Sindh-Punjab Agreement<ref name="IUCN 010">IUCN, 2010 – Pakistan Water Apportionment Accord for Resolving Inter-provincial Water Conflicts – Policy Issues and Options. IUCN Pakistan, Karachi. 11 pp. Draft available online: http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/pk_ulr_d4.pdf </ref> formulated by the British as a solution to introduce equity in water distribution amongst the two provinces. The 1945 Agreement stated that Sindh has the right to receive Indus waters and allocated 75% of main-stem Indus River to Sindh and 25% to Punjab whereas 94% from the eastern tributaries to Punjab and 6% to Sindh.<ref name="Mustafa 2010">Mustafa, D. 2010 – Hydropolitics in Pakistan’s Indus Basin. USIP Special Report. Available from usip.org http://www.usip.org/publications/hydropolitics-in-pakistan-s-indus-basin </ref> This formula remained in force up until 1947 when the sub-continent divided into independent India and Pakistan. The water sharing formula could not immediately be reviewed because when the British Act of Parliament was passed on July 18, 1947, the boundary between the two new dominions was not demarcated and so it was impractical to deal with the allocation of water.<ref name="Salman 2002">Salman, M.A.Salman and Kishor Uprety( 2002); Conflicts and Cooperation on South Asia’s
International Rivers; a Legal Perspective. Washington D.C.; The World Bank </ref> As the newly formed federal government in Pakistan began allocating water on an adhoc basis, the perceptions in Sindh largely viewed this practice as favoring Punjab.

It wasn’t until much later that the Water Apportionment Accord (WAA) was signed in March 1991 in the hope to address the inter-provincial distrust through providing overarching guideline for water allocation and monitoring that these allocations are respected through the establishment of Indus River System Authority (IRSA) in 1992.
|Issues=
|Key Questions={{Key Question
|Subject=Transboundary Water Issues
|Key Question - Dams=
|Key Question - Urban=
|Key Question - Transboundary=What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution?
|Key Question - Desalination=
|Key Question - Influence=
|Key Question - Industries=
|Key Question Description=The emphasis of addressing inter-state disputes over water allocations on the Indus Basion has more than often focused on allocation formula to be proposed and agreed in instruments such as the 1991 WAA. There is a need to identify a few additional mechanisms that can contribute to the desiging or adapting the water agreements and can also reflect levels of emerging conditions in view of climatic variations and impact on water management for agricultural productivity.
}}
|Topic Tags=
|External Links=
|Case Review={{Case Review Boxes
|Empty Section=No
|Clean Up Required=No
|Expand Section=No
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|Wikify=No
|connect to www=No
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|Disputed=No
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|ForceDiv=yes
}}
}}

User:Tahira

2014-01-16T15:25:21Z

Tahira: Created page with "{{Person |Name=Tahira Syed |organization=Tufts University / Water Diplomacy |User Location=Pakistan |External Links= }}"

{{Person
|Name=Tahira Syed
|organization=Tufts University / Water Diplomacy
|User Location=Pakistan
|External Links=
}}