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Integrated Management and Diplomacy Development of the Chao Phraya River Basin

2014-05-12T18:15:07Z

TSP:

{{Case Study
|Water Use=Agriculture or Irrigation, Domestic/Urban Supply, Hydropower Generation, Industry - consumptive use, Industry - non-consumptive use
|Land Use=agricultural- cropland and pasture, agricultural- confined livestock operations, industrial use, urban, urban- high density
|Climate=Monsoon; Dry-summer
|Population=25
|Area=157925
|Geolocation=13.752724664397, 100.52490234375
|Issues={{Issue
|Issue Description=* [http://www.rid.go.th/eng Royal Irrigation Department] (“RID”): a state department with responsibilities to provide all water supplies for irrigation throughout the year. Agriculture is the major concern. See also discussion of the organizational [[#Seasonality_Challenges:_Drought_and_Flooding_Risks|strategic responsibilities]].

* [http://www.egat.co.th/en/ Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand] (“EGAT”): a state enterprise that manages the majority of Thailand's electricity generation capacity. In this case, it operates dams to generate and stabilize the hydropower as a base load. However, owing to a broader and stronger energy mix in the recent decades, it becomes less dependent on the basin resources.

* [http://www.bangkok.go.th/th/main Bangkok Metropolitan Administration] (“BMA”): manages the urban city and maintains the integrity of water supply and flood protection in the Bangkok Metropolitan Area, together with the [http://www.mwa.co.th Metropolitan Waterworks Authority] (“MWA”).

* [http://www.thaigov.go.th/index.php Government of Thailand]: the executive administration under the constitutional monarchy of the Kingdom of Thailand. It is responsible for the overall management of the water supply (i.e., manage, control and promote efficient use of water for agricultural, industrial, power generation and urban uses toward self-sufficiency). It established the Flood Relief Operation Center (“FROC”) during the major flooding in 2011.

* [http://en.pwa.co.th/ Provincial Waterworks Authority] (“PWA”): a state department that provides water services in the Kingdom of Thailand, except for the Bangkok Metropolitan Area.

* [http://www.boi.go.th/ Thailand Board of Investment] (“BOI”): a governmental agency that promotes investment in Thailand and maintains contacts and relationship with foreign investors in Thailand.

* [http://eng.nesdb.go.th/ National Economic and Social Development Board] (“NESDB”): a special governmental agency with responsibilities to formulate and develop national strategies that alleviate poverty and income distribution, enhance competitiveness, and promote social capital development and sustainable development.
|NSPD=Water Quantity; Water Quality; Ecosystems; Governance; Assets; Values and Norms
|Stakeholder Type=Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Local Government, Development/humanitarian interest, Environmental interest, Industry/Corporate Interest, Community or organized citizens
}}
|Key Questions=
|Water Feature=
|Riparian=
|Water Project=
|Agreement=
|REP Framework=The Chao Phraya River, together with the Mekong River, is the most important river in Thailand, as the entire river stretches across a significant amount of area: from the upper basin via its tributaries in the northern part of Thailand, to the middle basin where the confluence of Ping and Nan Rivers, the two major tributaries, is located, and flows southward to the delta into the Gulf of Thailand. The entire area is denoted as the Chao Phraya River Basin (See Exhibit 1).

== Context of the Chao Phraya River Basin<ref>Contents in this section rely primarily on public information at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chao_Phraya_River http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bhumibol_Dam http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sirikit_Dam http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agriculture_in_Thailand http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Thailand </ref> ==
=== Evolution of the Basin Significance ===
[[File:Exhibit1-CPRB-Map-640x480.png|framed|Exhibit 1: The Chao Phraya River and its Tributaries<ref>Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tributaries_of_the_Chao_Phraya_River</ref>]]

The Chao Phraya River, together with the Mekong River, is the most important river in Thailand, as the entire river stretches across a significant amount of area: from the upper basin via its tributaries in the northern part of Thailand, to the middle basin where the confluence of Ping and Nan Rivers, the two major tributaries, is located, and flows southward to the delta into the Gulf of Thailand. The entire area is denoted as the Chao Phraya River Basin.

The Chao Phraya River Basin is rich in [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Thailand the history of Thailand], dating back to the Sukhothai (700 years ago), Ayutthaya (500 years ago) and Thonburi (250 years ago) Kingdoms. Cultural, social and political developments of Thailand over the years have transformed the basin, and the basin inherited significant endowments in terms of population settlements; the basin also preserved the traditional and cultural heritage that are still present in Thailand and the Thai culture today.

Nowadays, the basin is home to approximately 40% of the country’s population, with farmers as the majority in the upcountry and urban dwellers in Bangkok and other big cities in the basin such as Chiang Mai, Ayutthaya and Nonthaburi. With significant agricultural development since the middle of last century, water irrigation and related infrastructure developments such as dams and reservoirs have been constructed to increase the scale, scope and efficiency particularly to develop all-year agricultural activities. The rationale is: with preserved water supply by the dams, additional water-intensive agriculture can be developed in the dry season, rendering a positive impact in the sense of economic, trade and labor policies.

Together with the growing demand for electricity, driven by economic advances, large dams were constructed to serve both agricultural and hydropower generative ends. In particular, the Bhumibol dam (749 MW) on the Ping River and the Sirikit dam (500 MW) on the Nan River together control over one-fifth of the basin annual runoffs combined. Control of these dams therefore plays a major role in regulating water supply in the middle basin and the delta area.

In addition, it is also intended that the dams would assume additional functions, such as management of saline incursion, especially during the dry season when there is salt water intrusion from the Gulf of Thailand to the agricultural areas in the delta and middle basin; flood mitigation by limiting runoffs from the dams during the monsoons; and preservation of natural ecosystem in the upstream reservoirs and promotion of tourism.

=== Significance of the Chao Phraya River Basin ===

The Chao Phraya River Basin is the largest river basin of the Kingdom of Thailand. Since it has no transnational boundaries, the [[#Issues_and_Stakeholders|Government of Thailand]] assumes a primary authority of the basin management. From Thailand’s perspective, the basin not only represents a substantial geographical area inhabited by approximately 40% of the country’s population, it is arguably the most important river basin at least in five terms:

* Irrigation: the basin supplies water to the country’s largest agricultural systems, which represent the principal proportion of the nation’s entire workforces, and is naturally home to traditions and cultural heritages;

* Industrial use: the basin is domiciled to a host of emerging manufacturing factories ranging from automobile to electronic and chemical sectors. The industry represents a lion’s share of Thailand’s economic output with strong growth prospect, and implies a need to increase the amount of water supply to support the industries;

* Urban water supply: the basin provides the largest proportion of water supply in Bangkok, the capital city, and the Upper Ping Basin, including Chiang Mai, the second largest city. With a projected growing population density, increase in water demands is anticipated;

* Dams: implies the management of an interdependence of hydropower generative sources and flood control via water release management, primarily at the [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bhumibol_Dam Bhumibol] and [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sirikit_Dam Sirikit] dams that control over one-fifth of the basin annual runoffs combined. Control of these dams therefore plays a major role in regulating water supply in the middle basin and the delta area;

* Environment and cultural heritages: the basin, particularly in the upstream areas, is Thailand’s primary natural habitat of wildlife in a large natural preservation region. It is also home to the roots of Thailand’s cultural development since over 700 years ago.

Traditionally, the planning and execution of water resources management in the basin and throughout the Kingdom of Thailand is the duty and responsibility of the [[#Issues_and_Stakeholders|Royal Irrigation Department]] (See Exhibit 2)<ref>See http://www.rid.go.th/ and also http://www.bangkokpost.com/business/13065_info_royal-irrigation-department.html</ref>:

{{{!}} class="wikitable"
{{!}}-
! Duty !! Description
{{!}}-
{{!}} Water provisioning {{!}}{{!}} Implementation of activities aimed at achieving, collecting, storing, controlling, distributing, draining or allocating water for agricultural, energy, household consumption or industrial purposes under irrigation laws, ditch and dike laws and other related laws
{{!}}-
{{!}} Damage prevention {{!}}{{!}} Implementation of activities related to prevention of damages from water; safety of dams and appurtenant structures; safety of navigation in commanded areas and other related activities that may not be specified in annual plan
{{!}}-
{{!}} Agricultural land management {{!}}{{!}} Implementation of land consolidation for agriculture under the Agricultural Land Consolidation Act
{{!}}-
{{!}} Miscellaneous {{!}}{{!}} Implementation of other activities designated by laws or properly assigned by the Cabinet or Ministers
{{!}}}

However, since the turn of the century, the basin confronts a critical situation to preserve the sustainability of the basin, in terms of: matching the growing aggregate demand from the agricultural, industrial and urban uses with the limited supply; and managing the increasing predictability of seasonal precipitation, impacting particularly rain distribution and variation, in every single year and between consecutive years. This situation threatens not only the region, but also the entire country, because of the basin’s contribution relative to the nationwide level in terms of economic output from the agricultural and industrial to the service sectors; sources of employment, and implication of cultural heritages and communities; and urban area growth.

== Challenges: Seasonality versus Emerging Extreme Conditions ==
=== Seasonality Challenges: Drought and Flooding Risks ===
[[File:Exhibit2-RID-strategy-map-640x480.png|framed|right|Exhibit 2: Strategy Map of Thailand’s Royal Irrigation Department<ref>Source: http://www.rid.go.th/</ref>]]

The Chao Phraya Basin has experienced a higher frequency of extreme conditions (droughts and floods) within the last few decades. Presumable causes are deforestation, decreasing precipitation from climate change and increasing water abstraction especially in the upper basin<ref>Francois Molle, et al, “Dry-season water allocation in the Chao Phraya basin: What is at stake and how to gain in efficiency and equity”, Proceedings of the International Conference The Chao Phraya Delta, 2000.</ref>. Such occurrences cause a heightened stress in the basin, despite major engineering constructions that are designed primarily to mitigate droughts, e.g.:

* Storage of excessive rainfalls in the monsoon season by dams and reservoirs, such that there would be additional water supply for irrigation in the successive dry season. Water storage therefore enables agricultural activities for the entire year regardless of the dry-season severity;

* Improving scale, scope and efficiency of the canal and irrigation systems that stepwise increase the water service coverage, therefore decreasing the agricultural lands that solely depend on water supply from natural rainfalls. This effort increases the scale, scope and efficiency of the agricultural activities, provided that adequate water is available during the dry season by the dams and reservoirs located upstream.

On the other hand, the basin is vulnerable to great flooding risks, especially in the middle basin and the delta areas including Bangkok. With this concern, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bhumibol_Adulyadej His Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej] initiates and patronizes Bangkok’s integrated flood management system<ref>Siripong Hungspreug, et al, “Flood management in Chao Phraya River Basin”, Proceedings of the International Conference: The Chao Phraya Delta, 2000.</ref> by heightening flood barriers in the Bangkok Metropolitan Area (responsible by [[#Issues_and_Stakeholders|BMA]]), improving river and drainage systems (by [[#Issues_and_Stakeholders|RID and PWD]], respectively), building multipurpose dams (also by [[#Issues_and_Stakeholders|RID]]), and constructing '''temporary water storing areas'''<ref>See Water Detention Project or "Kaem Ling" (Monkey Cheeks in Thai) at http://www.chaipat.or.th/chaipat_old/n_stage/activities_e/ling_e/ling2_e.html</ref> on the western and eastern coast of Chao Phraya estuary (by [[#Issues_and_Stakeholders|BMA and RID]]).

=== Emerging Extremity from 2011 ===

Every year, one of the most important strategic decisions<ref>See Section 4.5 on page 20 from Francois Molle, et al, “Dry-season water allocation in the Chao Phraya basin: What is at stake and how to gain in efficiency and equity”, Proceedings of the International Conference The Chao Phraya Delta, 2000.</ref> focuses on the total amount of water that should be released by the dams during the 6-month dry season<ref>Thailand’s dry season runs from January to June, with the monsoon rainy season from July/August to November/December.</ref>. In general terms, the decisions are based on four criteria:

# Demand mainly from the agricultural planning, or the target volume;
# Rainfall forecast in the upstream and downstream areas of the basin;
# Carry-over water in the dam from the preceding monsoon season; and
# Regulated water level during the dry season.

In theory, the logic is to match the supplies in (2) and (3) with demands as specified in (1), by making sure the regulated levels of the dams do not deplete or overflow, specifically: The former concern of depletion raises the concern to ensure the dams will maintain adequate water supply, especially in an extremely dry year, until the end of the dry season, without breaching the minimum dam-level; whereas the latter concern of overflow prevention ensures that the dam will possess an adequate capacity to restore rainfall in the subsequent monsoon season, especially in an extremely rainy year, without breaching the maximum dam-levels.

However, this logic tends to be intractably complicated and as a result becomes a subject of mismanagement dispute from inadequate water supply (among [[#Issues_and_Stakeholders|RID, EGAT and PWA]]) or flooding (among [[#Issues_and_Stakeholders|RID, EGAT, PMA as well as BMA and MWA]]) that strongly affects the Bangkok Metropolitan Area. At the policy and political level, the Government of Thailand has become the focal point of dispute in the media, since it maintains an overall executive responsibility of the basin management.

In fact, potential causes of such practical challenges are varied and are not necessarily attributable to mismanagement of any one single party. The following are outstanding reasons of the management complexity on the basis of limited predictability with precision of:

* Water abstraction along the rivers and in the vast amount land in the basin further exacerbates the control mechanism;
* Rainfall forecasts, in the dry season and in the subsequent monsoon season. For example, a monsoon with high precipitation would require more water release from the dams and reservoirs in the preceding dry season, such that there would be adequate capacity to store excess rainfalls to effectively prevent flooding in the downstream.

[[File:Exhibit3-BfAf-Flooding-640x480.jpg|framed|right|Exhibit 3: Satellite photographs showing flooding in Ayutthaya and Pathum Thani Provinces in July 2011 (left, before the flooding) and October 2011 (right, after the flooding)<ref>Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Thailand_floods </ref>]]

The severe flooding in 2011<ref>Primarily from July 2011 to January 2012. See also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Thailand_floods</ref> portrays an illustrative example. The incident started with an early monsoon season, where extreme rainfalls from March over the northern basin area reached 344% above mean<ref>Bangkok Pundit, "The Thai floods, rain, and water going into the dams – Part 2", Asian Correspondent, November 2011: Source: Thai Meteorological Department Monthly Current Report Rainfall and Accumulative Rainfall March 2011.</ref> and caused significant runoffs from the upper basin to Bangkok. By the beginning of October, most major dams in the basin were already near or at the maximum capacity. As reported in the Nation daily newspaper from October 2, 2011<ref>"Major dams over capacity" The Nation, October 2011.</ref>:''Nine major dams are over 90 per cent "full", including Sirikit Dam in Uttaradit (99 per cent) and Bhumibol Dam in Tak (93 per cent).''

As a result, engineers of the major dams were left with no choice but forced to increase the rates of discharges. From this moment, flooding in the basin was inevitable. Exhibit 3 shows a comparison of an example satellite photos before and after the flooding.

The incident affected 13.6 million people and 65 provinces and, as a result, damages amounted to 1.4 trillion Baht in total<ref>World Bank “The World Bank Supports Thailand's Post-Floods Recovery Effort” December 2011: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2011/12/13/world-bank-supports-thailands-post-floods-recovery-effort</ref>. This extreme situation questions the long-standing challenges of the basin, particularly in terms of integrated management and natural limitation of the basin to handle emergency situation, as well as overlapping interests among institutions and the politics thereof. From an analysis of the timeline in this incident, one could infer the causes of the dispute from the following three examples:

* First, the potentially excessive use of groundwater may have undermined absorption and drainage capacity in case of flooding. The situation is exacerbated and complicated by inefficient canal and drainage systems in and around the cities. As cited by Bangkok Post on September 9, 2011<ref>“Froc admits it really doesn't know" Bangkok Post, September 2011.</ref>:''Responding to growing public anxiety, the [[#Issues_and_Stakeholders|FROC]] director said it was very difficult to evaluate the flood situation because the water was moving underground through the city's sewers''.

* Second, predictability of floods and joint fact-finding during the emergency hours were critical in the decision-making process but impossible to implement. As cited by Bangkok Post on November 11, 2011<ref>“Capital could be dry in 11 days”, Bangkok Post, November 2011. Also at Wikipedia entry: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Thailand_floods#Timeline_of_protecting_downtown_Bangkok</ref>:''The Thai (Royal) Irrigation Department reported Bangkok flood waters could be drained in 11 days. Spokesman dismissed reports (that) the city could be hit by more waters from the North. Floodwater was described as being 1 km (0.62 mi) from Rama 2 Road and the situation "hard to predict”.''

* Third, lack of a coherent implementation plan in the emergency phase led to resistance from people in the affected areas, in this case, those who dwelled outside the flood protection or “sandbag walls”. As cited by Bangkok Post on November 28, 2011 (7 days after the predicted “end of flood waters” from the previous paragraph)<ref>“Residents poised to revolt" Bangkok Post. November 2011.</ref>:''Residents in areas that remained flooded were growing more impatient. Sandbag walls were being sabotaged and sluice gate levels changed. Residents in some areas were said to be "poised to revolt”.''

== Aftermath: Proposal of a Master Plan on Sustainable Water Resource Management ==

In the aftermath of this severe flood in 2011, the Government of Thailand established the Strategic Committee for Water Resource Management and, as a response to the crisis, proposed Master Plan on Sustainable Water Resource Management<ref>“Master Plan on Water Resources Management”, Office of National Economic and Social Development Board, Thailand, January 2012.</ref>, under the management of the [[#Issues_and_Stakeholders|National Economic and Social Development Board]], a long-term strategic planning authority of the administration.

The overarching rationale of the Master Plan is to embrace the country’s development initiative under the guiding principle of His Majesty the King’s philosophy of '''Sufficiency Economy'''<ref>“Philosophy of Sufficiency Economy”, the Chaipattana Foundation, accessible at: http://www.chaipat.or.th/chaipat_english/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4103&Itemid=293</ref>, while incorporating short-term action plans to (a) improve the capacity of flood prevention, emergency flood management and warning systems; (b) prevent and minimize losses and damages from the large-scale floods; and (c) build confidence and engage farmers and communities.

The action plans comprises 8 work streams involving over 20 different state organizations with a total budget of 300 billion Baht (i.e. approximately 2.6% of the national GDP in 2012). The lion’s share of the budget shall be allocated to:

* Restoration and efficiency improvement of physical constructions (e.g. water channels, dams and drainage, including land use zoning;
* Selection of water retention areas and recovery measures (in the same sense as mentioned as “temporary water-storing areas” in Sections [[#Seasonality_Challenges:_Drought_and_Flooding_Risks|Seasonality Challenges: Drought and Flooding Risks]] and [[#Discussion:_Ongoing_Challenges_After_the_Major_Flooding_in_2011|Discussion: Ongoing Challenges After the Major Flooding in 2011]]);
* Restoration and conservation of forest and ecosystem particularly in the upper basin by focusing on reforestation and rehabilitation of the forest areas in the Chao Phraya River’s tributaries; and
* Establishment of an information warehouse, forecasting systems and disaster warning system.

As of 2013, it is still unclear how the government would finance this project; whether, when and to which extent this Master Plan will be implemented; and if the intended outcome could possibly be created at the targeted scale and scope, and sustained over the long haul.
|Summary=The [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chao_praya Chao Phraya River Basin] (“the basin”) is the largest river basin of [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thailand the Kingdom of Thailand] and plays a significant role in terms of agricultural, industrial and economic development. In recent years, there has been a series of extreme drought and flooding that increasingly challenge the management of the entire basin. For example, the major flood in 2011 has set a new precedent in terms of scale and scope of the issues at hand. As a consequence, one should wonder if and how the current assumptions and implications underlying the current practice should be reassessed. Considering the Water Diplomacy Framework, the management of the basin could be assessed and improved in a number of following ways.

* Recognize growing uncertainty of the water resources in the basin, particularly under the ongoing climate-change circumstance. This concern applies not only to the precipitation and runoff prediction, but also to the definition of zones of complexity of shared interests, particularly in the middle basin and the delta;
* Participate in the joint fact-finding process, engage in a value-creation process and commit to the consequent agreements; and
* Continually learn and adapt to emerging incidents and situations, and set priorities toward cumulative benefit not only for one specific party or group of interest, but rather for the entire basin.

As a consequence, the policy and politics of the Chao Phraya River Basin management should operate on a nonpartisan, impartial and fact-based platform. The management should also consider the dynamics and limited predictability of the resources, diverse interests of people and the communities, and the interdependence of economic, societal, policy and political dimensions of the commitments and consequences from prior and current decisions.

=== Structure of the first publication<ref>Published on May 11, 2014. The author would like to acknowledge valuable comments from Joyce Cheung and Itamar Shahar, also to Professor Lawrence Susskind and the entire Water Diplomacy class discussion on May 1, 2014. See further details about MIT Water Diplomacy at http://dusp.mit.edu/epp/project/water-diplomacy and Class 11.382 WATER DIPLOMACY: THE SCIENCE, POLICY AND POLITICS OF MANAGING SHARED RESOURCES at http://dusp.mit.edu/subject/spring-2014-11382-0 </ref> ===

The discussion comprises nine sections. The case first discusses the [[#Significance_of_the_Chao_Phraya_River_Basin|importance of the basin and implication]]s in natural/environmental, policy and political terms. A brief description of the [[#Evolution_of_the_Basin_Significance|basin history]] and [[#Issues_and_Stakeholders|stakeholders]] renders a discussion basis of the integrated management and challenges in two senses: a conventional view encompassing [[#Seasonality_Challenges:_Drought_and_Flooding_Risks|seasonal challenges such as drought and flood control]] and an emerging view with [[#Emerging_Extremity_from_2011|extreme conditions since 2011]]. Focusing on the latter circumstance, the depth of the discussion is extended to [[#Discussion:_Ongoing_Challenges_After_the_Major_Flooding_in_2011|emerging challenges as a consequence of the increasing extremity likelihood]]. Resolutions in response consist of a [[#Aftermath:_Proposal_of_a_Master_Plan_on_Sustainable_Water_Resource_Management|a proposal of a Master Plan on Sustainable Water Resource Management]] and a [[#Water_Diplomacy_Development_in_the_Chao_Phraya_River_Basin|complementary analysis in the sense of the Water Diplomacy Framework]].
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|Exhibit 1: The Chao Phraya River and its Tributaries Source: http://en_wikipedia_org/wiki/Tributaries_of_the_Chao_Phraya_River
</gallery>

The Chao Phraya River Basin (see Exhibit 1) is the largest river basin of the Kingdom of Thailand_ Since it has no transnational boundaries, the Government of Thailand assumes a primary authority of the basin management_ From Thailand’s perspective, the basin not only represents a substantial geographical area inhabited by approximately 40% of the country’s population, it is arguably the most important river basin at least in five terms:

* Irrigation: the basin supplies water to the country’s largest agricultural systems, which represent the principal proportion of the nation’s entire workforces, and is naturally home to traditions and cultural heritages;
* Industrial use: the basin is domiciled to a host of emerging manufacturing factories ranging from automobile to electronic and chemical sectors_ The industry represents a lion’s share of Thailand’s economic output with strong growth prospect, and implies a need to increase the amount of water supply to support the industries;
* Urban water supply: the basin provides the largest proportion of water supply in Bangkok, the capital city (see Exhibit 2), and the Upper Ping Basin, including Chiang Mai, the second largest city_ With a projected growing population density, increase in water demands is anticipated;
* Dams: implies the management of an interdependence of hydropower generative sources and flood control via water release management, primarily at the Bhumibol and Sirikit dams (see Exhibits 3 and 4) that control over one-fifth of the basin annual runoffs combined_ Control of these dams therefore plays a major role in regulating water supply in the middle basin and the delta area;
* Environment and cultural heritages: the basin, particularly in the upstream areas, is Thailand’s primary natural habitat of wildlife in a large natural preservation region_ It is also home to the roots of Thailand’s cultural development since over 700 years ago_

Since the turn of the century, the basin confronts a critical situation to preserve the sustainability of the basin, in terms of:
* Matching the growing aggregate demand from the agricultural, industrial and urban uses with the limited supply; and
* Managing the increasing predictability of seasonal precipitation, impacting particularly rain distribution and variation, in every single year and between consecutive years_

This situation threatens not only the region, but also the entire country, because of the basin’s contribution relative to the nationwide level in terms of economic output from the agricultural and industrial to the service sectors; sources of employment, and implication of cultural heritage and communities; and urban area growth_== Evolution of the Basin Significance ==

The Chao Phraya River Basin is rich in the history of Thailand, dating back to the Sukhothai (700 years ago), Ayutthaya (500 years ago) and Thonburi (250 years ago) Kingdoms. Cultural, social and political developments of Thailand over the years have transformed the basin, and the basin inherited significant endowments in terms of population settlements; the basin also preserved the traditional and cultural heritage that are still present in Thailand and the Thai culture today.

Nowadays, the basin is home to approximately 40% of the country’s population, with farmers as the majority in the upcountry and urban dwellers in Bangkok and other big cities in the basin such as Chiang Mai, Ayutthaya and Nonthaburi. With significant agricultural development since the middle of last century, water irrigation and related infrastructure developments such as dams and reservoirs have been constructed to increase the scale, scope and efficiency particularly to develop all-year agricultural activities. The rationale is: with preserved water supply by the dams, additional water-intensive agriculture can be developed in the dry season, rendering a positive impact in the sense of economic, trade and labor policies.

Together with the growing demand for electricity, driven by economic advances, large dams were constructed to serve both agricultural and hydropower generative ends. In particular, the Bhumibol dam (749 MW) on the Ping River and the Sirikit dam (500 MW) on the Nan River together control over one-fifth of the basin annual runoffs combined. Control of these dams therefore plays a major role in regulating water supply in the middle basin and the delta area.

In addition, it is also intended that the dams would assume additional functions, such as management of saline incursion, especially during the dry season when there is salt water intrusion from the Gulf of Thailand to the agricultural areas in the delta and middle basin; flood mitigation by limiting runoffs from the dams during the monsoons; and preservation of natural ecosystem in the upstream reservoirs and promotion of tourism.

== Challenges: Drought and Flooding Risks ==

The Chao Phraya Basin has experienced a higher frequency of extreme conditions (droughts and floods) within the last few decades. Presumable causes are deforestation, decreasing precipitation from climate change and increasing water abstraction especially in the upper basin . Such occurrences cause a heightened stress in the basin, despite major engineering constructions that are designed primarily to mitigate droughts, e.g.:

* Storage of excessive rainfalls in the monsoon season by dams and reservoirs, such that there would be additional water supply for irrigation in the successive dry season. Water storage therefore enables agricultural activities for the entire year regardless of the dry-season severity;

* Improving scale, scope and efficiency of the canal and irrigation systems that stepwise increase the water service coverage, therefore decreasing the agricultural lands that solely depend on water supply from natural rainfalls. This effort increases the scale, scope and efficiency of the agricultural activities, provided that adequate water is available during the dry season by the dams and reservoirs located upstream.

On the other hand, the basin is vulnerable to great flooding risks, especially in the middle basin and the delta areas including Bangkok. With this concern, His Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej initiates and patronizes Bangkok’s integrated flood management system by heightening flood barriers in the Bangkok Metropolitan Area (responsible by BMA), improving river and drainage systems (by RID and PWD, respectively), building multipurpose dams (also by RID), and constructing temporary water storing areas on the western and eastern coast of Chao Phraya estuary (by BMA and RID).

== Emerging Extremity Since 2011 ==

Every year, one of the most important strategic decisions focuses on the total amount of water that should be released by the dams during the 6-month dry season . In general terms, the decisions are based on four criteria:

# Demand mainly from the agricultural planning, or the target volume;
# Rainfall forecast in the upstream and downstream areas of the basin;
# Carry-over water in the dam from the preceding monsoon season; and
# Regulated water level during the dry season.

In theory, the logic is to match the supplies in (2) and (3) with demands in (1), by making sure the regulated levels of the dams do not deplete or overflow, specifically:

* The former concern of depletion raises the concern to ensure the dams will maintain adequate water supply, especially in an extremely dry year, until the end of the dry season, without breaching the minimum dam-level; whereas
* The latter concern of overflow prevention ensures that the dam will possess an adequate capacity to restore rainfall in the subsequent monsoon season, especially in an extremely rainy year, without breaching the maximum dam-levels.

However, this logic tends to be intractably complicated and as a result becomes a subject of mismanagement dispute from inadequate water supply (among RID, EGAT, PWA) or flooding (among RID, EGAT, PMA as well as BMA and MWA) that strongly affects the Bangkok Metropolitan Area. At the policy and political level, the Government of Thailand has become the focal point of dispute in the media, since it maintains an overall executive responsibility of the basin management.

In fact, potential causes of such practical challenges are varied and are not necessarily attributable to mismanagement of any one single party. The following are outstanding reasons of the management complexity on the basis of limited predictability with precision of:

* Water abstraction along the rivers and in the vast amount land in the basin further exacerbates the control mechanism;
* Rainfall forecasts, in the dry season and in the subsequent monsoon season. For example, a monsoon with high precipitation would require more water release from the dams and reservoirs in the preceding dry season, such that there would be adequate capacity to store excess rainfalls to effectively prevent flooding in the downstream.

The severe flooding in 2011 portrays an illustrative example. The incident started with an early monsoon season, where extreme rainfalls from March over the northern basin area reached 344% above mean and caused significant runoffs from the upper basin to Bangkok. By the beginning of October, most major dams in the basin were already near or at the maximum capacity. As reported in the Nation daily newspaper from October 2, 2011 :''Nine major dams are over 90 per cent "full", including Sirikit Dam in Uttaradit (99 per cent) and Bhumibol Dam in Tak (93 per cent).''

As a result, engineers of the major dams were left with no choice but forced to increase the rates of discharges. From this moment, flooding in the basin was inevitable. Exhibit 6 shows the rainfall statistics in the basin, by comparing year 2011 to an average annual precipitation. Exhibit 7 shows a comparison of an example satellite photos before and after the flooding.

The incident affected 13.6 million people and 65 provinces and, as a result, damages amounted to 1.4 trillion Baht in total. This extreme situation questions the long-standing challenges of the basin, particularly in terms of integrated management and natural limitation of the basin to handle emergency situation, as well as overlapping interests among institutions and the politics thereof. From an analysis of the timeline in this incident, one could infer the causes of the dispute from the following three examples:

* First, the potentially excessive use of groundwater may have undermined absorption and drainage capacity in case of flooding. The situation is exacerbated and complicated by inefficient canal and drainage systems in and around the cities. As cited by Bangkok Post on September 9, 2011 : ''Responding to growing public anxiety, the FROC director said it was very difficult to evaluate the flood situation because the water was moving underground through the city's sewers.''

* Second, predictability of floods and joint fact-finding during the emergency hours were critical in the decision-making process but impossible to implement. As cited by Bangkok Post on November 11, 2011 : ''The Thai (Royal) Irrigation Department reported Bangkok flood waters could be drained in 11 days. Spokesman dismissed reports (that) the city could be hit by more waters from the North. Floodwater was described as being 1 km (0.62 mi) from Rama 2 Road and the situation "hard to predict”.''

* Third, lack of a coherent implementation plan in the emergency phase led to resistance from people in the affected areas, in this case, those who dwelled outside the flood protection or “sandbag walls”. As cited by Bangkok Post on November 28, 2011 (7 days after the predicted “end of flood waters” from the previous paragraph) : ''Residents in areas that remained flooded were growing more impatient. Sandbag walls were being sabotaged and sluice gate levels changed. Residents in some areas were said to be "poised to revolt”.''

== Aftermath: Proposal of a Master Plan ==

In the aftermath of this severe flood in 2011, the Government of Thailand established the Strategic Committee for Water Resource Management and, as a response to the crisis, proposed Master Plan on Sustainable Water Resource Management , under the management of the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), a long-term strategic planning authority of the administration.

The overarching rationale of the Master Plan is to embrace the country’s development initiative under the guiding principle of His Majesty the King’s philosophy of “Sufficiency Economy” , while incorporating short-term action plans to (a) improve the capacity of flood prevention, emergency flood management and warning systems; (b) prevent and minimize losses and damages from the large-scale floods; and (c) build confidence and engage farmers and communities.

The action plans comprises 8 work streams involving over 20 different state organizations with a total budget of 300 billion Baht (i.e. approximately 2.6% of the national GDP in 2012). As shown in Exhibits 8a and 8b, the lion’s share of the budget shall be allocated to:

* Restoration and efficiency improvement of physical constructions (e.g. water channels, dams and drainage, including land use zoning;
* Selection of water retention areas and recovery measures (in the same sense as mentioned as “temporary water-storing areas” in §5 and §7);
* Restoration and conservation of forest and ecosystem particularly in the upper basin by focusing on reforestation and rehabilitation of the forest areas in the Chao Phraya River’s tributaries; and
* Establishment of an information warehouse, forecasting systems and disaster warning system.

As of 2013, it is still unclear how the government would finance this project; whether, when and to which extent this Master Plan will be implemented; and if the intended outcome could possibly be created at the targeted scale and scope, and sustained over the long haul.
}}

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File:Exhibit3-BfAf-Flooding-640x480.jpg

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TSP: Exhibit 3: Satellite photographs showing flooding in Ayutthaya and Pathum Thani Provinces in July 2011 (left, before the flooding) and October 2011 (right, after the flooding) Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Thailand_floods

Exhibit 3: Satellite photographs showing flooding in Ayutthaya and Pathum Thani Provinces in July 2011 (left, before the flooding) and October 2011 (right, after the flooding)
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Thailand_floods

File:Exhibit2-RID-strategy-map-640x480.png

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TSP: Exhibit 5b: Strategy Map of Thailand’s Royal Irrigation Department Source: http://www.rid.go.th/

Exhibit 5b: Strategy Map of Thailand’s Royal Irrigation Department
Source: http://www.rid.go.th/

File:Exhibit1-CPRB-Map-640x480.png

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TSP: Exhibit 1: The Chao Phraya River and its Tributaries Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tributaries_of_the_Chao_Phraya_River

Exhibit 1: The Chao Phraya River and its Tributaries
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tributaries_of_the_Chao_Phraya_River

ASI:Water Diplomacy Development in the Chao Phraya River Basin

2014-05-11T20:57:52Z

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{{ASI
|First Contributor=Siripong (Pong) Treetasanatavorn
|First Contributor Link=tsp@sloan.mit.edu
|Reflection Text=Applying the Water Diplomacy Framework to this specific case, the author proposes the following discussion as an effort to improve the current practices. In a nutshell, one should revisit basic assumptions and consider if the implied logics could lead to new logical interpretations.

==== What is the most important management practice to build a collaborative adaptive environment to manage tensions and conflicts between stakeholders? ====

The Chao Phraya River Basin is an extensive network of natural and human-made constructions that are both open and continuously changing, and subject to a large set of both manageable and unmanageable time-variant unknowns. Taking this aspect into consideration, managers should be mindful that no single decision should be made as absolute, irrevocable and unchallengeable. Rather, every party should be aware of uncertainties and unpredictability of the circumstances, such that every decision should be made based on the best collective knowledge that must be reassessed and potentially corrected regularly particularly once new relevant information is available. In political terms, this is a prerequisite to manage tensions and conflicts among stakeholders in a collaborative, adaptive and inclusive manner.

For example, the decision on the annual amount of water release from major dams should rather be made on a continual basis with close monitoring of the basin dynamics that may, as a result, lead to continual fine-tuning or corrections of the prior decisions. At the same time, the managers should remain nonpartisan and impartial in the information collection and interpretation, such that the decision to be made should be based on facts, rather than biases and prejudices.

==== Should the Water Diplomacy Framework be incorporated to the Master Plan? And if so, how could this initiative be implemented? ====

I believe that with public participation in the discussion over the priority and implementation practicality considering natural, societal and economic concerns, the Master Plan could be extended to address at least some aspects of the Water Diplomacy Framework.

First and foremost, it is vital to recognize that water is a dynamic resource that may not necessarily have to be perceived as a contentious medium for a zero-sum negotiation. One possible way forward may rely on the improvement of water resource efficiency and equity. This effort could be maximized in an orchestrated collaborative and complementary manner. Such could be applied in both contexts of drought and flood management as well as long-term environmental protection of the entire basin across natural, societal, economic and political realms as one integrative logical unit.

Second, the management process should not only be formed, organized and driven by considering the dynamic of the water resources, but also focused on the learning of the management organization and particularly stakeholders, constituents and affected citizens. It is only through cooperation, adaptation, and continuous learning from the ground that would likely produce a robust and sustainable system. The latter is non-negligible also in the sense of natural sources and biodiversity protection particularly in the upstream basin. Key is to strike a delicate balance between:

* Preserving and enhancing primary natural resources such as reforestation toward the long-term water security end; and
* Managing the short-term practicality from resource scarcity or abundance (drought and flooding) affecting the integrity and self-sufficiency of agricultural, industrial and urban management.

Third, the management of a complex network of resources of the Chao Phraya River Basin should be driven by a coherent and inclusive policy and political practice that directs the implementation of the concerted efforts, conducive to a long-term desirable result for people of the nation. This end result should be an ultimate objective of the entire engagement.

==== How can the administration gain political credibility when there is so much mistrust by the general public? ====

The management of the basin should focus on the consensus building and value creation among stakeholders, decision-making parties and affected citizens. The entire engagement should focus on the long-term objectives with citizens living in the basin as well as in the country. Only with this direction setting, the administration shall be able to:

* Bring together stakeholders (despite with different interests), set up an atmosphere for each party to share concerns and constraints openly and seek to establish a common understanding of the situation;
* Direct group energy in an orchestrated effort to solving large-scale, complex problems consisting of short- and long-term challenges; and
* Forge an agreement and implementation roadmap that interconnects decisions across natural, societal and political domains, thereby increasing the likelihood of a successful long-term cooperation.

Over time, the administration would then be able to gradually gain credibility and trust as a result of such transparent, thorough and inclusive efforts, with the citizens coming together solving the problems: on the basis of shared common understanding, toward a vision that builds a better future together for themselves, and with the administration only in an orchestrating role.

=== Acknowledgment ===

The author would like to acknowledge valuable comments from Joyce Cheung and Itamar Shahar, also to Professor Lawrence Susskind and the entire Water Diplomacy class discussion on May 1, 2014. See further details about MIT Water Diplomacy at http://dusp.mit.edu/epp/project/water-diplomacy and Class 11.382 WATER DIPLOMACY: THE SCIENCE, POLICY AND POLITICS OF MANAGING SHARED RESOURCES at http://dusp.mit.edu/subject/spring-2014-11382-0
|Reflection Text Summary=Diplomacy Development Cornerstones:
* Define long-term engagement objectives: people
* Recognise the challenges: management of uncertainties
* Focus on consensus building & adaptive learning
* Strike a balance between preserving natural resources and managing the short-term practicality
|Perspective=Observer
|ASI Type=Analysis
|Case Study=Integrated Management and Diplomacy Development of the Chao Phraya River Basin
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|User=TSP
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ASI:Discussion: Ongoing Challenges After the Major Flooding in 2011

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{{ASI
|First Contributor=Siripong (Pong) Treetasanatavorn
|First Contributor Link=tsp@sloan.mit.edu
|Reflection Text=The increasing likelihood of extreme droughts and floods has set a new precedent to the management of the basin. With ongoing deforestation, groundwater abstraction in urban areas and global climate change, the basin will inevitably confront with further tensions from extreme scarcity in the dry seasons and water excess during the monsoons, unless long-term strategies are implemented at the provincial, regional and national levels.

In addition to this challenge, the scale and scope of the tension have since the major flood in 2011 been extended to a new dimension. This incident exposes the vulnerability and the level of disruption and aggravation that a natural disaster could affect the basin integrity in the following four areas.

=== Urban city management ===
Particularly the urban area of Bangkok under the management of BMA and MWA has been under a severe pressure to strengthen its infrastructure to protect not only the inner part of the city, but also the entire city and the peripheral zones. BMA is naturally aware of the scale of the challenge, and yet is caught in a difficult position to define and manage a certain set of priorities, particularly in terms of zone management. That is, in order to improve the integrity of the city in the short run, it is most likely required to define and implement the “temporary water-storing areas” (see [[Integrated_Management_and_Diplomacy_Development_of_the_Chao_Phraya_River_Basin#Seasonality_Challenges:_Drought_and_Flooding_Risks|Section Seasonality Challenges: Drought and Flooding Risks]]), in parallel to improving the canal efficiency, sewage and drainage systems, limiting groundwater use, and developing a participative campaign calling for collective actions with/from the urban dwellers. Nevertheless, BMA must decide where to water-storing areas should be located and how to manage the technical implementation and the related politics thereof.

=== Balance of the upstream and downstream ===
The most contentious dispute in either drought or flood incidents is focused on the management of water distribution across the upper and middle basin areas and at the delta. The dispute is often aggravated under an assumption of political manipulation, human errors, or mismanagement of the water release from the major dams in the upstream. In fact, it is often neglected that the underlying force could well be down to the extent of deforestation and climate change that increases scale, scope and frequency of the incidents. Nevertheless, such could not be perceived as an excuse, since the authority could still have plenty at its disposal in the short run, particularly by employing a more transparent, fact-based and politically nonpartisan approach in the management of the upstream and downstream areas of the basin. Active communication on this matter to a broader group of stakeholders could provide a better general understanding of the issues at hand and their complications (e.g. by including state and non-state experts, trustworthy (and probably neutral) policy advisors, as well as constituents across parties and interest groups).

=== Industrial area protection ===
The flooding disaster disrupted the operations of a number of critical industrial areas along the Chao Phraya River in the middle basin (e.g., industrial parks in Ayutthaya) and in the delta (e.g., in the Bangkok Metropolitan Area). Given a critical role that the basin is in the global supply chain networks, such as manufacturing of automobiles and semiconductors such as hard drives and electronic devices, the flooding incident, in effect, disrupted the global value chains in the second half of 2011 and also in part in 2012. This disruption led to at least three consequences:

* Direct impact to the affected industries in terms of loss of revenue, inventories, tools and machineries, as well as implied costs in terms of restoration and recovery of the physical assets;
* Higher-order impact to investor’s confidence in the capability and priority to the management of the basin: It is not clear to which extent the investment decisions were and have been impacted in the affected industries in relation to future investments in Thailand. Despite without formal assessment, one should wonder if and how [[Integrated_Management_and_Diplomacy_Development_of_the_Chao_Phraya_River_Basin#Issues_and_Stakeholders|the Government of Thailand, particularly via BOI]], could restore investors’ confidence and convince the public and the investors that Thailand shall do whatever it takes to protect interests of the investors going forward, particularly with the prospect of Thailand being a major actor in the [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_of_Southeast_Asian_Nations#From_CEPT_to_AEC ASEAN Economic Community or AEC]; and
* Opportunity costs from the fiscal budget: Had the flooding incident been prevented in the first place, the recovery costs expended by the industry, BMA and the Government of Thailand, could have been used to create other policy, economic and social values.

=== Trust in the management of the administration ===
This flooding incident brought forward a grave concern in terms of crisis management at the provincial, regional and national levels. Even though a number of factors are unpredictable and uncontrollable (e.g. the amount of rainfalls and the consequence to the basin), trust in the management capabilities of the administration may be affected, particularly of those who were directly affected (e.g. in the discussion of sources of tensions in [[Integrated_Management_and_Diplomacy_Development_of_the_Chao_Phraya_River_Basin#Emerging_Extremity_from_2011|Section Emerging Extremity from 2011]]).

More importantly, on a political level, it is the perception of trust (and mistrust) that matters the most. Trust is a critical underlying component of the legitimacy of any elected representative and administration chosen to represent the corresponding constituents in the first place.

In fact, the same logic is applicable also to those who were not affected. As a result of the crisis management, a perception of unfair treatment (despite to only parts of the community<ref>Refer to, eg, "poised to revolt” context in the last paragraph of [[Integrated_Management_and_Diplomacy_Development_of_the_Chao_Phraya_River_Basin#Emerging_Extremity_from_2011|Section Emerging Extremity from 2011]]</ref>) could indeed resonate to the entire society, even though such unanticipated, undesirable decisions could have stemmed only from inadequate legitimacy or lack of transparency in the decision-making process at the political level. Generally speaking, the more the administration could preserve the integrity of the entire community (regardless of their political interests), the better the chance it should gain and eventually become a trustworthy representative of the people of the entire community, region and nation going forward.

=== Acknowledgment ===

The author would like to acknowledge valuable comments from Joyce Cheung and Itamar Shahar, also to Professor Lawrence Susskind and the entire Water Diplomacy class discussion on May 1, 2014. See further details about MIT Water Diplomacy at http://dusp.mit.edu/epp/project/water-diplomacy and Class 11.382 WATER DIPLOMACY: THE SCIENCE, POLICY AND POLITICS OF MANAGING SHARED RESOURCES at http://dusp.mit.edu/subject/spring-2014-11382-0
|Reflection Text Summary=As a result, the basin needs to cope with additional dimensions of the challenges:

* City management to mitigate risks of extreme events, eg, severe flooding, salinity incursion
* Balance of upstream and downstream resources, considering technical, societal & political aspects
* Industrial area protection to minimise risks from direct impact and manage investor’s confidence
* Trust in the management of the administration
|Perspective=Observer
|ASI Type=Analysis
|Case Study=Integrated Management and Diplomacy Development of the Chao Phraya River Basin
|ASI Keyword=
|User=TSP
}}

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TSP: 20140511 at 15h30 Chao Phraya S Treetasanatavorn - Draft 2.3

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