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ASI:Reflection on Challenges and Lessons Learned in Negotiations over the Western Scheldt Estuary

2014-05-23T00:40:33Z

Elizabeth:

{{ASI
|First Contributor=Elizabeth Cooper
|Case Study=Multilateral Negotiations over the Scheldt River Estuary: Transforming Centuries of Deadlock into Productive Multiparty Negotiations?
|Reflection Text Summary=Though the negotiations did ultimately result in agreements between the parties, the agreements did not necessarily lead to improved relationships within or among the parties, at least in near term. The Dutch’s misgivings about the deepening plans were exacerbated when they realized that the project ended up costing them significantly more than had been estimated (Warner and van Buuren 2009)<ref>Warner, Jeroen, and Arwin van Buuren. “Multi-Stakeholder Learning and Fighting on the River Scheldt.” International Negotiation 14, no. 2 (May 1, 2009): 419–40. doi:10.1163/157180609X432888.</ref>. Additionally, internal disagreements among the stakeholders within the countries were a major issue. The local and regional actors were not cooperative with the national governments on the aspects of implementation for which they had not been able to have a say (which was the case for much of the negotiations), and their resistance created an implementation gap, as either their resources were needed to carry out the plans on which the countries had agreed (in the case of the local and regional authorities), or—in the case of environmental NGOs—their buy-in was needed in order to avoid delays brought on by legal obstruction. However, several features of the Long-Term Vision Plan for 2030 made it likely to succeed in creating a more cooperative and efficient structure for negotiations and planning going forward, as well as more durable solutions (Warner and van Buuren 2009)<ref>Warner, Jeroen, and Arwin van Buuren. “Multi-Stakeholder Learning and Fighting on the River Scheldt.” International Negotiation 14, no. 2 (May 1, 2009): 419–40. doi:10.1163/157180609X432888.</ref>. This ASI details these topics and provides some reflection on the challenges and lessons learned.
|Reflection Text=== Outcomes of Negotiations ==

=== Strained Relationships ===
Though the negotiations did ultimately result in agreements between the parties, the agreements did not necessarily lead to improved relationships within or among the parties, at least in near term. The Dutch’s misgivings about the deepening plans were exacerbated when they realized that the project ended up costing them significantly more than had been estimated (Warner and van Buuren 2009)<ref>Warner, Jeroen, and Arwin van Buuren. “Multi-Stakeholder Learning and Fighting on the River Scheldt.” International Negotiation 14, no. 2 (May 1, 2009): 419–40. doi:10.1163/157180609X432888.</ref>. Additionally, internal disagreements among the stakeholders within the countries were a major issue. Environmental stakeholders and the province of Zeeland were unhappy with the natural restoration that was mandated to occur alongside the deepening plan in the estuary (though for different reasons), as well as with the lex specialis that the Dutch enacted to allow a quick decision to be made without the expected levels of consultation. While environmental organizations called for a more rigorous response to the demands of nature conservation, including depoldering to “make space for the river,” Zeeland was vehemently opposed to any such depoldering, because it increased its vulnerability to flooding. In Belgium, the federalization process and the transfer of authority to regional governments created some bumps in the negotiations and underscored intra-national division on the development questions the negotiations covered.

=== Implementation Gap ===
"Because the resources needed for the implementation of international policies were distributed among national governments, lower level governments, and NGOs, the latter parties were able to exert influence on decision-making by national governments, and in some cases were able to make tactical linkages” (Meijerink 1999, 354)<ref>Meijerink, Sander V. Conflict and Cooperation on the Scheldt River Basin. Environment & Policy 17. Springer Netherlands, 1999. http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-015-9200-0_1.</ref>. The local and regional actors were not cooperative with the national governments on the aspects of implementation for which they had not been able to have a say (which was the case for much of the negotiations), and their resistance created an implementation gap, as either their resources were needed to carry out the plans on which the countries had agreed (in the case of the local and regional authorities), or—in the case of environmental NGOs—their buy-in was needed in order to avoid delays brought on by legal obstruction.

=== Potential for Increased Effectiveness and Harmonization under the Long-Term Vision Plan for 2030 ===

The LTV 2030 plan had several features that made it likely to succeed in creating a more cooperative and efficient structure for negotiations and planning going forward, as well as more durable solutions (Warner and van Buuren 2009)<ref>Warner, Jeroen, and Arwin van Buuren. “Multi-Stakeholder Learning and Fighting on the River Scheldt.” International Negotiation 14, no. 2 (May 1, 2009): 419–40. doi:10.1163/157180609X432888.</ref>: The organization of the plan incentivized collaborative methods, because the advice that OAP provided on the implementation of negotiated agreements was required to be unanimous. Particular attention was given to “dealing with uncertainties” and ongoing monitoring, especially vis-à-vis the adequateness of the nature compensation projects to counteract the environmental costs of the deepening development plans. Stakeholders outside of the OAP were invited to participate via an Accompanying Council, which engaged in an exploratory process to unite stakeholders in developing mutually agreeable avenues for dealing with difficult and politically charged issues. The project organization arranged informal meetings and pre-negotiation sessions around difficult issues with stakeholders.

Despite obvious improvements in the negotiating context since the establishment of the LTV 2030, the organization has not been without challenges. The increased cost of time and effort in the more structured, collaborative venue of the LTV has meant that on some occasions parties have had to be persuaded to come to the table rather than rely on riskier but more expeditious legal avenues. The usual posturing and staking out of more extreme positions was also not absent from the negotiations. Agricultural interest groups, especially in Zeeland, continued to be left out of negotiations under the LTV structure, and the durability of the outcomes agreed upon suffered as a result.

== Reflection on Challenges and Lessons Learned ==

The majority of the negotiations up until the establishment of the LTV 2030 involved significant blockages and caused considerable relationship strain among the parties. Factors contributing to these challenges included the following:

* There was a history of mistrust between the parties, and thus no mutual faith or willingness to take risks to get agreements going
* This mistrust was not ameliorated by any shared trust-building tasks (i.e., research or JFF processes) until the establishment of the LTV
* Negotiations excluded relevant stakeholders, and were then either ultimately unable to lead to agreement, or faced significant obstacles to implementation even when the parties at the table did agree.
* The regional governments in Belgium had blocking power (as evident by Wallonia’s multiple vetoes of agreements made between the Belgian and Dutch national governments), but were not consulted.
* Local and environmental stakeholders with necessary resources were completely denied participation – and later resisted implementation efforts.
* Internal conflicts within each of the countries at times stalled the negotiations (e.g., the Dutch parliament’s opposition to the further deepening agreed upon between the Dutch and Belgian ministers, Wallonia’s veto of agreements at multiple stages in the process.)
* Both environmental organizations in the Netherlands and the province of Zeeland strongly opposed the plans as the Dutch government negotiated them. The fact that the Dutch signed agreements that in multiple instances were later rejected by their own internal stakeholders suggests that they did not anticipate the level of internal resistance they in fact encountered.
* The use of linkages and packaging cut both ways in terms of contributing to the negotiations. On one hand, they were a helpful strategy to get reluctant negotiators to the table (as was the case with the Dutch.) However, packaging tends to be a successful strategy when it allows parties negotiating to exploit differences between their priorities and interests. In the case of these negotiations, the linked items in some cases simply became another zero-sum issue to haggle over (as was the case for a period of time with the high-speed rail project in the negotiations between Flanders and the Netherlands.)
* The deals that were agreed upon did not include adaptive clauses or clear means to re-open negotiations if the parties found it to be necessary. This caused the parties to expend more energy several times trying to re-open the conversation when there was no pre-defined space in which those reconsiderations could occur.

Nearly all of these challenges were addressed in one way or another through the creation of the LTV 2030, indicating learning on the organizational and systemic levels. The ultimate effectiveness of the LTV will continue to be evaluated as more negotiations are brokered within the structure it set up. An in-depth analysis of the LTV is beyond the scope of this paper.

== Remaining Questions ==

Several important questions remain that were outside the scope of the research of this case study:

* How did negotiations on Scheldt basin issues interact with negotiations in other forums on broader water policies, such as the Habitat and Birds Directives (addressed briefly in this paper), the international river policies of the UN-ECE, and the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands?
* There were multiple cases where national government negotiators did not address their own internal stakeholders’ resistance before trying to move agreements forward at the top level (i.e., environmental stakeholders and Zeeland in the Netherlands, Wallonia in Belgium). Did the top-level negotiators not anticipate this resistance? If so, what factors explain this breakdown in communication or stakeholder assessment? If they were aware of this resistance, did they underestimate the blocking power these stakeholders had?
* How did the federalization of Belgium ultimately affect negotiating outcomes in region? Was the more piecemeal process of negotiating with the regions separately beneficial to efforts to reach agreement?
* Though the somewhat lurching nature of the negotiations over many years appears rather clumsy, was the incremental approach to negotiating perhaps the best strategy available? Could it even have helped make agreements possible by building small degrees of trust between the parties?
* Will the LTV ultimately resolve the systemic negotiating problems for region?
* Will it succeed in incorporating other legitimate stakeholders that were excluded in previous iterations of the negotiations?
* What changed about the political and/or leadership context of the parties negotiating that caused them to decide to create the LTV?
|ASI Keyword=
|User=Elizabeth
}}

Multilateral Negotiations over the Scheldt River Estuary: Transforming Centuries of Deadlock into Productive Multiparty Negotiations?

2014-05-23T00:37:29Z

Elizabeth:

{{Case Study
|Water Use=Agriculture or Irrigation, Domestic/Urban Supply, Industry - non-consumptive use, Other Ecological Services
|Land Use=agricultural- cropland and pasture, industrial use, urban- high density
|Climate=temperate
|Population=12.8
|Area=22116
|Geolocation=51.418050998642, 3.658447265625
|Issues=
|Key Questions=
|Water Feature=
|Riparian=
|Water Project=
|Agreement=
|REP Framework=== Background ==

=== History ===
The Scheldt Basin has been characterized by centuries of conflict and contention, especially over the use of its waterways and sea access. The estuary itself and the ports to which it provided sea access were both a hub of activity during the Roman, Spanish, and French empires, and access through the estuary was often contested and sometimes restricted as a tactical blow in transboundary conflicts in the area. The latter half of the 20th century saw the decline of what had been largely “hostile, securitized relations” (Warner and van Buuren 2009)<ref>Warner, Jeroen, and Arwin van Buuren. “Multi-Stakeholder Learning and Fighting on the River Scheldt.” International Negotiation 14, no. 2 (May 1, 2009): 419–40. doi:10.1163/157180609X432888.</ref> and began a period of more productive, if still conflictual, relations among the neighboring parties.

=== Geography ===
The total surface Scheldt River Basin is 22,116 km²; the surface of the Scheldt River Basin District (which includes other minor river basins) is 36,416 km² (International Scheldt Commission)<ref>International Scheldt Commission. “The Scheldt at a Glance.” ISC- CIE. Accessed May 5, 2014. http://www.isc-cie.org/the-scheldt-at-a-glance.</ref>. The Scheldt River rises in the Saint-Quentin plateau of France and travels through the Belgian regions of Wallonia, Brussels Capital, and Flanders, and empties into the North Sea in the Netherlands through the Western Scheldt Estuary (other branches of the river have been dammed.) It is 350 km long, including a large 160 km-long estuary, which at its mouth in the Netherlands is 5 km wide. This estuary provides the only sea access for Port of Antwerp, which is one of Europe’s largest ports. Many human-made channels, built to improve navigation in the Scheldt and to connect it to neighboring bodies of water, crisscross the basin. The estuary has been deepened several times over the years to accommodate larger ships transit to and from the Antwerp Port.

=== Ecology ===
The Western Scheldt’s wide and long estuary gives rise to some uncommon ecological characteristics. It has a gradual transition from fresh to saltwater, contains a large freshwater tidal area, and a 35-km2 brackish tidal area—the largest in all of Europe (Commission Internationale de l’Escaut International Scheldencommissie and Scaldit<ref>Commission Internationale de l’Escaut International Scheldencommissie, and Scaldit. “Scheldt International River Basin District Roof Report - European Water Framework Directive 2000/60,” February 2005. http://www.isc-cie.com/members/docs/documents/13625.pdf.</ref>). Its ecology provides a home for unique flora and fauna, and is a wintering area for large populations of migratory birds (Warner and van Buuren 2009)<ref>Warner, Jeroen, and Arwin van Buuren. “Multi-Stakeholder Learning and Fighting on the River Scheldt.” International Negotiation 14, no. 2 (May 1, 2009): 419–40. doi:10.1163/157180609X432888.</ref>. The Scheldt’s annual discharge is approximately 10 million m3, but because of the effects of the tide, about 1 billion m3 enters and exits the estuary daily (International Scheldt Commission)<ref>International Scheldt Commission. “The Scheldt at a Glance.” ISC- CIE. Accessed May 5, 2014. http://www.isc-cie.org/the-scheldt-at-a-glance.</ref>.

13% of the Scheldt district area is highly urbanized and built-up. 61% of the total area is devoted to agriculture (Commission Internationale de l’Escaut International Scheldencommissie and Scaldit)<ref>Commission Internationale de l’Escaut International Scheldencommissie, and Scaldit. “Scheldt International River Basin District Roof Report - European Water Framework Directive 2000/60,” February 2005. http://www.isc-cie.com/members/docs/documents/13625.pdf.</ref>.

=== Economic and Political Factors ===
The area of the Scheldt basin is densely populated, containing 12.8 million inhabitants. At 353 inhabitants/km2, it is about three times as densely populated as the European average. Over 40% of that total population is in the Flemish region, 35% in France, less than 10% each in the Brussels Capital Region and Wallonia, and finally, 4% in the Netherlands (ibid)<ref>Commission Internationale de l’Escaut International Scheldencommissie, and Scaldit. “Scheldt International River Basin District Roof Report - European Water Framework Directive 2000/60,” February 2005. http://www.isc-cie.com/members/docs/documents/13625.pdf.</ref>.

The basin is highly industrialized. The most common industries are food and metallurgy, but the chemical and textile sectors are also major players. As noted above, the majority of the land use in the basin is devoted to agriculture—mostly livestock farming in the north, and crop farming in the south. Additionally, industry includes significant tourism activities all along the basin, but especially in the more built-up Flemish region.

=== Governance Context ===
During the course of the most intensive negotiations between Belgium and the Netherlands (which will be outlined in detail below), the Belgian government was undergoing a significant federalization reform, which transferred incrementally more autonomy and governing powers to the regions of Belgium (Portal Belgian Government, n.d.)<ref>Portal Belgian Government. “Historical Outline of the Federalisation of Belgium.” Port Belgium.be. Accessed May 10, 2014. http://www.belgium.be/en/about_belgium/country/history/belgium_from_1830/formation_federal_state/.</ref>. The most significant milestone of these reforms occurred in 1992-1993, at which point certain treaty-making authorities were transferred directly to the governments of the regions of Belgium, which allowed them to broker deals directly with other states—in this case, the Netherlands (Meijerink 1999)<ref>Meijerink, Sander V. Conflict and Cooperation on the Scheldt River Basin. Environment & Policy 17. Springer Netherlands, 1999. http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-015-9200-0_1</ref>.

There was also tension between the national and provincial levels of government in the Netherlands: The province of Zeeland, whose territory is divided by and contains most of the two branches of the Scheldt Estuary, had in 1953 experienced a sea flood which killed approximately 2000 people in the province. After that point, a network of dykes and dams were constructed to protect Zeeland against even extreme flooding, and the concept of breaching those protections intentionally was regarded as culturally unacceptable in the region. Zeeland was therefore quite wary of returning agricultural land to the sea/estuary through flooding to “make space for the river”, an element of Dutch flood management that was incorporated into the deepening negotiations.

== Issues and Stakeholders ==

===== Major stakeholders in the Western Scheldt Estuary negotiations: =====

* The Netherlands
* Zeeland (province of the Netherlands)
* Belgium
* Flanders (region of Belgium)
* Brussels Capital (region of Belgium)
* Walloon (region of Belgium)
* France
* Environmental NGOs and groups
* Agricultural industry and farmers

===== Main stakeholders' primary interests in negotiations in the Estuary: =====

{{{!}} class="wikitable"
{{!}}-
! Interests: !! Parties:
{{!}}-
{{!}} Increased access for transit of cargo ships to and from Port of Antwerp (including deepening of Western Scheldt channels, improving navigability of Western Scheldt by reducing tight bends, and construction of additional channels to access sea via Scheldt) {{!}}{{!}} Belgium, especially region of Flanders
{{!}}-
{{!}} Improvement and management of water quality in Scheldt River, including reduction of sediment pollution and water contamination {{!}}{{!}} Netherlands, Environmental NGOs, (European Commission)
{{!}}-
{{!}} Estuarine rehabilitation; nature restoration (including maintaining environment to European Commission standards) {{!}}{{!}} Netherlands, Environmental NGOs, (European Commission)
{{!}}-
{{!}} Regional autonomy and avoidance of infrastructural burdens {{!}}{{!}} Belgian regions, especially Wallonia
{{!}}-
{{!}} Water quality and guaranteed flows from the Meuse River (major drinking water source for the Netherlands) (added as part of a negotiating package) {{!}}{{!}} Netherlands
{{!}}-
{{!}} Preservation of land in Zeeland from being intentionally flooded and submerged into estuary {{!}}{{!}} Zeeland, agriculture industry, farmers in Zeeland
{{!}}-
{{!}} Construction of a high-speed rail project between Antwerp and Amsterdam (added as part of a negotiating package) {{!}}{{!}} Netherlands
{{!}}}

== Timeline of Conflict and Phases of Negotiation ==

Between 1967 and 1997 alone, 14 rounds of contentious negotiation took place, primarily on two broad issues of international significance: 1) sea access for the Antwerp port, and 2) water, particularly its quantity and quality, as well as sediment pollution issues. The following timeline outlines key events in the negotiations during this period and in the negotiating developments in the years immediately afterward.

{{{!}} class="wikitable"
{{!}}-
! Year !! Events
{{!}}-
{{!}} 1967 {{!}}{{!}} Belgium proposes the initiation of negotiations with Netherlands over several development projects to improve transit access for Antwerp Port:
* Construction of Baalhoek and Bath canals (on Dutch territory) to improve access from Antwerp harbors to the Western Scheldt

The Dutch are disincentivized to cooperate due to the risk of decreased competitiveness of their Rotterdam Port resulting from improved sea access for Antwerp Port. The Dutch link Belgium’s request to their own request of improved quantity and quality of flow from Meuse River, and improvement of water quality in the Scheldt. The two parties negotiate on these terms.

{{!}}-
{{!}} 1970-1975 {{!}}{{!}} Major dredging takes place in the estuary.
{{!}}-
{{!}} 1975 {{!}}{{!}} The Belgian-Dutch Water Convention is drafted and includes agreements on all five issues under negotiation (including construction of canals, and increases in water quantity and quality from Meuse and Scheldt Rivers.)

At eleventh hour, Wallonia blocks the draft Water Convention agreement (the Belgian federalization is at that time in process, thus transferring more power to regions), due to an unfavorable cost-benefit calculus:
* Walloon would garner little benefit from agreement, as the increased access to Antwerp Port is more of a benefit to Brussels Capital and especially Flanders.
* As an upstream party, Walloon would bear heavy responsibility for remediation of both rivers. It would also be responsible for holding and developing water storage reservoirs and infrastructure to guarantee minimum flows to the Netherlands from the Meuse River.
* Walloon is concerned over loss of autonomy on Meuse River issues, and asks to bring France into negotiations.

Beginning of 10-year deadlock on negotiations

{{!}}-
{{!}} 1985 {{!}}{{!}} Belgium and the Netherlands attempt to restart negotiations:
* Belgium introduces the issue of deepening the Western Scheldt according to the “48’/43’/38’ deepening programme” to further improve access for large cargo ships traveling to and from Antwerp port
* Walloon raises the same objections it had previously about the distribution of burdens and benefits, and Belgium and the Netherlands agree to modify the draft convention
{{!}}-
{{!}} 1987 {{!}}{{!}} Walloon opposes the composition of the newly reinstated negotiation commission, citing a lack of direct representation of the regional governments of Belgium.
* Belgium allows representatives of regions to join the commission, and replaces the head of the commission.
* Negotiations stall over disagreements on the extent of water quality policies that the parties will adopt under the agreements.
{{!}}-
{{!}} 1992 {{!}}{{!}} Driven by two developments in the governance structures of the basin, the Dutch reopen the negotiations:
* During this time, the parties sign the UN-ECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, which requires cooperation among all basin states in international river negotiations. As a result, France is brought into negotiations.
* The latest phase of federalization in Belgium is completed, and one outcome is that Belgian regions are now given authority to negotiate and enter into treaties directly.
{{!}}-
{{!}} 1993 {{!}}{{!}} As a result of these two developments, bilateral and multilateral negotiations are initiated simultaneously:
* Multilateral negotiations over water quality issues for both Scheldt and Meuse Rivers between France, Netherlands, Wallonia, Brussels Capital, and Flanders
* Bilateral negotiations between the Netherlands and Flanders over the “48’/43/38’ deepening programme” and the quantity of flows from the Meuse reaching the Netherlands. These negotiations include linking the issue of the construction of a high-speed rail project between Antwerp and Amsterdam, which is of interest to the Netherlands (as well as to Flanders, Brussels region, and France, who have an indirect interest in improving linkages between Amsterdam and the southern areas of the High Speed Rail system.)

Though the Netherlands and Flanders come to agreement over the deepening of the Scheldt and the quantity of guaranteed flows from the Meuse, the high-speed rail, which Flanders had included as an incentive to get the Netherlands to the table, turns out to be a sticking point. The Dutch will not sign the agreement without a plan for the rail project.

The Netherlands, France, Walloon and Brussels Capital agree to the multilateral water quality convention, but Flanders makes its signing of the agreement contingent on a bilateral deal on deepening with Netherlands. Therefore, both agreements are stalled.
{{!}}-
{{!}} 1994 {{!}}{{!}} Flanders and the Netherlands are able to reach an agreement on decision-making procedures for the development of the high-speed rail project. They sign the bilateral convention on the deepening of the Western Scheldt.

With the bilateral treaty out of the way, Flanders signs the multilateral water quality conventions, thus concluding more than 25 years of negotiations over these issues.
{{!}}-
{{!}} 1995-1997 {{!}}{{!}} Implementation:

The International Commission for the Protection of the Scheldt (ICPS), the body charged with enacting the water quality conventions, is installed.

The first Scheldt Action Program (SAP) is negotiated.

Implementation of the deepening programme for the Western Scheldt is initiated. Dredging begins in June. A plan is developed to compensate for “nature losses” incurred because of that implementation. An expert commission to advise on this compensation plan is formed.

The Dutch invoke lex specialis to expedite the approval process of the deepening programme. Stakeholders in the Netherlands, including environmental advocates and the province of Zeeland are resistant to the implementation of the plan. The former are concerned about ecological costs as a result of the deepening; the latter resist the concept of intentionally returning land in the estuary to the sea, which is required as part of the development plan.
{{!}}-
{{!}} 1998 {{!}}{{!}} The Flemish initiate a new round of negotiations with the Dutch to request further deepening of the Western Scheldt
* The Dutch link new issues with the high-speed rail project (including timing and frequency of trains) to the negotiations
{{!}}-
{{!}} 1999 {{!}}{{!}} Dutch and Belgian Prime Ministers Kok and Verhofstadt sign a treaty based on the 1995 agreements to deepen the estuary further. The Hzeren Rijn train line is packaged with this deal. However, when the treaty comes to the Dutch parliament in 200, it faces massive opposition and does not move forward.
{{!}}-
{{!}} 2001 {{!}}{{!}} The ministers negotiating over the increased deepening decide to incorporate this round into the development of a Long-Term Vision of the Scheldt Estuary 2030, which is created in 2001.
{{!}}-
{{!}} 2005 {{!}}{{!}} A further deepening agreement between The Netherlands and Flanders is reached.
{{!}}}

===== Creation of the Long-Term Vision of the Scheldt Estuary in 2030: =====

The creation of the Long-Term Vision of the Scheldt Estuary in 2030 and the institution of a standing structure to mediate negotiation on water issues in the basin marked a departure from the previous decades of ad-hoc requests for negotiations among the parties. The plan included five main goals (Warner and van Buuren 2009)<ref>Warner, Jeroen, and Arwin van Buuren. “Multi-Stakeholder Learning and Fighting on the River Scheldt.” International Negotiation 14, no. 2 (May 1, 2009): 419–40. doi:10.1163/157180609X432888.</ref>:
# Improve access to channel of Antwerp
# Restore ecology of estuary
# Guard against floods
# Preserve physical-system characteristics of estuary
# Conduct decision-making on Scheldt through mutual cooperation

The permanent bilateral Technical Committee on the Scheldt organized the project. The Secretariat of Benelux (a union between Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg), a respected neutral actor, provided a secretary for the main governmental stakeholders group, the Consultation Group (OAP). A joint fact-finding research plan explicitly made space for expert working groups and non-official stakeholders to participate, and included a process for conducting environmental impact assessments and social impact assessments. While the plan did not determine an order in which the named priorities are treated, it did set conditions for how future negotiations on these issues would be conducted. The first Development Plan for 2010 was developed between 2003 and 2006. Under this Long-Term Vision plan, an additional deepening of the Western Scheldt was negotiated and implemented in 2010, after an initial provisional agreement that had been reached in 2007 was debated and rejected by local stakeholders, including environmental organizations and farmers in Zeeland.
|Summary=The Scheldt River rises in France, flows through the three regions of Belgium—Wallonia, Brussels Capital, and Flanders—and empties into the North Sea in the Netherlands. While the entire region, and especially the waterways and strategic sea access that the Scheldt River provides, have been a source of conflict and tension in the region for centuries, this case will focus primarily on negotiations over the Western Scheldt Estuary specifically, beginning in the 1960s at the start of a period of more productive relations among the neighboring parties, and describe and later analyze the interactions between them through the early 2000s. Information about the Basin is provided to give context to this analysis.

Negotiations over water resources, ecology and nature preservation, and transit/sea access issues, among others, were conducted over more than 40 years (some are ongoing), principally between the Netherlands and Belgium, with other stakeholders involved to varying degrees at different points. Adding layers of complexity to these negotiations were the federalization process occurring in Belgium, which changed the stakeholders who had a seat at the table mid-way through negotiations, and the evolving requirements governing water resource management and ecosystem conservation, stemming from the European Water Framework Directive and from regulations from the European Commission such as the Habitats and Birds Directives (European Commission, n.d.)<ref>European Commission. n.d. “The Habitats Directive - Environment.” http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/legislation/habitatsdirective/index_en.htm. </ref> and from the UN Economic Commission for Europe.
|Topic Tags=
|External Links=
|Case Review={{Case Review Boxes
|Empty Section=No
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|Expand Section=No
|Add References=No
|Wikify=No
|connect to www=No
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|MPOV=No
|ForceDiv=yes
}}
}}

Multilateral Negotiations over the Scheldt River Estuary: Transforming Centuries of Deadlock into Productive Multiparty Negotiations?

2014-05-23T00:32:17Z

Elizabeth:

Multilateral Negotiations over the Scheldt River Estuary: Transforming Centuries of Deadlock into Productive Multiparty Negotiations?

2014-05-23T00:31:05Z

Elizabeth:

Multilateral Negotiations over the Scheldt River Estuary: Transforming Centuries of Deadlock into Productive Multiparty Negotiations?

2014-05-23T00:30:10Z

Elizabeth:

Multilateral Negotiations over the Scheldt River Estuary: Transforming Centuries of Deadlock into Productive Multiparty Negotiations?

2014-05-23T00:27:42Z

Elizabeth:

ASI:Reflection on Challenges and Lessons Learned in Negotiations over the Western Scheldt Estuary

2014-05-23T00:25:01Z

Elizabeth:

ASI:Reflection on Challenges and Lessons Learned in Negotiations over the Western Scheldt Estuary

2014-05-23T00:23:13Z

Elizabeth:

Multilateral Negotiations over the Scheldt River Estuary: Transforming Centuries of Deadlock into Productive Multiparty Negotiations?

2014-05-23T00:21:49Z

Elizabeth:

ASI:Reflection on Challenges and Lessons Learned in Negotiations over the Western Scheldt Estuary

2014-05-23T00:20:32Z

Elizabeth:

ASI:Reflection on Challenges and Lessons Learned in Negotiations over the Western Scheldt Estuary

2014-05-23T00:17:47Z

Elizabeth:

ASI:Reflection on Challenges and Lessons Learned in Negotiations over the Western Scheldt Estuary

2014-05-23T00:16:23Z

Elizabeth:

Multilateral Negotiations over the Scheldt River Estuary: Transforming Centuries of Deadlock into Productive Multiparty Negotiations?

2014-05-23T00:12:37Z

Elizabeth:

Multilateral Negotiations over the Scheldt River Estuary: Transforming Centuries of Deadlock into Productive Multiparty Negotiations?

2014-05-23T00:10:58Z

Elizabeth:

Multilateral Negotiations over the Scheldt River Estuary: Transforming Centuries of Deadlock into Productive Multiparty Negotiations?

2014-05-23T00:07:50Z

Elizabeth:

Multilateral Negotiations over the Scheldt River Estuary: Transforming Centuries of Deadlock into Productive Multiparty Negotiations?

2014-05-23T00:03:53Z

Elizabeth:

Multilateral Negotiations over the Scheldt River Estuary: Transforming Centuries of Deadlock into Productive Multiparty Negotiations?

2014-05-22T23:59:48Z

Elizabeth:

Multilateral Negotiations over the Scheldt River Estuary: Transforming Centuries of Deadlock into Productive Multiparty Negotiations?

2014-05-22T23:56:17Z

Elizabeth:

Multilateral Negotiations over the Scheldt River Estuary: Transforming Centuries of Deadlock into Productive Multiparty Negotiations?

2014-05-22T23:53:16Z

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Multilateral Negotiations over the Scheldt River Estuary: Transforming Centuries of Deadlock into Productive Multiparty Negotiations?

2014-05-22T23:52:59Z

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Multilateral Negotiations over the Scheldt River Estuary: Transforming Centuries of Deadlock into Productive Multiparty Negotiations?

2014-05-22T23:48:06Z

Elizabeth:

ASI:Reflection on Challenges and Lessons Learned in Negotiations over the Western Scheldt Estuary

2014-05-22T23:46:01Z

Elizabeth:

ASI:Reflection on Challenges and Lessons Learned in Negotiations over the Western Scheldt Estuary

2014-05-22T23:41:51Z

Elizabeth: Created page with "{{ASI |First Contributor=Elizabeth Cooper |Reflection Text Summary=== Analysis, Synthesis, and Insight== === Outcomes of Negotiations === ==== Strained Relationships ===..."

Multilateral Negotiations over the Scheldt River Estuary: Transforming Centuries of Deadlock into Productive Multiparty Negotiations?

2014-05-22T23:35:18Z

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Multilateral Negotiations over the Scheldt River Estuary: Transforming Centuries of Deadlock into Productive Multiparty Negotiations?

2014-05-22T23:33:13Z

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Multilateral Negotiations over the Scheldt River Estuary: Transforming Centuries of Deadlock into Productive Multiparty Negotiations?

2014-05-22T23:32:36Z

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Multilateral Negotiations over the Scheldt River Estuary: Transforming Centuries of Deadlock into Productive Multiparty Negotiations?

2014-05-22T23:30:49Z

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Multilateral Negotiations over the Scheldt River Estuary: Transforming Centuries of Deadlock into Productive Multiparty Negotiations?

2014-05-22T23:27:43Z

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Multilateral Negotiations over the Scheldt River Estuary: Transforming Centuries of Deadlock into Productive Multiparty Negotiations?

2014-05-22T23:24:13Z

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Multilateral Negotiations over the Scheldt River Estuary: Transforming Centuries of Deadlock into Productive Multiparty Negotiations?

2014-05-22T23:22:38Z

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Multilateral Negotiations over the Scheldt River Estuary: Transforming Centuries of Deadlock into Productive Multiparty Negotiations?

2014-05-22T23:19:30Z

Elizabeth:

Multilateral Negotiations over the Scheldt River Estuary: Transforming Centuries of Deadlock into Productive Multiparty Negotiations?

2014-05-22T23:18:26Z

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Multilateral Negotiations over the Scheldt River Estuary: Transforming Centuries of Deadlock into Productive Multiparty Negotiations?

2014-05-22T23:15:29Z

Elizabeth:

File:Stakeholder interests table.jpg

2014-05-22T23:14:24Z

Elizabeth:

Multilateral Negotiations over the Scheldt River Estuary: Transforming Centuries of Deadlock into Productive Multiparty Negotiations?

2014-05-22T23:11:55Z

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Multilateral Negotiations over the Scheldt River Estuary: Transforming Centuries of Deadlock into Productive Multiparty Negotiations?

2014-05-22T23:10:06Z

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Multilateral Negotiations over the Scheldt River Estuary: Transforming Centuries of Deadlock into Productive Multiparty Negotiations?

2014-05-22T23:09:15Z

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Multilateral Negotiations over the Scheldt River Estuary: Transforming Centuries of Deadlock into Productive Multiparty Negotiations?

2014-05-22T23:08:19Z

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Multilateral Negotiations over the Scheldt River Estuary: Transforming Centuries of Deadlock into Productive Multiparty Negotiations?

2014-05-22T23:05:04Z

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Multilateral Negotiations over the Scheldt River Estuary: Transforming Centuries of Deadlock into Productive Multiparty Negotiations?

2014-05-10T00:40:59Z

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2014-04-30T20:52:48Z

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