AquaPedia Case Study Database - User contributions [en]

ASI:Additional Notes on Gaza Water Management

2014-10-22T13:13:41Z

Christine.Buesser: Created page with "{{ASI |First Contributor=Christine Buesser |First Contributor Link=http://aquapedia.waterdiplomacy.org/wiki/index.php?title=User:Christine.Buesser |Case Study=Gaza Strip Water..."

{{ASI
|First Contributor=Christine Buesser
|First Contributor Link=http://aquapedia.waterdiplomacy.org/wiki/index.php?title=User:Christine.Buesser
|Case Study=Gaza Strip Water Management
|Reflection Text Summary=This ASI is a note on the process of case development. Christine.Buesser contributed the original case and 2 other ASI articles linked to Gaza Water Management.
|Reflection Text=''Christine is the initial contributor for this case and also wrote the related ASI articles: [[ASI:Short and Long Term Solutions for Water Problems in Gaza |Short and Long Term Solutions for Water Problems in Gaza]] and [[ASI:Threats to Addressing a Water Strategy for Gaza|Threats to Addressing a Water Strategy for Gaza]]. This article is a note on the evolution and development of the case.''

A Palestinian colleague of mine gave me the following feedback when clicking on the link to the case study: How can you have the word Water Diplomacy and Gaza in the same title? Because of the high emotional and value judgments carried by the Palestinian and Israeli people, I felt that it was important to frame the case study.

The Gaza Water Management Case was written for the final case study for the seminar titled WATER DIPLOMACY: THE SCIENCE, POLICY AND POLITICS OF MANAGING SHARED RESOURCES and taught by Professor Lawrence (Larry) Susskind at the MIT - Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, MA, USA. This particular seminar was taught for the first time during the spring semester 2014 and introduces a new Water Diplomacy Framework (WDF) that provides a better way to understand and resolve water resource management disputes around the world (trans-boundary or shared water resources).

The case is about available water sources (or the lack thereof) in the Palestinian Gaza Strip (Gaza), which is currently under Israeli military land, air and sea blockage, highlighting the gap between supply and demand. Also, I demonstrated that technical solutions cannot be ‘used’ to derail political solutions. This is emphasized by the following quote from the case study: “Technical solutions should not be an excuse for the international community to stop the pressure on Israel to meet its obligations under International Law to secure water for the occupied Palestinian population or to absolve the Israelis of its respective responsibilities.”

When choosing the final case study, I decided to focus on the Gaza Strip (Gaza) as my recent impressions from the March 2014 Harvard student-led trek to Israel and the West Bank in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) were still very much on my mind. Given the fact that I was not allowed to visit Gaza as a tourist during the trek due to the on-going blockage, I initially felt compelled to analyze and explain the physicality of the dispute linked to the Coastal Aquifer, which is a trans-boundary water source that stretches from the northern Sinai Peninsula in Egypt, via Gaza to Israel in the north.

I decided to start preliminary discussions with different regional stakeholders, as I was unsure how to best present the issues linked to water in Gaza. One interlocutor responded as follows: “The Coastal Aquifer isn’t a good case study for a trans-boundary watercourse as the Gaza part is relatively small and most of the recharge is at the Israeli side. There is no shared management of the aquifer. Israel is supplying water to Gaza (a few million cubic meters a year).” Another difficulty was that the Palestinian-Israeli dispute over water (not just in Gaza) has been elaborately documented and interpreted by many commentators. Hence I had to find a fresh perspective of the story for Aquapedia, and not necessarily talk about the Gaza Coastal Aquifer disputes in the context of the larger, well-documented, water conflicts.

After additional interviews with regional stakeholders and further research, I agreed with Professor Susskind to write something about water in Gaza and the conflicts within Gaza and the rest of Palestinian state including the various interests in Gaza. I would do so by highlighting the water demand and supply (since the latter has been getting lower while demand has been increasing). Furthermore, I would do an analysis on ways to match supply and demand including a strategy for closing the gap (with a handful of different ways to solve it), such as increasing supply (e.g. if Israel provides more water, desalinate more water with an investment in desalination and energy).

Unfortunately, the on-going Israel-Palestinian conflict, with an escalation in violence between Gaza and Israel in July and August 2014, makes it even less likely that the collaborative efforts required on water management in Gaza will be initiated. The renewed level of destruction of infrastructure makes the situation 100% humanitarian in nature. I understood from one of my sources that the dialogue at the technical level is there, but neither side is ready to go deeper than necessary at this moment. Trust, not water, has been scarce for a long time. Without trust, it is not impossible to have an overall water solution, but it is very difficult. Relationships around working projects would have to be created. Could a big desalination plant in Gaza with Israeli technology (solar energy? upgrade Gaza power plant from diesel to gas?) and financing act as such a project? If the necessary local engagement is there, and if sufficiently realistic steps are undertaken, then the resulting momentum could lead to longer strides, without either side noticing the magnitude of the change. So the question becomes what situation could you construct where either side does not talk about the real issues, but some principles that could guide some resolution of differences to move forward? This question is rhetorical though, as long as Gaza’s blockade does not end.

I would like to express my thank you and gratitude to all the individuals that were contributing to the writing of this final case study.

Warmly,

Christine

|Perspective=Observer
|ASI Type=Personal Insights
|ASI Keyword=
|User=Christine.Buesser
}}

User:Christine.Buesser

2014-07-10T03:54:32Z

Christine.Buesser:

{{Person
|Name=Christine Buesser
|organization=Graduate of the Harvard Kennedy School with the ‘Water Diplomacy’ course taken at Massachusetts Institute of Technology
|User Location=Switzerland
|External Links={{External Link
|Link Text=Linkedin Profile
|Link Address=http://ch.linkedin.com/pub/christine-buesser/0/90b/874/
}}
|Bio=I left Switzerland more than 15 years ago to initially pursue an undergraduate degree in Business Administration at Babson College in Wellesley, MA. This served as a foundation for my three-year stint as investment banker in New York City before joining Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF/ Doctors Without Borders) in 2007. Since then I have been leading MSF's projects and missions in North Sudan, DRC, Haiti and Pakistan. In June 2013, I went back to school to pursue a 1-year graduate degree in Public Administration at the Harvard Kennedy School in Cambridge, MA.

While being enrolled at the Harvard Kennedy School, I was able to take classes at other universities in the Boston area. Hence I decided to take a course called ‘Water Diplomacy’ [http://dusp.mit.edu/subject/spring-2014-11382-0] with Professor Larry Susskind at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) during the 2014 spring semester. For my final assignment, I had to present and write up a case that had to do with a complex water management problem. Given the fact that I was in Israel and the State of Palestine (West Bank) on a Harvard student-led Spring break trek in March 2014, I decided to write the water management case about Gaza to shed light on the profound complexity and difficulty of getting not only enough but also quality water to the Gazan people.
}}

User:Christine.Buesser

2014-07-10T03:53:01Z

Christine.Buesser:

ASI:Threats to Addressing a Water Strategy for Gaza

2014-06-26T19:10:10Z

Christine.Buesser:

{{ASI
|First Contributor=Christine Buesser
|Case Study=Gaza Strip Water Management
|Reflection Text Summary=The task faced in improving the water sector in Gaza is thus of significant scale and difficulty. No ‘magic bullets’ exist, at least in the absence of an equitable and reasonable reallocation of shared fresh water between Israel and the State of Palestine, and there will be a need for a major overhaul of the sector as a whole in Gaza. In the event of not being able to settle a final agreement with Israel on the final status, there will be no possibilities to implement the long-term water strategy objectives and it will have a very negative impact on the water situation in the territories, which will give right to announce these territories as water disaster areas. Practical difficulties even for the short-term solutions can only be addressed if [a] the blockade is dealt with; [b] water is ‘kept out of politics’ and [c] there is the formation of an interim government decided upon by Fatah and Hamas. Current challenges are just too manifold for any technical solution to work effectively and efficiently. These challenges are presented and discussed here.
|Reflection Text=The task faced in improving the water sector in Gaza is thus of significant scale and difficulty. No ‘magic bullets’ exist at least in the absence of an equitable and reasonable reallocation of shared fresh water between Israel and the State of Palestine and there will be a need for a major overhaul of the sector as a whole in Gaza. In the event of not being able to settle a final agreement with Israel on the final status, there will be no possibilities to implement the long-term water strategy objectives and it will have a very negative impact on the water situation in the territories, which will give right to announce these territories as water disaster areas. Practical difficulties even for the short-term solutions can only be addressed if [a] the blockade is dealt with; [b] water is ‘kept out of politics’ and [c] there is the formation of an interim government decided upon by Fatah and Hamas. Otherwise current challenges are just too manifold for any technical solution to work effectively and efficiently:

==There is no income==
*Currently the Gaza population is being kept alive by the humanitarian community as there is barely any income; 80% of Gazans receive some form of assistance (UN, 2012)

==Delays in project approvals by Israel==
*The Coordination Liaison Administration (CLA), which is a civil-military body, is the link between Gaza and the outside world; everything has to pass through them and then they deal with the other ministries<ref name="INGO 27April2014"> INGO working in the State of Palestine and Israel, personal communication with Christine Buesser, April 27, 2014</ref>
*The CLA is the bottleneck as it has its ways to delay projects
*Projects have to presented to the CLA with all kinds of specifications (location of materials; GPS location; photos of materials being used to be sure that they are not going to Hamas or any affiliation of Hamas, etc.)
*All these approval processes take a long time (on average UN projects are on hold for 9 months)<ref name="INGO 27April2014"/>

==Israeli rules for Gaza are not always clear==
*Import restrictions of materials and equipment dates back to 2007 when Hamas came into power
**From 2007 to now, Israel has lifted some restrictions (over the years some things have been allowed to be imported but the rules are never clear)
**As of May 2014, Israel prevents the entry of essential materials necessary for construction and rehabilitation on of WATSAN infrastructure, which also applies to projects supervised by international organizations<ref name="EWASH">Emergency Water Sanitation and Hygiene group. (March 2014). Water in the occupied Palestinian territory: causes, impacts and recommendations (Brussels, 18 March, 2014) [PowerPoint Slides]. </ref>
**Israel classifies these materials as dual-use items and prohibits their entry<ref name="EWASH"/>
*According to one INGO working in Gaza, there are no clear rules when it comes to the importation of materials and equipment into Gaza hence it is very difficult to do any kind of long-term planning: “You never know what happens tomorrow which is the case for construction materials!”
**There is a recent change that Israel only allows construction material for projects which are supervised by international organizations
**UN has adopted it but makes their work in Gaza quite complicated as they need staff around the clock for example in the cement factory<ref name="INGO 27April2014"/>
*This is has a severe impact on WATSAN services in Gaza, the breakdown of which is placing public health and the wider environment at risk<ref name="Toggenburg 15May2014"/>
*A lot of donors and states are trying to pressure Israel to release some of these restrictions but without much effect (UN, personal communication, unknown date)

==Big infrastructure projects are costly==
*E.g. US$ 450 million for the regional desalination plant in Gaza, which is a lot of money especially for the PA that has few resources
*Most rely on donors which is not sustainable (who pays for running costs of infrastructure projects?) (M. Muenchenbach, personal communication, April 25, 2014)

==Donor money is slow==
*A lot of donors need to find a consortium of donors to finance big infrastructure projects which takes years not months as donors cannot fund it individually (anonymous, personal communication, April 25, 2014)
*Moreover, donors are scared and hesitant of Gaza context (e.g. on-going blockage, Hamas considered as a terrorist organization by some countries, possibility of infrastructure being demolished by a single Israeli air strike, Fatah-Hamas division, lack of political willingness to support the sustainability of longer-term projects, etc.)

==Wastewater reuse not standardized==
*There are still not approved standards so it is difficult to get projects going and the environmental quality authority will have to give its approval too<ref name="INGO 27April2014"/>

==Situation of electricity is not sustainable==
*Electricity supply in Gaza is estimated at around 180 MW while demand can reach up to 360 MW in peak hours, resulting in a 50% shortfall and therefore the present rationing of electricity, with electricity blackouts of up to 8 hours in every Gaza neighborhood, every day affecting approximately 600,000 people at any given moment (M. Milner, personal communication, April 24, 2014)
**Very often the GPP cannot produce at 100% of capacity because of insufficient fuel supply
**Israel currently supplies half the energy needs of Gaza but is itself running at near full capacity, with little electricity to spare (M. Milner, personal communication, April 24, 2014)
**Egypt is supplying Gaza with less electricity then already promised (political unrest in Egypt has dramatically reduced energy exports from the country) and Hamas is reluctant to import more fuel from Israel to power the existing GPP as tax revenues for fuel imports coming in from Israel are paid to the PA in Ramallah and not to Hamas in Gaza (anonymous, personal communication, April 24, 2014)
*Demand is continuing to increase (growing by ~10% because of new infrastructure projects in the health and water sectors, increased household demands) but production is stable (M. Milner, personal communication, April 24, 2014)
*There are many ideas to increase supply but none of them have materialized in the past years and are unlikely to materialize in the coming years
**As example, the PWA is ready to start operating a new project (WWTP) in the north of Gaza but does not have electricity to operate it (needs permanent supply); there have been Israel-Palestine discussion to install a separate power line, which started in the summer of 2013 but nothing has moved<ref name="INGO 27April2014"/>

==Weak private sector==
*Opportunities for profitability are not significant
**GDP per capita of Gaza is close to half of that of the West Bank (UN, 2012)
*There are good contractors and suppliers to do the construction work and there are good suppliers but there are not any private sector contractors to operate for example a wastewater management plant<ref name="INGO 27April2014"/>
*Foreign companies are doing some work but are funded by their own governments (consultants)

==Lack of willingness and ability to pay for services ==
*According to one INGO working in Gaza, when Hamas came into power, the government did not want to push taxes on population as they wanted to be seen as an authority who is socially nice and could rely on the support from other governments (e.g. Egypt, Qatar, Iran) and in the past from the taxes from the tunnels (to be seen if the closure of many of the tunnels by Egypt will put enough pressure on Hamas to start taxing population)
*As Hamas is not involved in the business of water and/ or infrastructure, there is no pressure and regulation from the government to make consumers pay for services such as water<ref name="INGO 27April2014"/>
*No clear understanding of why customers are not paying for water services: are consumers not paying because of the bad services, out of bad habit (was never enforced by the Hamas government), sheer lack of willingness and/ or because they are simply too poor?
*The fact that many people are not paying for services such as water reduces the income of the operators but the operators are supposed to maintain all this infrastructure (UNICEF, personal communication, April 25, 2014)
**All the water losses in the networks cannot be addressed if the operators do not have the money to extend the networks

==Pending water sector reform==
*The water system in Gaza is the result of many different regimes (from the Ottomans to the British to the Israelis) and there is a need for reform
*Currently, the PWA acts like a ministry of water (in charge of managing water resources, monitoring the sector and operators) (PWA, personal communication, April 24, 2014)
**In addition, there are various bodies depending on the region: CMWU acts as service provider/ utility company and the water departments of the different municipalities act as service providers with municipalities that are not connected to the network and village councils that take care of their own water system<ref name="INGO 27April2014"/>
*Separation of municipalities is the result of the following factors: a) some municipalities are strong Hamas authorities and CMWU is seen as a Fatah institution so they do not want to collaborate<ref name="INGO 27April2014"/> , b) personal issues between the Mayor of Gaza and the Chairman of CMWU cause the municipality of Gaza not to cooperate with CMWU<ref name="INGO 27April2014"/> , c) no powerful mechanisms to bring the different water departments together because of the lack of a strong regulatory body and the pending new water law.<ref name="Yaqoubi 27April2014">A. Al Yaqoubi, personal communication with Christine Buesser, April 27, 2014"</ref>
**However, there is not a complete separation because most networks and production are managed by CMWU (some kind of cooperation on-going)
*Challenge of CMWU to fulfill its role which is a problem for municipalities because they do not have technical capacity to manage it properly and plan for the future (e.g. expand their networks in the context of Gaza where you have contamination and where it would be good to balance pumping from one area to another)
*Currently there are 4,000 wells (average figure) which are not licensed and are not registered; mostly for agricultural use and even though the farmers are not pumping a lot they still pump a few cubic meters here and there which adds up<ref name="Yaqoubi 09May2014">A. Al Yaqoubi, personal communication with Christine Buesser, May 09, 2014</ref>

==Fractioned stakeholders==
*PWA is linked to the PA but there are other political actors that are outside the control of the PA including some municipalities and ministries, etc.; however to implement such a big water strategy, all the stakeholders need to work together<ref name="INGO 27April2014"/>
*The new reconciliation agreement between Fatah and Hamas (April 2014) is still questionable can only succeed if both sides can agree on a new government
**If both sides agree on a plan for new elections, this may make a difference by having a common united Palestinian front in negotiation with Israel<ref name="INGO 27April2014"/>
**If Hamas becomes part of the Ramallah government, it is not clear what Israel will do (will Israel cut all or most of the ties with PA?)

==Ramallah approval can be slow==
*All legal documents need to be approved by Prime Minister (PM) in Ramallah
*New water law is still not approved by the President because there is a political blockage at the level of the PA because of the Fatah/ Hamas division, which questions the legitimacy of the President<ref name="INGO 27April2014"/>
*Without the new water law, which is built on a system recognized by the World Bank, there will not be a water sector reform with a clearer differentiation of responsibilities between the players in the water sector to better manage the resources cannot be implemented<ref name="Yaqoubi 27April2014"/>

==No effective central data collection system==
*No central data management (municipalities and CMWU have their own data and PWA is accessing data from here and there)
**One of the INGOs in Gaza is currently working with PWA to improve the monitoring of the Coastal aquifer to have data over the entire Gaza strip to improve the quality of the water
**Gaza is small so if there are a few monitoring wells, it is relatively easy to get a clear model (PWA has the capacity to do a proper analysis/ modeling of aquifer)

==Non-existence of trans-boundary water management==
*Palestinians would like trans-boundary management of the Coastal aquifer but Israelis are not willing to make allowances for that as it will not give positive effects to Israelis<ref name="INGO 27April2014"/>
*According to different expert sources, Israel does not consider the Coastal aquifer as shared (Gaza is the downstream entity)
*No official data exchange about shared water resources from Israel (no information regarding pumping, abstraction, etc.)
*No information on the Israeli-Egyptian management of the Coastal aquifer; however there are no formal or informal agreements for the optimization of use, protection and sustainability

In the absence of a peace agreement between the State of Palestine and Israel, the international community should keep advocating for Israel to:
- Fulfill its obligations under international law by allowing free passage of goods and people to and from the Gaza Strip, subject to individual security checks and subject to arrangements that meet both Israel’s security needs and its obligation to facilitate normal life in Gaza (Gisha, 2011)
- Allow for sustainable and economic growth and poverty alleviation in Gaza<ref name="Toggenburg 15May2014"/>
- Allow Palestinians their rightful share of trans-boundary water resources<ref name="Toggenburg 15May2014"/>
- Open the valve for the additional 5 MCM/ year water flow from Israel to Gaza <ref name="Ironside 15May 2014">P. Ironside, personal communication with Christine Buesser, May 15, 2014</ref>

=Conclusions=

Unless the blockage is lifted and a transfer of goods to the West Bank and exports to Israel and movements of people are allowed, a state of de-development and poverty will continue to make WASH related problems for the Gazan population worse.<ref name="EWASH"/> In order for the water strategy to be fully implemented, the political landscape has to change hence the on-going advocacy by the international community on the points mentioned in the above paragraph is of utmost importance. Otherwise the challenges are too many to overcome, especially with the on-going blockage. However, in the absence of a political solution, the PWA, other local stakeholders and the international community should explore and implement all technical solutions as highlighted in the above paragraphs weighing the benefits and constraints (as long as these solutions are not suggested at the expense of the political rights of Palestinians).

They can be put into two different categories: low-hanging fruit (water demand management increasing system efficiency, collection of rain/ storm water, capacity building with farmers for managing agricultural consumption etc.) and investment intensive solutions (WWTPS and desalination). In between the low-hanging fruits and the investment intensive solutions are the low- to high-volume water transfers from Israel and/ or other countries. On one hand, some experts argue that high-volume transfer of water from Israel, its allies and/ or other countries in the neighborhood are not reliable and sustainable solutions given the current political environment or the financial unfeasibility. On the other hand, other experts say that the only answer to the water crisis is the equitable transfer of fresh water from Israel because Gaza would become physically, not politically, a large-scale recipient of water from Israel (not as a favor or as a purely commercial client, but in fulfillment of its political water rights).<ref name="Messerschmid 2011">Messerschmid, C. (2011). Water in Gaza: Problems and Prospects. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1764252</ref>

Low-hanging fruit solutions such as the repair of infrastructure are absolutely needed and important no matter what other type of solutions might be found.<ref name="Toggenburg 15May2014">J. von Toggenburg, personal communication with Christine Buesser, May 15, 2014</ref> These solutions will alleviate the pressure on the system but will not provide large-scale sustainable solutions providing sufficient quality water to 1.8 million Gazans (including 70% of Palestinian refugees). Hence the investment intensive solutions have a larger impact and can be more beneficial.<ref name="Toggenburg 15May2014"/> However, both long-term options -WWTPS and desalination plants - are very vulnerable to the Israeli restrictions and obstacles and the energy needs. They make Gaza more dependent on power supply from Israel (and/ or Egypt) than ever. In addition, it is important to keep in mind that wastewater is not fit for drinking purposes when it comes out of the plant hence it can only be used for agricultural uses. Hence, desalination is needed to provide immediate drinking water needs. The environmental concerns of desalination also need to be addressed in terms of impact of discharging brine (salty water and chemicals) into the sea as the Gaza Strip is already so heavily polluted and pressured by untreated wastewater flowing into the sea every day and other waste being thrown into it.<ref name="Toggenburg 15May2014"/>

When weighing the benefits and constraints of the different solutions, it becomes evident that both the low-hanging fruit and the investment intensive solutions (including the ones in between) are necessary to provide the population with enough quality drinking water, increase the resilience of the population and have a better emergency preparedness (e.g. floods from the Alexa storm in December 2013). However, there is a need for integrated solutions (the water, energy and food security nexus) as highlighted during the roundtable in Gaza on April 30, 2014. Moreover, the donors and the international community need to be aware of the consequences and impact of any of the choices and support the investment needed for the mid-term to longer-term solutions. This requires a joint approach between the local authorities and the international community to see the big investment picture and identify priorities of how the money should be spent in the most sustainable way. For example, why should Gaza WATSAN services be maintained by millions of dollars in Qatari fuel subsidies if with half of this money the GPP could be upgraded in a period of eight months?<ref name="UNICEF"> UNICEF, personal communication with Christine Buesser, May 15, 2014</ref> The question is to find the solutions that help Gaza to get out of the vicious cycle of humanitarian relief (where possible) to get to more sustainable solutions.

Most western government donor agencies prefer to consider technical solutions for a purely political problem and all political approaches are dismissed as unrealistic, utopian and counterproductive.<ref name="Messerschmid 2011"/> However, technical solutions should not be an excuse for the international community to stop the pressure on Israel to meet its obligations under International Law to secure water for the occupied Palestinian population or to absolve the Israelis of its respective responsibilities. For example, large-scale desalination plants should not reduce Gaza’s prospects to successfully negotiate a larger share in the Coastal aquifer’s freshwater potential.

Certainly, practical solutions are needed to move forward in the current environment and to keep advocating for lifting the blockage and other points mentioned above. Yet, these solutions should not be suggested at the expense of the political rights of Palestinians. The technical and political solutions have to go in parallel. In addition, in the absence of a peace agreement between the State of Palestine and Israel, access to water should not be held hostage to a final agreement because solutions to the water problems cannot wait.
|Perspective=Academic
|ASI Type=Analysis
|ASI Keyword=
|User=Christine.Buesser
}}

Coastal Aquifer (Israel, Palestine)

2014-06-25T20:45:42Z

Christine.Buesser:

{{Water Feature
|Type=aquifer
|Located in Region=Western Asia
|isabasin=no
|Basin Area=
|Average Basin Discharge=
|Maximum Basin Discharge=
|Maximum Basin Discharge=
|Basin Population=
|Riparian Basin=
|Located in Riparian={{Link Riparian
|Riparian=Gaza
}}{{Link Riparian
|Riparian=Israel
}}{{Link Riparian
|Riparian=Palestine
}}
|issurface=groundwater
|Water Feature Area=
|Average Discharge=
|Maximum Discharge=
|Minimum Discharge=
|Water Feature Length=
|Within Basin=
|Description=The Coastal Aquifer's northern bounds is in the Carmel range and it extends to the Sinai Peninsula. Only the southern most portion of the aquifer extends to Gaza. <ref name="Weinberger 2012">Weinberger, G. et al. 2012. The Natural Water Resources between the Meditteranean Sea and the Jordan River. Israel Hydrologic Service. Jerusalem. online: http://www.water.gov.il/Hebrew/ProfessionalInfoAndData/Data-Hidrologeime/DocLib4/water_report-MEDITERRANEAN-SEA-AND-THE-JORDAN.pdf</ref>The supply of fresh water to the population of Gaza is almost totally reliant on the Coastal Aquifer.

[[File:Coastal-Aquifer-Extent.png|300px|thumbnail|The Aquifer extends from its northern edge at the Carmel Range to the Sinai Peninsula. Flow is generally toward the Mediterranean sea. <ref name="Weinberger 2012"/>]]

=The Coastal Aquifer in Gaza=
The southernmost portion of the coastal aquifer is the primary source for natural freshwater in Gaza. The shallow sandy aquifer, extending eastward to Israel and southward to Egypt. There are more than 5,000 water wells, most of them for agriculture purposes and with an average depth of 40-70 meters, and the water table lies between 20-50 meters below the ground surface.<ref name="PWA 2014"/> Gaza is a dry area and local aquifer recharge is very limited (55-60 MCM/year on average). Abstraction by all users (Israelis, Egyptians and Palestinians) already far exceeds natural recharge.<ref name="UN-ESCWA 2012">United Nations- Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (UN-ESCWA), Inventory of Shared Water Resources in Western Asia - Coastal Aquifer: report of the Federal Institute of Geosciences and Natural Resources (2012).</ref> Consequently, the aquifer has been depleted and suffers from seawater intrusion. Groundwater abstraction in Gaza has reached 180 MCM/ year, whereas the natural aquifer recharge on this portion of the aquifer is estimated to be only 55 MCM/ year.<ref name="Al Yaqoubi 2012 report">Al Yaqoubi, A., Assessment of Risk and Uncertainty Related to Coastal Aquifer Management in the Gaza Strip/Palestine: report of Palestinian Water Authority (September 2012).</ref> Abstraction rates have increased markedly over the last three decades, due to a combination of inadequate available water imports to Gaza; the expanding population; and the drilling and use of unlicensed wells (especially to provide irrigation for agricultural activities)<ref name="CSO-G 2011">Palestinian National Authority & Palestinian Water Authority, The Gaza Emergency Technical Assistance Programme on Water Supply to the Gaza Strip: the updated final report [Report 7 of the CSO-G] of The Comparative Study of Options for an Additional Supply of Water for the Gaza Strip (CSO-G) (2011, July 31).</ref>. For this reason, the long-term strategy aims to reduce total groundwater abstraction in Gaza from the current rate of 180 MCM/ year to 70 MCM/ year in 2032.<ref name="PWA 2014"/>

[[File:CMWU-2010-nitrate.png|250px|thumbnail|left|Nitrate concentrations in the aquifer<ref name="CMWU 2011">From CMWU Annual Report 2010, Coastal Municipalities Water Utility, Palestine, 2011. Online at: http://www.cmwu.ps/en/yreports.php?view=17</ref>]]
[[File:CMWU-2010-chloride.png|250px|thumbnail|left|Chloride concentrations in the aquifer<ref name="CMWU 2011">From CMWU Annual Report 2010, Coastal Municipalities Water Utility, Palestine, 2011. Online at: http://www.cmwu.ps/en/yreports.php?view=17</ref>]]

=Restoring the Aquifer=

The costal aquifer is depleted as a result of disequilibrium between the total water abstraction and its renewable amount, where the water level has been declining during the last few years to about 10-15 m below sea level.<ref name="PWA 2014">Palestinian Water Authority. (March 2014). Gaza Strip: No Clean Drinking Water, No Enough Energy, and Threatened Future. Gaza, occupied Palestinian territory.</ref> One of the stakeholders working in Gaza put it as follows: “Gazans know that they are destroying the aquifer but they do not have any other options hence they are looking at desalination plants to minimize the abstractions from the aquifer.” Apart from the fact that the Gaza Coastal Aquifer receives insufficient rainwater quantities for recharge, Israeli water policies have aimed at further reducing the aquifer’s renewable yield through the impediment of surface and groundwater<ref name="anonymous-cbuesser">anonymous, personal communication with Christine Buesser, April 24, 2014.</ref> On one hand, Israel diverted around 20 MCM/ year of surface water from Wadi Ghaza to agricultural fields in Israel before its arrival in Gaza (westwards)<ref name="anonymous-cbuesser"/>. On the other hand, the natural groundwater flow from Israel to the Coastal Aquifer (eastwards) has been reduced through the drilling of a number of deep wells along the Israel-Gaza border.<ref name="anonymous-cbuesser"/> The degree to which such flows might have contributed historically to the recharge of the Gaza groundwater system may be contemplated.<ref name="CSO-G 2011"/> It is noted that even if Wadi Gaza were to flow on downstream into Gaza in the future, only limited quantities of such flows could be captured and utilized, and these would be available during the wet season, when the demand is lower in any event.<ref name="CSO-G 2011"/>

=Seawater Intrusion=
Groundwater depletion in the Coastal aquifer has two negative impacts: (a) seawater invasion of large parts of the inland aquifer and (b) upward leakage of the underneath saline water. As a result of that depletion, the groundwater salinity has been increasing significantly to an unacceptable level, where 95% of the pumped water exceeds World Health Organization (WHO) drinking limit (250 mg/l) in terms of chloride concentration. While around 70% of the urban area is served by wastewater collection system, many people are still using cesspits or septic tanks for dumping their raw wastewater. Hence a huge amount of untreated wastewater leaks through the unsaturated sandy zone each day causing the groundwater pollution. As recorded, groundwater pollution by nitrates is already widespread in Gaza and the majority of the wells utilized for domestic water contain more nitrates than the WHO-recommended drinking limit (50 mg/l). This percentage is still growing with higher concentrations under urban areas.<ref name="PWA 2014"/>[[File:Coastal-Aquifer-Schematic.png|400px|thumbnail|Geologic Schematic of the Aquifer.<ref name="Greitzer 1967">Greitzer, D. J. Dan. 1967, The effect of soil landscape and quaternary geology on the distribution of saline and freshwater aquifers in the Coastal Plain of Israel, Water Planning for Israel, Tel Aviv, Lhala ltd. June 1967</ref> The western edge of the Aquifer abuts the sea, creating potential for local sea water intrusion, dependent on pumping regime and the local water table levels <ref name="Weinberger 2012"/> ]]
|External Links=
|Case Review={{Case Review Boxes
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Coastal Aquifer (Israel, Palestine)

2014-06-25T20:27:42Z

Christine.Buesser:

Gaza Strip Water Management

2014-06-25T20:27:03Z

Christine.Buesser:

{{Case Study
|Water Use=Agriculture or Irrigation, Domestic/Urban Supply
|Land Use=agricultural- cropland and pasture, urban
|Climate=Dry-summer
|Population=1.67
|Area=360
|Geolocation=31.522561, 34.453
|Issues={{Issue
|Issue=Establishing permanent water rights
|Issue Description=As long as the permanent status negotiations are stalled, Palestinians will pursue their interests in connection with obtaining Palestinian water rights for the territories (Gaza and the West Bank), including the fair right-of-access, right-of-control and right-of-use to water resources shared with other countries, in line with international law <ref name="PWA 2014"/>
|NSPD=Water Quantity; Water Quality; Governance; Assets; Values and Norms
|Stakeholder Type=Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Sovereign state/national/federal government, Local Government, Non-legislative governmental agency, Community or organized citizens
}}{{Issue
|Issue=Feasibility of developing desalination Infrastructure given insecurity and instability
|NSPD=Water Quantity; Water Quality; Governance
|Stakeholder Type=Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Sovereign state/national/federal government, Local Government, Non-legislative governmental agency, Development/humanitarian interest, Environmental interest, Community or organized citizens
}}
|Key Questions={{Key Question
|Subject=Technological Innovation
|Key Question - Dams=
|Key Question - Urban=
|Key Question - Transboundary=
|Key Question - Desalination=What roles can desalination play in a country's national water policy and what energy ecological and water quality considerations ought to go into making such a decision?
|Key Question - Influence=
|Key Question - Industries=
|Key Question Description=Brackish water desalination and sea water desalination provide a small portion of the total water needs in the Gaza Strip.
Discussion of a large desalination plant has occurred for over 20 years, but political and economic instability have made the process of funding and implementing such a plant infeasible.

A big desalination project takes time and a significant amount of money hence short-term, low volume (STLV) desalination is relevant because relatively small volumes of desalinated water can be produced rapidly to address the drinking water problems. However, the STLV desalination cannot solve the existing problems of the over-abstraction of the aquifer <ref name="CSO-G 2011"/>

The current water strategy includes building three STLV desalination plants with a total of 13 MCM/ year for emergency needs to improve quality of water and a regional high-volume desalination plant with a total of 55 MCM/ year (that can be expanded later on) to be completed by 2017 <ref name="PWA 2014"/>

While some of the funding has been secured for this large project, there are still questions of feasibility and sustainability. One of these concerns is related to energy - as there is a large energy deficit and electric power is not available all day. Using fuel for pumping water adds considerable cost. Energy concerns cannot be de-linked from desalination projects.

If the currently planned STLV plant is not successfully implemented, Gazans are concerned about the prospects for building the required additional desalinization infrastructure.

One of the staff of the PWA in Gaza said the following: “If we do not succeed with this small plant, then everything else will be a big problem hence it is like a test case at the very small scale.” <ref name="Christine Buesser ASI 1"> Christine Buesser, ASI:Short and Long Term Solutions for Water Problems in Gaza. (2014, June 25). AquaPedia Case Study Database, . Retrieved 18:31, June 26, 2014 from http://aquapedia.waterdiplomacy.org/wiki/index.php?title=ASI:Short_and_Long_Term_Solutions_for_Water_Problems_in_Gaza&oldid=7226.AquaPedia </ref>
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Technological Innovation
|Key Question - Dams=
|Key Question - Urban=
|Key Question - Transboundary=
|Key Question - Desalination=What types of benefit sharing models can be used to make desalination more economically feasible and beneficial in water-scarce regions?
|Key Question - Influence=
|Key Question - Industries=
|Key Question Description=There have also been discussions on desalinating water in Egypt and supplying fresh water to Gaza. This option remains highly controversial as it will be a protracted affair.<ref name="CSO-G 2011"/> However, fresh water supply to El-Arish and other parts of the Sinai in Egypt is very poor, with highly saline groundwater being present in many areas (Geriesh et al., 2004; Ghodeif & Geriesh, 2004). This would suggest that the Egyptian authorities may be amenable to a trans-boundary project pertaining to desalination, with shared benefits. However, for that option to materialize, the political landscape in Egypt or Gaza would have to change (UNICEF, personal communication, unknown date).<ref name="Christine Buesser ASI 1"/>
}}
|Water Feature={{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Coastal Aquifer (Israel, Palestine)
}}
|Riparian={{Link Riparian
|Riparian=Palestinian Territories
}}{{Link Riparian
|Riparian=Israel
}}{{Link Riparian
|Riparian=Egypt
}}{{Link Riparian
|Riparian=Gaza
}}
|Water Project=
|Agreement={{Link Agreement
|Agreement=Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Oslo II Agreement)
}}
|REP Framework= 
=Economy, Environment and Land Use=

Gaza is an urban economy, heavily reliant on intensive trade, communication and movement of people; however the area has been essentially isolated since 2005 given land and sea restrictions, which has led to an unviable economy. The Gaza Airport, funded by donor countries and which opened in 1998, and the Gaza Seaport project, which started in 2000, were both destroyed by the Israeli army when the second Palestinian uprising (intifada) against Israeli occupation inflamed.<ref name="Wiki Airport">Yasser Arafat International Airport. (2014, May 31). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 14:17, June 15, 2014, from http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Yasser_Arafat_International_Airport&oldid=610916688</ref><ref name="Wikipedia Gaza Seaport plans">Gaza Seaport plans. (2014, February 26). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 14:22, June 15, 2014, from http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Gaza_Seaport_plans&oldid=597201860</ref> As of 2014, the airport is not operational and the construction of the Gaza seaport has not resumed even though the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA), following the Israel's withdrawal from Gaza, re-announced the start of the works.<ref name="Wiki Airport"/> The transfer of goods to the West Bank and exports to Israel, both traditional markets for Gazan goods, is banned with a few exceptions. For the goods entering Gaza, Israel collects customs and value added tax.<ref name="Gisha2">Gisha Legal Center for Freedom of Movement. (November 2011). Scale of Control: Israel’s Continued Responsibility in the Gaza Strip. Retrieved from http://gisha.org/publication/1660</ref> Restrictions on the movement of people are in place. Citing security concerns, the Israeli military has also imposed restrictions on access to farmland on the Gaza side of the fence, and to fishing areas along the Gaza Strip coast - the Access Restricted Areas (ARAs).<ref name="UNO OCHA 2013">United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Fragmented Lives Humanitarian Overview 2013: report of OCHA in the occupied Palestinian territory (March 2014), available from http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/43B4D427B63C369B85257CB300585957.</ref>
[[File:Gaza Strip 2011-01-20.gif|250px|thumbnail|Map of the Gaza Strip, CIA world factbook, via Wikimedia Commons]]
Gaza has been and continues to be kept alive through external funding and the illegal tunnel economy under the Egypt-Gaza border. According to an ILO report, the tunnel economy has benefited Hamas as they have received a considerable share of the benefits from it.<ref name="UN Gaza 2020 2012">United Nations, Gaza in 2020 - A liveable place?: report of the United Nations Country Team in the occupied Palestinian territory (August 2012). </ref> The tunnel economy has taken a sharp hit as Egypt's military has destroyed most of the 1,200 tunnels from June 2013 onwards, which were primarily used to smuggle construction materials for the private sector and subsidized Egyptian fuel.<ref name="Rueters 2014">Court bans activities of Islamist Hamas in Egypt. (2014, March 04). Reuters. Retrieved from: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/04/us-egypt-hamas-idUSBREA230F520140304</ref> According to OCHA, the closure of these tunnels led to a sharp spike in unemployment, an increase in food prices, and chronic electricity shortages resulting from interruptions to the operation of the Gaza Power Plant (GPP), severely disrupting the provision of basic services.<ref name="UNO OCHA 2013">United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Fragmented Lives Humanitarian Overview 2013: report of OCHA in the occupied Palestinian territory (March 2014), available from http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/43B4D427B63C369B85257CB300585957.</ref>

The people of Gaza remain worse off than they were in the 1990s, despite increases in real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita over the past three years<ref name="UN Gaza 2020 2012"/>. One of the main reasons for the economy’s inability to recover to pre-2000 levels is the blockade of Gaza. The Palestinian Ministry of National Economy estimates that the blockade led to costs or unrealized growth worth US$ 1.9 billion in 2010 alone. Moreover, Israel’s Operation ‘Cast Lead’ in the Gaza Strip in December 2008 to January 2009 caused a total of US$ 181 million in direct and US$ 88 million in longer-term costs for Gaza’s agriculture; generated US$ 44 million in environmental costs and almost US$ 6 million in water and sanitation infrastructure damages.<ref name="UN Gaza 2020 2012"/>

Unemployment is high and affects women and youth in particular. High levels of food insecurity persist in the Gaza Strip, with a total of 66% of households classified as food insecure or vulnerable to food insecurity (UN, 2012). The main cause of food insecurity is the affordability of food and non-food items, resulting from the lack of income-earning possibilities for Gaza households.<ref name="Muenchenbach">M. Muenchenbach, personal communication with Christine Buesser, April 25, 2014.</ref> Gaza’s GDP per capita is expected to grow only modestly in the coming years, making it ever more difficult for Gazans to secure a living.<ref name="UN Gaza 2020 2012"/> The current import/ export conditions are unsustainable, putting Gaza’s economy at a competitive disadvantage, and eroding the resiliency of the private sector to create jobs, which is a key component for the affordability of food and non-food basic requirements for families.<ref name="WFP 2010">World Food Programme (WFP) occupied Palestinian territory Country Office. Gaza – eased or uneased? Changes on Gaza Market and Household Conditions following Israel’s 20 June 2010 New Access Regime [PowerPoint Slides]. </ref> If the current political status quo continues, the situation will only become more challenging.

Agriculture plays an important but limited role in Gaza, with about 40% of Gaza under cultivation. The agriculture sector continues to be characterized by small-scale (mainly family-based) farming. Exports of small amounts of strawberries, flowers and cherry tomatoes (mostly to Europe) are too minor to have a substantial impact on the overall economic situation.<ref name="UN Gaza 2020 2012"/> Given the water crisis, there is a trend to use fewer water-intensive and more salt-resistant crops, such as dates, which is in fact a return to the traditional crops of Gaza. The climate vulnerability of residents of Gaza is compounded by the expected environmental impacts of climate change. Increased amounts of precipitation will lead to reduced yields for rain-fed agriculture, and could also mean a greater frequency of flash floods.<ref name="PWA 2014">Palestinian Water Authority. (March 2014). Gaza Strip: No Clean Drinking Water, No Enough Energy, and Threatened Future. Gaza, occupied Palestinian territory: Author. </ref> Reduced amounts of precipitation will lead to increased strain on groundwater resources. According to Clemens Messerschmid, it should not be overlooked however that in former times Gaza was esteemed for its high-quality water resources and regarded as an oasis. The climate did not change over the last thousand years, but the number of inhabitants began to explode with the mass expulsions from Israel in 1948.<ref name="Messerschmid 2011">Messerschmid, C. (2011). Water in Gaza: Problems and Prospects. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1764252</ref>

=Political Environment=

==Peace Negotiations Between Israel and the State of Palestine ==
Direct negotiations between Israel and the State of Palestine began on 29 July 2013 following an attempt by United States Secretary of State John Kerry to restart the peace process. The negotiations were scheduled to last up to nine months to reach a final status to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by mid-2014. A deadline was set for establishing a broad outline for an agreement by April 29, 2014. On the expiry of the deadline, negotiations collapsed (AFP, 2014). The PA confirmed that the continuation of the negotiations depended on Israel agreeing in writing to: recognizing the 1967 borders of the Palestinian state, with East Jerusalem as its capital; releasing 1,200 prisoners; lifting the blockade of Gaza; returning Church of Nativity deportees; ceasing the construction of Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem and other locations; uniting fifteen thousand Palestinian families, giving them full citizenship; and preventing Israelis from entering areas of the PA and Area C.<ref name="GANSO Apr 2014">Gaza Strip Summary - Update on Reconciliation. (2014, April 03-16). Gaza NGO Safety Office (GANSO) Bi-weekly Safety Report, 7(21). </ref>

==Fatah-Hamas Reconciliation==
In April 2014, a reconciliation agreement between Fatah and Hamas was announced, which builds on the talks between Hamas and Fatah first in Doha in February 2012 and expanded later in Cairo in May 2012. <ref name="GANSO Apr 2014"/> This development could see the Palestinian territories under a unified leadership for the first time in years. The next steps would be the announcement of an interim government in the weeks to come, with elections possible by early 2015.<ref name="CNN 2014">Hamas, Fatah announce talks to form Palestinian unity government. (2014, April 23). CNN World. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/23/world/meast/gaza-west-bank-palestinian-reconciliation/</ref>

=Legal Environment=

==Water Rights==
In the long-term, Palestinian water rights will be negotiated with Israel and the other riparian countries in accordance with international law and best practice with regard to the management of trans-boundary water resources. In the meantime, the Oslo II Agreement regulates the temporary allocations of water utilization to Palestinians. The Oslo II Agreement was primarily based on actual water abstraction at that time (1995), although it also included a slight increase to allow for population growth. Its aim was to regulate water allocations over a 5-year interim period, until a final agreement was reached between the State of Palestine and Israel. This interim period was not supposed to last 20 years and the Oslo II Agreement did not address what force (if any) it would have beyond the interim period. For this reason, the Oslo II Agreement utilization figures no longer meet the minimal requirements of the Palestinian people. Although there is an urgent need to amend these figures (due to population change and other environmental and socio-economic factors), this agreement is still frequently cited as a reference during discussions at Joint Water Committee (JWC) meetings.<ref name="Brookes and Trottier 2012">Brooks, D., & Trottier, J. (March 2012). An agreement to share water between Israelis and Palestinians: The FoEME proposal. EcoPeace/ Friends of the Earth Middle East, 3, 54-61. Retrieved from http://foeme.org/uploads/13411307571~%5E$%5E~Water_Agreement_FINAL.pdf
</ref><ref name="PWA 2014"/>

Additional comments from the 2014 PWA report<ref name="PWA 2014"/>:
*Under the Oslo II Interim Agreement, the Israelis are to supply 5 additional MCM/ year to Gaza, and Palestinians are authorized to develop an additional 78 MCM/ year in the West Bank (compared with their water use in 1995);
*The Oslo II Interim Agreement does not clearly deal with abstraction rights on the Coastal aquifer; it does not include any figures on either the Israeli or Palestinian abstraction rate in 1995. It merely states that both sides should maintain the existing utilization.
According to different expert sources, the reasons for the Oslo accords not detailing how much Palestinians and Israelis can extract from the Coastal aquifer are:
*Extractions from the aquifer in Gaza will not affect the aquifer yield in Israel due to the direction the water flows, so Israel is not worried how much it is extracted from Gaza since it will not affect it.
*On the other hand, extractions from the Coastal aquifer from the Israeli side will affect availability in Gaza. Israeli over extraction of the Coastal aquifer affects the yield in Gaza but there is no good data of how much exactly. Even though it might be limited, for Gaza even limited impact of this extraction has big consequences.
*Israel had already embedded in the Oslo accords the separation of Gaza from the West Bank, which is part of the long-term planning of Israel.
According to international law, Israel as the upstream riparian in the shared groundwater flow system is clearly responsible for an "equitable and reasonable" allocation of resources.<ref name="Messerschmid 2011"/> It would therefore have to supply Gaza with considerably more water.<ref name="Messerschmid 2011"/>

==The Current Water Problems==

As long as the permanent status negotiations are stalled, Palestinians will pursue their interests in connection with obtaining Palestinian water rights for the territories (Gaza and the West Bank), including the fair right-of-access, right-of-control and right-of-use to water resources shared with other countries, in line with international law.<ref name="PWA 2014"/> Ideally, Gaza would get its water from a transfer of high water volumes from Israel to the State of Palestine based on equitable and reasonable reallocation of the existing fresh water resources shared between the State of Palestine and Israel; however this is deemed unfeasible given the fact that there is no guarantee that a territorial link will exist between Gaza and the West Bank.
[[File:Coastal-Aquifer-Extent.png|300px|thumbnail|right|The Aquifer extends from its northern edge at the Carmel Range to the Sinai Peninsula. Flow is generally toward the Mediterranean sea. <ref name="Weinberger 2012">Weinberger, G. et al. 2012. The Natural Water Resources between the Meditteranean Sea and the Jordan River. Israel Hydrologic Service. Jerusalem. online: http://www.water.gov.il/Hebrew/ProfessionalInfoAndData/Data-Hidrologeime/DocLib4/water_report-MEDITERRANEAN-SEA-AND-THE-JORDAN.pdf</ref>]]
According to different stakeholders operating in the State of Palestine, there is no difference between the Israeli and Egyptian blockage of Gaza and the Israeli occupied West Bank as Israel is in control of both territories. For example, in the West Bank, water wells cannot be drilled without the approval from Israel and movements of Palestinians are severely hampered (Israeli checkpoints and roadblocks). In Gaza, import restrictions of certain materials are in place, movements of Gazans into the West Bank or Israel are only allowed in exceptional humanitarian cases and additional water transfers from Israel are very difficult to negotiate, etc. The Israeli Government is ready to provide the Palestinians with additional water as long as it is on a cost basis, which is not acceptable to the PA. In most water authority meetings between the State of Palestine and Israel, Israel says that it is ready to support the Palestinians in the following way as reflected in the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM):<ref name="Yaqoubi pc 12May2014">A. Al Yaqoubi, personal communication with Christine Buesser, May 12, 2014</ref>
*Ready to encourage donors to build desalination projects;
*Ready to help with the desalination of water; and/ or
*Ready to allow the entry of all the materials needed to build and operate a desalination plant.

The problem is that this does not fully translate into actions on the ground (e.g. restricted access to construction materials through the official crossing).

===Technical Matters===
*As noted by the CMWU of Gaza in 2010, the supply of fresh water to the population is almost totally reliant on the underlying groundwater (the aquifer);
*Minor volumes of fresh water (5 MCM/ year, recently) are imported from Israel, and it has not been possible to date to increase those flows;
*Further very small volumes arise from several scattered desalination facilities in Gaza,<ref name="Hilles et al 2011">Hilles, A.H., & Al-Najar, H. (2011). Brackish water desalination is the merely potable water potential in the Gaza Strip: Prospects and limitations. Journal of Environmental Science and Technology , 4 (2), 158-171.</ref> but these are currently insignificant at the strategic level;
*The annual sustainable yield of the aquifer within the geographical boundary of Gaza is widely quoted as 55 MCM;<ref name="Yaqoubi 24April2014"/>
*Recent rates of pumping from the aquifer are estimated at 180 MCM/ year (in 2014) with the main problems highlighted below:
:#Abstraction rates have increased markedly over the last three decades, due to a combination of inadequate available water imports to Gaza; the expanding population; and the drilling and use of unlicensed wells (especially to provide irrigation for agricultural activities) (The Comparative Study of Options for an Additional Supply of Water for Gaza <ref name="CSO-G 2011"/>;
:#Gaza’s current salt input from the Southeast, which stems from natural lateral ground water inflow from Israel, has been increasing (amounting to 37 MCM/ year) with the bulk of it being contaminated by a very high natural salt content (Messerschmid, 2011)
:#Contamination of shallow groundwater from activities at the surface or near-surface of the land in Gaza,<ref name="Shomar 2008">Shomar, B., Osenbrück, K., & Yahya A. (2008). Elevated nitrate levels in the groundwater of the Gaza Strip: Distribution and sources. Science of the Total Environment, 398, 164-174.</ref> which arises mainly from wastewater (almost all of which is generated within Gaza); and
:#Military incursions by Israel caused environmental damage<ref name="UNEP 2009">United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Environmental Assessment of the Gaza Strip following the Escalation of Hostilities in December 2008-January 2009: report of United Nations Environment Programme, Geneva (2009).</ref> and water sector infrastructure damage<ref name="UNICEF 2010">The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) - Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG), Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Household Survey, Gaza: report of UNICEF and the PHG (April 2010).</ref><ref name="Messerschmid 2011"/> following Operation Cast Lead in late 2008 and early 2009.

The result of these problems in combination is that: (a) the water quantity available to the population in Gaza is inadequate (supply and demand gap is discussed in more detail below); and (b) the water quality falls well short of accepted international guidelines for potable resources (i.e. for use as drinking water, or more broadly for domestic use, but also for the agricultural sector where yields are beginning to be impacted by the poor water quality). The overall effect of poor water quality is a very high incidence of water-related disease amongst the population as a whole.<ref name="UNICEF 2010"/> <ref name="UNICEF 2011">The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Protecting Children from Unsafe Water in Gaza: Strategy, Action Plan and Project Resources: report of UNICEF in the occupied Palestinian territory (March 2011).</ref> Many commentators have characterized this as a humanitarian crisis. In addition, the groundwater quality is so poor in some areas of Gaza that agricultural yields suffer<ref name="PNSU 2010">Palestinian Negotiation Support Unit (2010). A Strategic Plan for the Introduction of Wastewater Reuse in Palestine. Ramallah, occupied Palestinian territory.</ref><ref name="Messerschmid 2011"/> because of the saline intrusion (chloride negatively affects plant growth).

Several parties have stated (usually on the basis of modeling future water salinity and quality) that Gaza’s groundwater will soon become so contaminated that its entire volume will cease to be available for use. This is commonly known as ‘aquifer failure’ or ‘aquifer collapse.’

There are short-term and long-term interventions that can potentially stop this from happening, which will be discussed further below. However, it must be noted that short-term interventions are humanitarian in nature and can only reduce the rate at which the situation worsens. Only medium-term and longer-term interventions, which can only succeed if the Gaza blockade is lifted, can generate sustainable improvement and allow the aquifer to recover.

===Beyond the status quo===

The continuation of the status quo in the water sector in Gaza is not acceptable given the reasons mentioned in the paragraphs above. Based on a 2011 report produced by the Comparative Study of Options for an Additional Supply of Water for Gaza (CSO-G in acronym), which was a joint effort by PWA and some of the donors, there is need for rapid interventions to retrieve the situation in the water sector in Gaza. Many studies have been completed on the water sector in Gaza, however, the CSO-G is different in both its timing and its overall approach. The CSO-G represents the first component of an envisioned emergency response to the problems in the water sector in Gaza, and provides proposals for an overall strategy to address and resolve the current problems.<ref name="CSO-G 2011">Palestinian National Authority & Palestinian Water Authority, The Gaza Emergency Technical Assistance Programme on Water Supply to the Gaza Strip: the updated final report (Report 7 of the CSO-G) of The Comparative Study of Options for an Additional Supply of Water for the Gaza Strip (CSO-G) (2011, July 31).</ref>

Since then, the PWA has drafted the National Water Strategy (NWS) based on previous studies including the Coastal Aquifer Management Program (CAMP), a project funded by USAID, and the CSO-G report for the Gaza parts<ref name="Yaqoubi, n.d.">A. Al Yaqoubi, personal communication with Christine Buesser, n.d.</ref>. The NWS is a document presenting the framework of action in the water sector for the sustainable management of water resources in the State of Palestine<ref name="PWA 2014"/>. The NWS covers a time period until 2035, including a short-term implementation plan designed until 2017 assuming no change in the political situation, and a long-term investment plan assuming a comprehensive peace deal where the Palestinian people will recover their full rights over natural water resources according to the 1967 border. The short-term implementation plan includes only investments, water resources management and actions that can be completed in the present political situation because of the constraints and restrictions due to the Gaza blockade (e.g. abnormal delays and difficulties importing materials and equipment, restrictions on the movement of people etc.). After 2017, the plan includes an improvement of the industrial and tourist sectors’ water consumption, access to water resources and an expansion of the agricultural sector, etc.<ref name="Yaqoubi 27April2014">A. Al Yaqoubi, personal communication with Christine Buesser, April 27, 2014"</ref>

During the first semester of 2013, PWA presented the NWS to other ministries, donors, NGOs, civil society, etc. The civil society technical experts have challenged some aspects of the NWS, not so much because of the document’s contents, but because they feel that they were not consulted enough<ref name="INGO 27April2014"> INGO working in the State of Palestine and Israel, personal communication with Christine Buesser, April 27, 2014</ref>. The NWS is about to be introduced in the PA Cabinet.

In 2014, different UN and INGO organizations working in Gaza, the PWA and the CMWU decided to come up with a multi-stakeholder roundtable co-hosted by UNICEF, the PWA and the CMWU to get water and energy stakeholders together and to get the attention of donors and diplomats regarding the enormous challenges to implement the CSO-G’s recommendations.<ref name="INGO 27April2014"/> The roundtable was meant to bring the appropriate people together to discuss the on-going lack of water resources, WATSAN installations and services and electricity (why is there a lack; material and people movement restrictions; lack of welfare of the population)<ref name="Muenchenbach"/>. The organizers of the roundtable felt that there is comprehensive and complex thinking missing when it comes to water and its linkage to the energy and food security sectors, which is critical for translating the NWS into action.<ref name="Ironside 15May2014"> P. Ironside, personal communication with Christine Buesser, May 15, 2014</ref> There is a need to create alliances and partnerships to advance from a more conservative mindset. The first such roundtable was held in Gaza on April 30, 2014, with another planned for September 2014.<ref name="Muenchenbach"/> According to one of the participants, for future roundtables, more private sector representatives, community-based organizations (farmers, users), and food security experts should be at the table.

==Water Supply ==

===Groundwater resources===
In Gaza, groundwater resources are contained in a shallow sandy aquifer, extending eastward to Israel and southward to Egypt. There are more than 5,000 water wells, most of them for agriculture purposes and with an average depth of 40-70 meters, and the water table lies between 20-50 meters below the ground surface.<ref name="PWA 2014"/> Gaza is a dry area and local aquifer recharge is very limited (55-60 MCM/year on average). Abstraction by all users (Israelis, Egyptians and Palestinians) already far exceeds natural recharge.<ref name="UN-ESCWA 2012"/> Consequently, the aquifer has been depleted and suffers from seawater intrusion. Groundwater abstraction in Gaza has reached 180 MCM/ year, whereas the natural aquifer recharge on this portion of the aquifer is estimated to be only 55 MCM/ year.<ref name="Al Yaqoubi 2012 report">Al Yaqoubi, A., Assessment of Risk and Uncertainty Related to Coastal Aquifer Management in the Gaza Strip/Palestine: report of Palestinian Water Authority (September 2012).</ref> For this reason, the long-term strategy aims to reduce total groundwater abstraction in Gaza from the current rate of 180 MCM/ year to 70 MCM/ year in 2032.<ref name="PWA 2014"/>

===Desalination of seawater===
There is only one seawater desalination plant located in the middle area of Gaza Strip (Deir El Balah) with a total capacity of 600 m3/ day (0.25 MCM/ year). By using two beach wells, it will be expanded to about 2600 m3/ day by year 2014.<ref name="PWA 2014"/>

===Desalination of brackish groundwater===
Most of the water supplied through the network is not directly used for drinking purposes due to the high content of chloride and nitrate (exceeding the drinking limit). There are about one hundred water vendors that supply water (for cooking and drinking) from brackish water desalination plants operated for 4-6 hours/ day. The total supplied quantities are 2.8 MCM/ year. The actual groundwater abstraction by these plants is about 4.8 MCM/ year.<ref name="PWA 2014"/>

More than 80% of Gaza’s people are buying water from these private vendors at a cost of 40 Israeli Shekel (ILS)/ m3. The average household (5 persons) consumption of such expensive water is about 0.5-1.0 m3/ month. The remaining people use in-house reverse osmosis units to desalinate and purify the water. In addition, there are eight groundwater desalination plants operated by the CMWU in the southern parts of Gaza (Khan Younis- Deir Al Balah and Rafah) whose water is distributed through domestic distribution networks, mixed with well water (with a total capacity of 1 MCM/ year).<ref name="PWA 2014"/>

===Reuse of treated wastewater===
There are different small demonstration reuse activities as pilot projects in scattered areas with total reuse quantities of around 1 MCM/ year.<ref name="PWA 2014"/>

===Water transfer from Israel===
As of Oslo II, 5 MCM/year of drinking water are imported into Gaza through the Israeli water company Mekorot, which Gaza has to pay for. According to the Oslo II Agreement, water supply from Israel should increase by an additional 5 MCM of desalinated water annually (Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Annex III: Protocol Concerning Civil Affairs) but so far the delivery of this water is pending and Mekorot has not started pumping this water, despite a letter from the PWA to do so. <ref name="PWA 2014"/>

'''Table 1: Gaza Unaccounted for Water (UFW) Percent and Baseline and Projected Production/ Import Needs'''
{{{!}} class="wikitable"
! Gaza Strip Water Supply values in Mm3/year
! baseline
! short term action plan
! colspan=3 {{!}} Long term strategy
{{!}}-
{{!}} {{!}}{{!}}2012{{!}}{{!}}2012-2017{{!}}{{!}}2017-2022{{!}}{{!}}2022-2027{{!}}{{!}}2027-2032
{{!}}-
{{!}}UFW%{{!}}{{!}}42,0%{{!}}{{!}}36,5%{{!}}{{!}}31,0%{{!}}{{!}}25,5%{{!}}{{!}}20,0%
{{!}}-
{{!}}Production needs{{!}}{{!}}102{{!}}{{!}}113{{!}}{{!}}134{{!}}{{!}}151{{!}}{{!}}276
{{!}}-
{{!}}Groundwater abstraction{{!}}{{!}}93{{!}}{{!}}48{{!}}{{!}}50{{!}}{{!}}37{{!}}{{!}}176
{{!}}-
{{!}} - from springs{{!}}{{!}}0{{!}}{{!}}0{{!}}{{!}}0{{!}}{{!}}0{{!}}{{!}}0
{{!}}-
{{!}} - from wells {{!}}{{!}}93{{!}}{{!}}48{{!}}{{!}}50{{!}}{{!}}37{{!}}{{!}}176
{{!}}-
{{!}}Desalination{{!}}{{!}}4,0{{!}}{{!}}55{{!}}{{!}}70{{!}}{{!}}100{{!}}{{!}}129
{{!}}-
{{!}}Import{{!}}{{!}}5{{!}}{{!}}10{{!}}{{!}}14{{!}}{{!}}14{{!}}{{!}}14
{{!}}-
{{!}}}
''Source: PWA. The current per capita water production rates in Gaza vary from just over 200 litres/ day in northern Gaza, to marginally over 100 litres/ day in Rafah in the south. Water consumption rates are considerably lower than these values, due to system inefficiencies of various types (leakage, illegal connections, etc.), which approach or may even exceed 40% in certain areas.''

==Issues worth mentioning regarding water supply==

There are regular power cuts in Gaza as the provision of electricity remains below demand. As of May 2014, there is an 8 hours ‘on’ and 8 hours ‘off’ electricity supply schedule, which will decrease to 6 hours ‘on’ and 12 hours ‘off’ during the hot summer months.<ref name="Muenchenbach"/> The problem is that Gaza’s infrastructure - including the water and sanitation (WATSAN) facilities - needs electricity. Gaza used to get fuel from Israel but in October 2007, following its declaration of Hamas-controlled Gaza as a “hostile territory”, Israel began limiting the amount of industrial diesel the Palestinian Fuel Authority is allowed to transfer to Gaza.<ref name="Gisha1">Gisha Legal Center for Freedom of Movement. (Undated). Gaza Power Plant. Retrieved from http://gisha.org/gazzamap/395
</ref> At the end of 2009, the European Union (EU) stopped funding the purchase of industrial diesel for the power plant. After that, the amount of diesel entering the Gaza Strip dropped even further due to a domestic Palestinian dispute concerning its funding.<ref name="Gisha1"/> Since January 2011, no industrial diesel fuel has entered the Gaza Strip from Israel. The power plant was using regular diesel purchased by the Energy Authority in Gaza through tunnels from Egypt. However, the entry of cheap fuel came to a near complete halt due to tunnel closures and/ or destruction by the Egyptian authorities.<ref name="Muenchenbach"/> The only reason that the GPP is not completely shut down is due to subsidized Qatari fuel (P. Ironside, personal communication, May 15, 2014). The service providers could not afford to pay higher fuel prices, and the costs of fuel imported from Israel is double the price of fuel that used to come from Egypt.<ref name="Muenchenbach"/> However, Qatar’s US$ 60 million six-months fuel subsidy is ending in June 2014.<ref name="Ironside 15May2014"/> As of May 2014, none of the Gaza stakeholders know what will happen after June 2014. However, Gaza receiving millions of dollars in fuel subsidies is not a sustainable way to keep the WATSAN facilities functioning.

According to multiple Gazan stakeholders, many different solutions to the electricity problem have been discussed in the past but without any significant result. The energy-water discussions have been activated during the donor-PWA-CMWU roundtable that was held in Gaza on April 30, 2014, as the water strategy cannot be implemented without additional electricity.<ref name="Ironside 15May2014"/> Some of the options being discussed include the following:

*Expansion of existing GPP?
**The GPP was originally designed for a capacity of 140 mega watts (MW) but currently has a limited capacity of only 60 to 80 MW because of spare parts and fuel shortages<ref name="Milner 24April2014">M. Milner, personal communication with Christine Buesser, April 24, 2014</ref>
**After the GPP’s transformers were hit by Israeli missiles in 2006 (after the capture of Israeli *Upgrade existing GPP from diesel to natural gas to ease reliance on fuel, which is costly?
**The GPP was originally designed to be operated by gas but due to a shortage of gas, it is now operated by diesel<ref name="Al Yaqoubi 01May2014"> A. Al Yaqoubi, personal communication with Christine Buesser May 01, 2014</ref>
**Upgrade of the GPP would cost US$ 32 million and could be completed in eight months<ref name="Ironside 15May2014"/> which is less money than the US$ 60 million in Qatari subsidized fuel for a period of six months ending in June 2014
*Increase amount of electricity from Israel?
**Israel is in a difficult situation when it comes to electricity (at capacity); on the other hand quantities needed in Gaza are very small (to sell 100 MW to Gaza should not be an issue) (anonymous, personal communication, unknown date)
**Israel is also starting to benefit from gas off its coast in the eastern Mediterranean
***In a few years Israel will have much more gas then they need to meet their own demand
***Israeli’s gas companies could start to negotiate with various partners - including Gazans - to sell gas, but Israel’s political lobby might not be on board (e.g. Israel should not be doing anything for Gaza and Egypt should become the supplier for anything to Gaza).<ref name="INGO 27April2014"/>
***GPP could be connected to gas line
*Increase amount of electricity from Egypt?
**Additional supply could also come from Egypt; however it is not clear if Egypt is in a position to export more energy<ref name="Al Yaqoubi 12May2014"> A. Al Yaqoubi, personal communication with Christine Buesser, May 12, 2014</ref>
**If additional infrastructure is built, the electricity coming from Egypt could be more than doubled <ref name="Ironside 15May2014"/>
**Gaza could be connected to the electricity grid shared among the Arab countries (similar to the system that exists in Europe), which the PA and Egypt have been negotiating for a long time with no outcome so far
***Solar energy?
**PWA and donors started to think about solar with a small project to minimize the stress on the grids; however solar power needs space and Gaza is very crowded
**As of May 2014, PWA together with the World Bank are drafting a ToR to do a 3-month study regarding solar energy’s affordability and feasibility in Gaza<ref name="Al Yaqoubi 09May2014">A. Al Yaqoubi, personal communication with Christine Buesser, May 09, 2014</ref>
*Desalination plant to combined with energy plant to be self-sufficient?

==Water Demand==

The population of the State of Palestine has been increasing at a very high rate for the last ten years, approximately 3.5 % per year.<ref name="PCBS 2011">Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (2011). A special bulletin on the Palestinians on the Occasion of World Population Reaching 7 Billion. Ramallah, occupied Palestinian territory: Author. Retrieved from http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_PCBS/Downloads/book1794.pdf</ref> The Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development (MoPAD) expects the growth rate will remain very high over the coming years, but it is expected to slow slightly as a result of changes in education and family structure, as has been observed in other Mediterranean countries. MoPAD has also made a demographic projection, which includes: a progressive decrease from the present population growth rate to a more modest rate by 2032; and a dramatic inflow of Palestinian returnees as a consequence of a final agreement with Israel.<ref name="PWA 2014"/>

One of the most relevant water service parameters is the quantity of water made available to each citizen. The total amount of water supplied in Gaza provides each person with an average of 96 liters per capita per day (lpc/ day) in Gaza; however 95% of Gaza water is of unacceptable quality. The objective of the PWA is to provide 120 lpc/ day of quality water by 2030; however, this increase will be constrained not only by the customers’ capacity and willingness-to-pay for this service, but also by consumers’ support to limit water wastage and the over-abstraction of limited water resources. <ref name="PWA 2014"/>

'''Table: Average water available in liters per capita per day in Palestine by year'''
{{{!}} class="wikitable"
!
! 2004
! 2005
! 2006
! 2007
! 2008
! 2009
! 2010
{{!}}-
{{!}}Palestine{{!}}{{!}}85{{!}}{{!}}83{{!}}{{!}}81{{!}}{{!}}83{{!}}{{!}}88{{!}}{{!}}82{{!}}{{!}}82
{{!}}-
{{!}}West Bank{{!}}{{!}}80{{!}}{{!}}78{{!}}{{!}}76{{!}}{{!}}79{{!}}{{!}}86{{!}}{{!}}75{{!}}{{!}}72
{{!}}-
{{!}}Gaza{{!}}{{!}}91{{!}}{{!}}90{{!}}{{!}}89{{!}}{{!}}88{{!}}{{!}}91{{!}}{{!}}92{{!}}{{!}}96
{{!}}-
{{!}}}

''These estimates from the Technical, Planning and Advisory Team (TPAT) calculations using PWA sources are for total availability and is greater than the amount reaching endusers due to loss''

'''Table: Gaza Baseline and Projected Water Demand, Domestic and Industrial Demand (Mmm3/year) '''

{{{!}} class="wikitable"
!
! baseline
! short term action plan
! colspan = 3 {{!}} Long term strategy
{{!}}-
{{!}} {{!}}{{!}}2012{{!}}{{!}}2012-2017{{!}}{{!}}2017-2022{{!}}{{!}}2022-2027{{!}}{{!}}2027-2032
{{!}}-
{{!}}population (MoPAD estimate){{!}}{{!}}1 644 293 {{!}}{{!}}1 994 680{{!}}{{!}}2 339 313{{!}}{{!}}2 645 554{{!}}{{!}}3 001 518
{{!}}-
{{!}}Domestic Water Demand {{!}}{{!}}58{{!}}{{!}}70{{!}}{{!}}89{{!}}{{!}}106{{!}}{{!}}132
{{!}}-
{{!}}Industrial Water Demand (Mm3/year est as 3% domestic){{!}}{{!}}1.7{{!}}{{!}}2.1{{!}}{{!}}3.8{{!}}{{!}}6{{!}}{{!}}9.2
{{!}}-
{{!}}total demand (domestic + industry) Mm3/year{{!}}{{!}}59{{!}}{{!}}72{{!}}{{!}}93{{!}}{{!}}112{{!}}{{!}}141
{{!}}}
''Source: PWA. Baseline and projected demand for domestic and industrial water in Gaza. The 58 MCM/ year reflects the consumption quantity, which is less than the total abstraction due to leakages, distribution losses, theft, etc. System efficiency is around 60%.''

There are no large industrial facilities (chemical plants, cement factories, etc.) consuming high volumes of water in Gaza, and most industries are small factories that use the urban water supply network as their sole source of water.<ref name="PWA 2014"/> Some industrial facilities also use private wells, which are mainly registered as irrigation wells, as PWA has not issued abstraction rights for industry wells.<ref name="PWA 2014"/> According to PWA estimations, industrial consumption is very low, as farmers already struggle to find sufficient water to irrigate their land and are therefore unwilling to resell this water to industry. The baseline for industry is 3% of domestic demand, which equates to 3 MCM/ year. <ref name="PWA 2014"/>If political constraints are removed, the market opportunities for Gazan industries will increase and more investors will venture to develop small factories.

According to the most recent data, there are 133,355 dunum (equivalent to 13,425 ha) of irrigable land in Gaza.<ref name="SP MoA 2011">State of Palestine Ministry of Agriculture (2011). Agriculture Sector strategy 2011-2013. Ramallah, occupied Palestinian territory.</ref><ref name="PCBS 2010">Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (2010). A Comparative Study on the Social, Familial, Marital, Educational and Economic Characteristics of the Households in the Palestinian Territory (1997–2007). Ramallah, occupied Palestinian territory: Author. Retrieved from http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_PCBS/Downloads/book1648.pdf</ref>. </ref> However, demand for water has been assessed on the basis of irrigated, rather than irrigable, land. The amount of water required per dunum varies from one place to another and is dependent on rainfall, temperature, quality of soil, the type of crop being grown and the irrigation technology used (submersion, sprinklers, drip irrigation, etc.). For overall planning purposes, the MoA recommends using an average figure of 500 m3/ dunum/ year taking the recent development of drip irrigation into account.<ref name="SP MoA 2011"/> If the current political situation persists, it is considered that the amount of water available for irrigation will be severely constrained.

==Issues worth mentioning regarding water demand==
Most Palestinian (including Gazan) localities have no continuous water service. The water operator manages to pipe water to each section of the network for a few hours per day (or a few hours every two days or more) and customers have to invest in storage facilities if they wish to have water available all day long (UNICEF, personal communication, unknown date). As the network lacks pressure for several hours of every day, it becomes very vulnerable to contamination by wastewater infiltration.<ref name="PWA 2014"/> In addition, intermittent water distribution causes the network to deteriorate at a faster rate and reduces its lifespan.

===UFW and NRW===
Unaccounted for water (UFW) is calculated as the difference between water produced and water billed to customers, and is expressed as a percentage of water production. This figure aggregates leakages in the network (distribution losses) and water that is stolen. Non-revenue water (NRW) is the addition to UFW of the percentage of water that has been accounted for, but not billed (e.g. mosque, camps, fire fighting, etc.). It is generally slightly higher than UFW and it is expressed in percentage. In Gaza, PWA has calculated that UFW stands at 41 to 46 %, which by international standards is high for an area that is almost flat and mainly equates to stolen water.

===Collection rates===
In addition to high UFW, service providers suffer from low bill collection rates and NRW is very high. The average collection rate in Gaza is 25- 50 %.<ref name="PWA 2014"/> When compared with neighboring countries (such as Jordan or Egypt, not to mention Israel), it is clear that the performances of the Palestinian water providers with regard to NRW are poor.

===Problem Statement: Total recharge is only one third of total abstractions===
In 2014, the total abstracted groundwater volume is about 95 MCM for municipal uses (domestic and industrial) in addition to about 85 MCM/ year for agricultural uses<ref name="CBuesser pres">Christine Buesser, public presentation, MIT Water Diplomacy course, May 15, 2014 archived online at: [[File:Buesser, Christine - Gaza Water Management Presentation MIT May 2014 external use.pdf]]</ref>. This is in addition to 4.8 MCM/ year from the groundwater small-scale desalination plants (with a supply of 2.8 MCM/ year due to system inefficiency) and 0.25 MCM/ year from Deir El Balah seawater desalination plant.<ref name="CBuesser pres"/> Hence the total abstracted volume is about 185 MCM/ year, which means that the total recharge (55-60 MCM/ year) is only one third of total abstractions.<ref name="CBuesser pres"/> This gap will only increase further with the expected population growth rate remaining very high over the coming years and a potentially drastic inflow of Palestinian returnees as a consequence of a final agreement with Israel. The PWA expects demand for fresh water to grow to 260 MCM/ year by 2020, an increase of 60% over 2012 levels of abstraction from the aquifer.<ref name="PWA 2014"/>

Note that the 5 MCM/ year supplied from Israel (Mekorot) and the 1 MCM/ year from pilot schemes wastewater reuse are not part of the abstraction calculation.
|Summary=The Gaza Strip (Gaza) is a region on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea that borders Egypt on the southwest and Israel on the east and north. Gaza has a total area of 378 km2 (40 km in length, 6-12 km in width) with a total population of about 1.8 million inhabitants (70% of the population are refugees abroad). <ref name="Al Yaqoubi 2014 pres">Al Yaqoubi, A. (2014). Water Resources Management, Use and Sustainable Development in the Gaza Strip, Palestine [PowerPoint Slides].</ref> Since 2007, the Gaza Strip has been de-facto governed by Hamas, a Palestinian faction claiming to be the legitimate representatives of the Palestinian National Authority or Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Palestinian People. Israel, US, Canada, EU, Jordan, Egypt and Japan classify Hamas as a terrorist organization, while Iran, Russia, Turkey, China and many nations across the Arab world do not.<ref name="Hamas 2014">Hamas. (2014, June 13). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 14:21, June 15, 2014, from http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Hamas&oldid=612805559</ref> Following the elections, the Quartet (United States, Russia, United Nations [UN], and European Union [EU]) conditioned future foreign assistance to the PA on the future government's commitment to nonviolence, recognition of the state of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements. Hamas resisted such changes, leading to Quartet suspension of its foreign assistance program. Israel and Egypt then imposed an economic blockade on Gaza, on the grounds that Fatah forces were no longer providing security there. <ref name="Hamas 2014"/> In 2012, the UN recognized the Gaza Strip as part of the State of Palestine, which includes the territory claimed by the Palestinian government in Ramallah. However, geographically speaking, Gaza is completely isolated from the West Bank and there is currently no territorial link. Under the Oslo Accords, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are recognized "as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period".<ref name="Wikipedia Palestinian fom">Palestinian freedom of movement. (2014, May 7). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 14:19, June 15, 2014, from http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Palestinian_freedom_of_movement&oldid=607462403</ref> Israel, however, has changed this position and now considers the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as "two separate and different areas."<ref name="Hamoked BTselem 2014">Hamoked & B'Tselem (January 2014). So near and yet so far—Implications of Israeli Imposed Seclusion of Gaza Strip on Palestinians’ Right to Family Life. Retrieved from http://www.btselem.org/publications/201401_so_near_and_yet_so_far</ref>

The Coastal aquifer in Gaza is part of the Coastal Aquifer Basin that stretches along the eastern Mediterranean coast from the northern Sinai Peninsula via Gaza to northern Israel.<ref name="UN-ESCWA 2012">United Nations- Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (UN-ESCWA), Inventory of Shared Water Resources in Western Asia - Coastal Aquifer: report of the Federal Institute of Geosciences and Natural Resources (2012).</ref> Water resources in Gaza are limited, and the Coastal aquifer is the only source of fresh water for the Palestinian population in Gaza.<ref name="PWA 2014">Palestinian Water Authority. (March 2014). Gaza Strip: No Clean Drinking Water, No Enough Energy, and Threatened Future. Gaza, occupied Palestinian territory.</ref> For the last three decades, the aquifer has been subjected to extreme pressure due to increasing demand for fresh water relative to the limited natural replenishment rate of the aquifer. This condition has resulted in the increase of many sources of pollution including seawater intrusion, leakage of partially treated sewage, return flow from irrigation water, etc.<ref name="UN-ESCWA 2012"/> There is little rainfall and no reliable surface flow; hence water supply for different purposes is tied to groundwater. Gaza’s population presently extracts almost three times the aquifer’s sustainable yearly recharge. <ref name="PWA 2014"/> At its present rate of deterioration due to pollution and amount of groundwater remaining, the aquifer will be unusable by 2016, and irreversibly damaged by 2020.<ref name="UNRWA 2014">United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), UNRWA leads the way with region’s first ‘Green School’. 24 March 2014, http://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/press-releases/unrwa-leads-way-region’s-first-‘green-school’.</ref> Even if the aquifer cannot be irreversibly damaged, the likelihood of the aquifer being a sustainable water resource is decreasing in the years to come.<ref name="Togenburg">Personal communication between Christine Buesser and J. von Toggenburg, May 15, 2014.</ref>

Hamas' rise to power had a significant impact on water and sanitation issues in Gaza as highlighted below. The Palestinian Water Authority was split into two, one in Ramallah and one in Gaza. However, management and long-term planning has continued to be at the hands of the PA in Ramallah because they have the resources.<ref name="Z. Lunat 24May2014">Z. Lunat, personal communication with Christine Buesser, May 24, 2014)</ref> There was a donor arrangement to work through Coastal Municipalities Water Undertaking (CMWU) as they were seen as independent enough to be trusted with donor money to channel local projects.<ref name="Z. Lunat 24May2014"/> As part of an arrangement with the PA, the PWA is responsible for the water sector in Gaza.<ref name="Milner">M. Milner, personal communication with Christine Buesser April 24, 2014)</ref> Today access to Gaza is restricted under full Israeli military control. Moreover, the Rafah border crossing with Egypt, which is the only gateway that is not controlled by Israel, has been repeatedly closed since the installment of the military-installed government in Cairo.<ref name="UN pc">UN official, personal communication with Christine Buesser, April 25, 2014</ref> Israel also maintains a naval blockade along Gaza’s entire coastline (at a distance of approximately 3 nautical miles). In addition to essential items such as food or fuel, Israel’s blockade restricts the entry of materials needed to upgrade and repair Gaza’s collapsing water and wastewater infrastructure (e.g. cement) (EWASH, public presentation, March 18, 2014). Fuel shortages continue to create rolling electricity blackouts that in turn affect water distribution to household reservoirs, while many water wells have stopped working or are working at half capacity due to a lack of spare parts. <ref name="PWA CMWU 2014">Palestinian Water Authority & Coastal Municipalities Water Utility (2014, April 30). ‘Water and Energy’ - Time for solutions: from risk to resource [PowerPoint Slides].
</ref> Crucially, this also prevents Palestinians from exploring other options in terms of accessing alternative water supplies, and has delayed the importation of additional water. Despite an agreement for Israel to provide an additional 5 million cubic meters of water per year (MCM/ year) - in addition to the 5 MCM/ year Israel is already selling to Gaza - this agreement has not been activated by the Israelis due to political reasons, even though the necessary infrastructure on both sides has been completed.<ref name="Yaqoubi 24April2014">A. Al Yaqoubi, personal communication with Christine Buesser, April 24, 2014)</ref>
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Gaza Strip Water Management

2014-06-25T20:23:06Z

Christine.Buesser:

ASI:Threats to Addressing a Water Strategy for Gaza

2014-06-25T20:22:16Z

Christine.Buesser: Created page with "{{ASI |First Contributor=Christine Buesser |Case Study=Gaza Strip Water Management |Reflection Text Summary=The task faced in improving the water sector in Gaza is thus of sig..."

ASI:Short and Long Term Solutions for Water Problems in Gaza

2014-06-25T19:35:48Z

Christine.Buesser: Created page with "{{ASI |First Contributor=Christine Buesser |Case Study=Gaza Strip Water Management |Reflection Text Summary=An immediate priority should be to dramatically reduce current grou..."

{{ASI
|First Contributor=Christine Buesser
|Case Study=Gaza Strip Water Management
|Reflection Text Summary=An immediate priority should be to dramatically reduce current groundwater abstraction rates in order to reverse the damage being done to the Coastal aquifer underlying Gaza. The PWA’s short-term strategy aims to reduce the total groundwater abstraction in Gaza to about 150 MCM/ year in order to bridge the gap between water supply and demand. This would allow the aquifer to gradually replenish itself predominantly through natural recharge. However, a complete replenishment of the aquifer can only be achieved if the total abstraction is further reduced to about 70 MCM/ year and if the agricultural needs can be met with treated wastewater. A number of options exist spanning water demand management for both agricultural and domestic use to supply side options utilizing technology (desalination) or water transfer. These options are described here, including SWOT analysis of major options.

|Reflection Text=Even though a complete moratorium on groundwater extraction would be ideal, it is not realistic as long as there are no others solutions operational to at least address the loss in water supply from the aquifer. However, an immediate priority should be to dramatically reduce current groundwater abstraction rates in order to reverse the damage being done to the Coastal aquifer underlying Gaza. The PWA’s short-term strategy aims to reduce the total groundwater abstraction in Gaza to about 150 MCM/ year in order to bridge the gap between water supply and demand.<ref name="PWA 2014">Palestinian Water Authority. (March 2014). Gaza Strip: No Clean Drinking Water, No Enough Energy, and Threatened Future. Gaza, occupied Palestinian territory</ref>This would allow the aquifer to gradually replenish itself predominantly through natural recharge. However, a complete replenishment of the aquifer can only be achieved if the total abstraction is further reduced to about 70 MCM/ year and if the agricultural needs can be met with treated wastewater.<ref name="PWA 2014"/>

Hence an affordable alternative water supply must be found to meet the water needs of Gaza’s residents. The options are limited as a result of Israel’s continuing blockade; however, in discussion with multiple stakeholders in Gaza, the following interventions are being considered:<ref name="PWA 2014"/>

*Water Demand Management
**Upgrade of pipe work and repair of infrastructure to reduce system losses (leakage/ infiltration) and deliver high-quality water for domestic use by consumers
**Development of wastewater reuse and higher water use efficiencies in the agricultural sector
**Management of domestic and agricultural water consumption
*Collection and re-infiltration of rain and storm water
*Seawater desalination both in the short-term (to create relatively low water volumes for blending back to limited quantities of groundwater, for domestic use by residents of Gaza), and in the much longer term to assure a consistent supply of high-quality water for the expanding population
*Additional low-volume water imports from Israel or other countries; it is important to note that the PWA does not consider the additional water from Israel a reliable and major source of water for Gaza (because of political interference by the Israeli government).

As per the CSO-G report recommendations, a Project Coordination Unit (PCU) with the support of the Austrian government was established in September 2013 to seek funding for the water strategy work plan and monitor the implementation of the above-mentioned interventions. Four people (water supply, media, monitoring and water health experts) are working in the PCU and are supported by the PWA. A technical consultant was hired by the Austrian government to review the work plan and report on the activities and their respective performance.

In addition, a water and health monitoring project was started, integrating the various ongoing efforts of this type into a more coherent package and ensuring that reliable data are available to drive the interventions, and to monitor their success. The Terms of Reference (ToR) to make the base line water quality study was finalized to try to establish links between the water quality and the various diseases.

Finally, a comprehensive review should be completed of the use of water and the economic returns from water - in the agricultural sector in Gaza. This should seek to minimize water use and maximize economic returns.

==Water Demand Side Options (Domestic and Agricultural Use)==

===Domestic Use Water Demand Management (WDM)===
Water demand has to be managed by regulating demand at the domestic consumer level, through the use of diverse economic instruments and water-saving measures. However, not all of these general principles are relevant to the Gaza scenario. The possibilities for reducing water use in the domestic sector in Gaza are limited.<ref name="PWA 2014"/> .

Many of the Gaza population presently consume less than the recommended minimum volume of fresh water as established by the WHO, this being either 100 or 150 lpc/ day. Therefore, the focus should be on addressing the leakages in the system, the water thefts and inefficiencies to create some improvements because the domestic consumers cannot be expected to reduce their water consumption by a significant margin under the current circumstances. According to the PWA in Gaza, if the system efficiency is increased by 20%, then 20 to 30 MCM of water/ year could be saved.<ref name="PWA 2014"/> At the moment this is an ongoing activity with only small improvements hence more needs to be done. Major investments in the distribution networks (leakage detection, illegal connection detection, pressure management, pressure districts, etc.), improving the service providers’ performance and/or efficiency in technical, administrative and financial components and at the customer connection level are needed<ref name="ICRC">ICRC, personal communication with Christine Buesser, April 27, 2014</ref>. The problems with leakage and infiltration are much less intractable in Gaza in relation to the agricultural use of groundwater, compared to domestic water supply.<ref name="PWA 2014"/> Where leakage occurs, the flows generally recycle into the groundwater and infiltration is of much less importance in the agricultural sector, as there are far less constraints on water quality at the point of use. Therefore, provision of pipe work in the agricultural sector in Gaza is secondary and should instead focus upon the accelerated introduction of the reuse of wastewater.<ref name="PWA 2014"/>

In addition, service providers are not big and financially sound enough to improve the capacity to increase collection efficiency and there are no regulations to force people to pay for water (A. Al Yaqoubi, personal communication, May 01, 2014). However, in order to make any significant infrastructure investments interesting enough for donors, the sustainability aspect has to be addressed. Hence the tariffs and the collection rates would have to be improved in order to cover the operational and maintenance costs of any such project into the future.<ref name="Muenchenbach"/> The political climate is as such that Hamas is not involved in the business of water and/ or infrastructure and there is no pressure from the government to increase tariffs or make consumers pay.<ref name="INGO 27April2014"/> The use of higher tariffs to attempt to reduce water consumption would also be of little or no benefit, especially at the current levels of poverty in Gaza (no income with 40% of people below the poverty line). It costs roughly 200 ILS/ family/ month for water and taxes an amount, which is unaffordable to many Gazan families. However, PWA with support of the World Bank just finished the ToR to survey households in Gaza to see the capability and willingness to pay for services such as electricity, water, etc. (PWA, personal communication, May 01, 2014). The PWA and the World Bank hope to understand the underlying causes of this deficiency: Are customers not paying because of the bad services, sheer lack of willingness and/ or because they are simply too poor? Could the tariffs be increased for some parts of the population?

The survey will also help to see if the installation of prepaid meters could be an option for the water sector to increase the collection of bills. However, it should be based on a cross-subsidized model. This is currently being done in the power sector in Gaza and it seems to be working because it does not present a lot of money.<ref name="INGO 27April2014"/>

====SWOT: Water Demand Management====
{{{!}} class="wikitable" width="60%"
{{!}}-
! Strengths/ Opportunities
! Weaknesses/ Threats
{{!}}- valign="top"
{{!}}
*Domestic water supplies: potential reduced system losses (renovated/ re-supplied distribution system)
*Agricultural water supplies: potential attention to irrigation techniques and cropping patterns
*Sector education possible where groundwater use is high: domestic users have been educated in the appropriate use of different types of water; and farmers have been encouraged to reduce their rates of groundwater abstraction and to commence the utilization of treated wastewaters
{{!}}
*As a whole, the institutional system of service providers has to be improved, which has to be accompanied by a reform of the water sector whereby responsibilities are divided into many levels: strategic and policy level done by the PWA/ regulatory body (1st level), bulk water utility responsible for supply water to service providers (2nd level), service providers (3rd level)
**This proposal is currently in the Cabinet but has not been endorsed yet
*If the domestic water distribution system in Gaza is not adequately upgraded and maintained, most consumers will experience little change in the water quality (or quantity) available to them hence they are less likely to start paying for water
*If the improvements in the agricultural sector are not realized, further degradation of the groundwater will continue to erode agricultural productivities
*A 20% increase in system efficiency is not an easy task and they have to be met within twenty years (i.e. by 2032)
{{!}}}

===WDM - Wastewater treatment for Agricultural Use ===

Domestic flows would be treated and reused for agricultural needs. The reuse of treated wastewater is a very important component because approximately half of the current fresh water use in Gaza is allocated to the agricultural sector. While interventions pertaining to the domestic use of water will serve to reduce the abstraction pressure on the groundwater to some extent (especially when the regional desalination facilities come on-line), the introduction of wastewater reuse will be an exceptionally important component of any reduction in the present over-abstraction of groundwater.<ref name="Yaqoubi 24April2014"/> Nevertheless, according to Clemens Messerschmid, wastewater reuse cannot solve the drinking water crisis (due to the poor quality of effluents) and can only be an optimization of, and an addition to, existing agricultural supplies.<ref name="Messerschmid 2011">Messerschmid, C. (2011). Water in Gaza: Problems and Prospects. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1764252</ref>

Over the last decade, a number of small-scale reuse schemes have been developed for experimentation and demonstration purposes (House of Water and Environment [HWE], no date). The results of these experiments (plus those of the regional experience) provide sufficient proof for the programs to evolve into the next stage: medium-sized pilot projects.<ref name="PWA 2014"/> In order to mobilize the farmers more rapidly, awareness-raising campaigns have to continue to be conducted to inform potential users of the benefits and safety of water reuse. For example, MoA and Ministry of Health (MoH) have to produce a limited list of crops for which irrigation with wastewater is permitted and considered safe and with efficient irrigation system.<ref name="Yaqoubi 12May2014">A. Al Yaqoubi, personal communication with Christine Buesser, May 12, 2014</ref>

There are already three large Wastewater Treatment Plants (WWTPS) in place in Gaza (Beit Lahiya, Gaza and Rafa) and additional high-quality capacities are under construction.<ref name="PWA 2014"/> All the existing WWTPS in Gaza Strip are function at moderate efficiency rates (45-70%); they also operate above their actual capacity and are in need of upgrade and maintenance.<ref name="PWA 2014"/> The biological treatment is not done in a proper way and they do not have facility to absorb the water for re-use.

Hence, the reuse of treated wastewaters depends fundamentally on the completion of the following high-quality WWTPS.<ref name="Yaqoubi 24April2014">A. Al Yaqoubi, personal communication with Christine Buesser, April 24, 2014)</ref>

*North Gaza WWTP (35,000 m3/ day) should have been put in operation by end of 2012. Delay due to restrictions on delivery of equipment and materials, access to site and the provision of a three MW power supply from Israel. Its reuse and recovery scheme is also delayed due to funding, land acquisition of small parts (affected by the internal division) and the very conservative environmental concerns of donors. Additional 7 MW power supply is needed as well.
*Gaza and Middle area WWTP (120,000 m3/ day) has been delayed since 2003 due to initial security concerns because it is situated close to the ‘Green Line’. There is an agreement between the PWA and its Israeli counterpart where Israel approved the location hence there should not be any security problems anymore. Recently engineering works have resumed to revise designs and can be put into operation by 2018 under optimistic scenarios. Additional Power supply of 6.5 MW will be needed.
*South Khan Younis WWTP (26,000 m3/ day) has been delayed since early 2000. Recently an agreement to bridge the fund deficit is furnished between Islamic Development Bank (IDB) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to complement an available fund from Japan. It is anticipated that the project can be functional by 2017. Additional 1.8 MW of energy is needed. Reusing the treated effluent still lacks funding.
Even though the international community has invested in the building of three large regional sewage treatments facilities with the treatment plant for northern Gaza completed since September last year, no treatment plant is able to operate as long as Gaza has insufficient electricity supply to power them.<ref name="Z. Lunat 24May2014">Z. Lunat, personal communication with Christine Buesser, May 24, 2014)</ref>

====SWOT: Wastewater Treatment====
{{{!}} class="wikitable" width="60%"
{{!}}-
! Strengths/ Opportunities
! Weaknesses/ Threats
{{!}}- valign="top"
{{!}}
*Farmers in Gaza are willing to utilize treated wastewaters for irrigation, if flows of the relevant volume are made available
*Wherever large scale wastewater reuse is carried out, scientific monitoring will be conducted by an approved laboratory
**Instituting such monitoring will help minimize any potentially detrimental impacts on the environment and, more specifically, on the soil and underlying aquifers
*Opportunity for a strategic review to increase the economic water productivity (the economic return generated per cubic meter of water allocated to the sector in Gaza):
**Increase drip irrigation
**Conjunctive use of Green Water and Blue Water
**Production of high-value crops for export to generate income to support importation of staple foods
*Under the umbrella of the trilateral cooperation organized by the Middle East Desalination Research Center, Israelis are giving wastewater and desalination training to Palestinian professionals and technicians
{{!}}
*Restrictions on delivery of materials and movement of people, which will delay any project
*Insufficient energy supply to operate WWTPS in Gaza; dependency of additional energy from Israel
*Sustainability of implementation is the main issue for donors (who covers the running costs/ maintenance?)
**For example, the North Gaza treatment plant is finished but there is no power and even if there is power, Gaza does not have the money to cover the running costs/ maintenance
*For the pilot wastewater reuse schemes to be augmented, the major wastewater treatment plants scattered throughout Gaza need to be completed, as reuse cannot be introduced at any significant scale in the absence of high-quality wastewater treatment
*If the wastewater treatment facilities cannot be completed in a short period of time, there will be no significant volumes of treated wastewater appropriate for reuse, and the farmers will simply continue to over-pump the groundwater (increasing the deficit of fresh water)
*Policy-level issues have not been addressed yet (coherent policy regarding wastewater use needs to be put in place)
**Environmental Limit Values (standards and guidelines)
**Right-of-use
**Tariff-setting mechanism
{{!}}}

==Domestic Use Supply Side Options==

===Desalination of seawater===

For over 20 years, a major desalination plant for Gaza has been discussed, but nothing has been done mainly because of insecurity and political instability (for example, there was the withdrawal of an American obligation to fund the construction of a desalination plant).<ref name="UNICEF 25April2014"> UNICEF, personal communication with Christine Buesser, April 25, 2014</ref>.

A 2011 CSO-G report concluded once more that regional desalination should be a priority for Gaza. Seawater desalination plants coupled with wastewater reuse in the agricultural sector are important as they reduce the present levels of over-abstraction of the groundwater. A big desalination project takes time and a significant amount of money hence short-term, low volume (STLV) desalination is relevant because relatively small volumes of desalinated water can be produced rapidly to address the drinking water problems. However, the STLV desalination cannot solve the existing problems of the over-abstraction of the aquifer.<ref name="CSO-G 2011"/>

Therefore, the current water strategy includes building three STLV desalination plants with a total of 13 MCM/ year for emergency needs to improve quality of water and a regional high-volume desalination plant with a total of 55 MCM/ year (that can be expanded later on) to be completed by 2017.<ref name="PWA 2014"/>

The location and capacity of the STLV desalination plants were defined in conjunction with the central desalination plant.<ref name="Al Yaqoubi 01May2014">A. Al Yaqoubi, personal communication with Christine Buesser, May 01, 2014</ref> As of May 2014, the EU has given the funding (10 million euros) to start building one of the three plants with a capacity of 2 MCM/ year; if more money can be made available, the capacity could be increased.<ref name="Yaqoubi 09May2014">A. Al Yaqoubi, personal communication with Christine Buesser, May 09, 2014</ref> The project is currently in the design phase and the idea is to blend the reservoir with the groundwater and then the water is redistributed to consumers. This plant will be serving 75,000 inhabitants (5% of Gaza) and the costs for consumers will increase from 1.5 ILS - in that area the price is already higher in comparison to Gaza city where the current price is 1 ILS - to 2 ILS.<ref name="Yaqoubi 09May2014"/> System losses should be improved (40% of losses are not acceptable) and PWA hopes to get 75% of system efficiency.<ref name="Yaqoubi 09May2014"/>

The US$ 450 million regional project has support from Israel and the major donor countries. The plant site has been secured (along the coast) and preliminary negotiations are under way with development banks: IDB has committed 50% of the total costs but the bank wants other countries (e.g. EU) to commit the other 50% as they consider this project a priority<ref name="UNICEF 15MAY2014"> UNICEF, personal communication with Christine Buesser, May 15, 2014</ref>. As of May 2014, there is still a funding gap with only the French government having committed an additional 10 million euros.<ref name="Yaqoubi 24April2014"/>

Due to the current political (Gaza blockage) and economic environment (no income), there are many valid concerns of the feasibility and sustainability of such a big project.<ref name="Muenchenbach">M. Muenchenbach, personal communication with Christine Buesser, April 25, 2014.</ref> Hence a project implementation consultant (PIC) was contracted by the European Investment Bank (EIB) in January 2014 for 24 months to conduct additional studies and surveys (including energy options) in addition to the preparation of design-build tender documents.<ref name="PWA 2014"/> Power is a very big issue and a real concern of all the donors given the 40% energy deficit in Gaza with only eight hours of energy/ day.<ref name="Muenchenbach"/> Without electricity, water facilities/ wells cannot pump hence fuel is needed, which is too expensive. The consultant was specifically asked to look into the options of covering the additional power needs of 35 MW.<ref name="PWA 2014"/> As energy cannot be delinked from any desalination project, PWA is asking donors to also include money for energy. Another PIC will be recruited through the World Bank support on the associated projects side including the North South main water carrier, the reduction of Non-Revenue water and the Energy Supply.<ref name="PWA 2014"/>

According to multiple Gazan stakeholders, the regional desalination plant is a very difficult project. Just getting the EU-funded STLV plant into the design phase was a huge challenge given the donor’s skepticism. However, once this plant is operational, it will give an idea of the performance in terms of operations, maintenance, recovering the costs, etc. One of the staff of the PWA in Gaza said the following: “If we do not succeed with this small plant, then everything else will be a big problem hence it is like a test case at the very small scale.”

As far as Clemens Messerschmid is concerned, the desalination solution is misleading, not only because it is entirely unecological and unaffordable for Gaza’s impoverished population but also because it is expensive.<ref name="Messerschmid 2011"/> Israel advertises desalination as the solution for the chronic water conflict also out of its interest not to share any of its existing fresh water use with the Palestinian co-riparians<ref name="Messerschmid 2011"/>. Unfortunately, for pragmatic-political reasons more and more donor states start advocating this unfair and wasteful option, because they consider the simple alternative as politically not "enforceable" or "unrealistic": to pressure Israel to at least partly sell some of its surplus in the south to Gaza.<ref name="Messerschmid 2011"/>

The question becomes what the alternative to a regional desalination plant would be in order to have the same positive effects on the aquifer. According to one person at the PWA in Gaza, there is a solution for delaying the problem, which is far from ideal: increase the number of the wells to redistribute the abstraction to many wells and to minimize the water level decline and the seawater intrusion by some extent. However, it will be expensive to add wells and to re-configure the system.

====SWOT: Desalination====
{{{!}} class="wikitable" width="60%"
{{!}}-
! Strengths/ Opportunities
! Weaknesses/ Threats
{{!}}- valign="top"
{{!}}
*Historical reticence of the Palestinian authorities to introduce desalination in Gaza has softened in recent years
*Adds ‘new water’ to the equation in Gaza, which is highly desirable (unlike desalination from brackish groundwater)
*Gaza Strip borders the Mediterranean Sea, a nearly unlimited source of saltwater
*Seawater desalination technologies are mature and there are competing manufacturers of reliable equipment on the market (many of them with good track records of producing desalination plants of the same category as those planned in Gaza)
*Economies of scale and improvements in reverse-osmosis technology have reduced the price of desalinated water significantly
*STLV are a rapid response till LTHV plant is operational (at least 6 years)
*There are several small pilot plants already operating, most sponsored by international agencies, but they can meet only a fraction of present demand
*Good political security of supply (desalinator and pipelines) as under Palestinian control; infighting would need control
*High likelihood of external capital financing assistance as seen as humanitarian assistance
*Under the umbrella of the trilateral cooperation organized by the Middle East Desalination Research Center, Israelis are giving wastewater and desalination training to Palestinian professionals and technicians
{{!}}
*Difficulties in attracting investors:
**Conflict and risks of Israel targeting the installation as it previously did with the Gaza power station
**Sustainability concerns (no money to pay for operation and maintenance costs in the long run)
**Significant delays of project approval by the Israeli Civil Administration (on average a project is on hold for 9 months)
**Restrictions on delivery of materials and movement of people cause additional project delays
*Do not make Gazans independent from Israel; desalination plants with their sophisticated and sensitive technology are far more vulnerable and dependent on steady, reliable supplies of spare parts and raw materials (chemicals) for their operation
*Desalination plants require large amounts of electricity, which is in short supply in Gaza, where much of the power is still provided by Israel’s utility company
**Leaves Palestinians even more dependent on uninterrupted energy supplies or fuel imports than ever before
*More energy efficient to sell additional water than having desalination in Gaza
*Expensive: a cubic meter of normal drinking water from Mekorot in Israel costs 2, 86 ILS (including VAT) pumped as bulk supply to the entrance of Gaza; the cheapest desalinated sea water is to be had for approximately 4 ILS
*Supply to consumers of high-quality (and relatively expensive) water arising from desalination will only be successful if the current leakage/ infiltration rates are minimized
*Physical security of pipelines and desalinator is challenged: effects of Israeli incursions; possibly also effects from Palestinian infighting
*Civil society concerned that Palestinian loose water rights in the negotiations if they become self-sufficient
*Environmental impact of brine; potential negative impact on livelihood of fishermen
{{!}}}

===Desalination of brackish groundwater ===
Even though desalination from brackish groundwater is cheaper and requires less energy than desalination from seawater, it is not a feasible option in the current context.<ref name="CSO-G 2011">Palestinian National Authority & Palestinian Water Authority, The Gaza Emergency Technical Assistance Programme on Water Supply to the Gaza Strip: the updated final report [Report 7 of the CSO-G] of The Comparative Study of Options for an Additional Supply of Water for the Gaza Strip (CSO-G) (2011, July 31). </ref> Water managers in Gaza feel strongly that the groundwater abstraction rates must be reduced as a first priority.

===Using surface water===

Collection and re-infiltration of rain and storm water can contribute to increase the recharge of the aquifer as well as grey water availability during the winter months outside of the agricultural season. However, given the limited amount of rainfall this option cannot be expected to have a large impact; nevertheless, is worth looking into how much money and time would have to be invested to upgrade or expand the existing infrastructure.<ref name="EWASH">Emergency Water Sanitation and Hygiene group. (March 2014). Water in the occupied Palestinian territory: causes, impacts and recommendations (Brussels, 18 March, 2014) [PowerPoint Slides].</ref> After the last big storm in Gaza in December 2013 (storm Alexa), the PWA and other stakeholders started to react and have come up with a plan for rain and storm water collection and re-infiltration.<ref name="Ironside 15May2014"> P. Ironside, personal communication with Christine Buesser, May 15, 2014</ref> Many stakeholder meetings were held to understand the different possibilities and the optimal locations for additional rain and storm water collection have been identified <ref name="Yaqoubi 12May2014">A. Al Yaqoubi, personal communication with C. Buesser, May 12, 2014</ref> Smaller-scale rain and storm water collection and re-infiltration projects are already being implemented. There is also a plan for a big-scale project to be implemented, which includes the upgrading of the current re-infiltration basins and the construction of a new infiltration basin.<ref name="Yaqoubi 12May2014"/> The two existing re-infiltration basins that are there to avoid flooding of Gaza city need to be upgraded to make them more effective in terms of the rain and storm water being infiltrated to the groundwater (to recharge the Coastal aquifer). During storm Alexa, the basins could not absorb the high rainfall quantity hence Gaza city was flooded.

==Water Transfer for Domestic Use==
One report suggests considering towing icebergs from the Antarctic to provide fresh water to Gaza, which cannot be serious.

Under normal circumstances, importing and exporting water (and using transboundary water) is the normal way to address unequal water resources among regions and countries. This is not the case for the State of Palestine. Agreements can only be sought with neighbors on importing and exporting water in order to meet the customer demand with the most cost effective options only after obtaining the rights on groundwater and surface water resources, according to international law.<ref name="PWA 2014"/> The principles of customary international water law, which binds all States, whether or not they have signed specific conventions, support a case that the Gaza population should receive a much higher volume of fresh water from the resources shared with Israel to date.<ref name="PWA 2014"/>

In the absence of a peace agreement with Israel, buying water from Israel and its allies cannot be a very reliable and major source of water for Gaza because of the political landscape.<ref name="PWA 2014"/> Moreover, some of the solutions to buy water for example from Turkey (via ‘medusa bags’ or tankers) are not feasible from a financial/ economic point of view.<ref name="CSO-G 2011"/>

===Transfer from Israel===
Gaza currently imports and pays for some of its water (5 MCM/ year) from the Israeli water utility (Mekorot), which is stipulated in Oslo II. This represents only 3% of the region’s water consumption. Israel is under an obligation to supply an additional 5 MCM/ year but this has been under negotiations for many years and blocked due mostly political reasons. <ref name="Milner pc april 24 2014">M. Milner, personal communication with Christine Buesser, April 24, 2014</ref> However, a financial protocol was signed in 2013 whereby both countries agreed on upon a price.<ref name="Yaqoubi 27April2014"> (A. Al Yaqoubi, personal communication with Christine Buesser, April 27, 2014</ref> Moreover, in 2013, one of the INGOs working in Gaza agreed to fund the installation of the pipeline 130 meters in length at the 1967 border between Gaza and Israel) to secure the additional water flow, which was completed in January 2014. However, as of May 2014, the additional water is still not flowing from the Israeli side. Different sources state that Israel makes the additional 5 MCM/ year conditional upon the Palestinians reactivating the JWC, which has not been properly functioning for more than two years, and reviving the project approval discussions in the JWC. However only the West Bank and not Gaza is part of the JWC. Palestinians do not want to reactivate the JWC because they do not agree with the JWC’s concept, purpose and objectives.<ref name="anonymous-cbuesser">anonymous, personal communication with Christine Buesser, April 24, 2014.</ref> Israel wants the State of Palestine to approve WATSAN projects in the settlements situated in the West Bank, which the Palestinians cannot approve as it would legitimize the settlements.<ref name="INGO 27April2014"> INGO working in the State of Palestine and Israel, personal communication with Christine Buesser, April 27, 2014</ref>. The United States asserts that it will do its best to encourage Israel to provide Gaza water, but then nothing happens<ref name="anonymous-cbuesser"/>.

Given the fact that even low volume transfers - such as the additional 5 MCM/ year - from Israel to Gaza keeps falling due to the politics, the PWA does not anticipate any significant increase in water import from Israel. Moreover, Mekorot itself is becoming increasingly reliant on expensive desalination water. Israel has expressed willingness to increase water sales to Gaza, but the price could be rather high.<ref name="PWA 2014"/> Moreover, negotiations with Mekorot are tainted by the complex political relationship between the two countries.<ref name="anonymous-cbuesser"/> Hence the Mekorot water resource is an option that needs to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis through a commercial agreement, but not as a general source of water for the State of Palestine.

====SWOT: Fresh Water Transfer from Israel====
{{{!}} class="wikitable" width="60%"
{{!}}-
! Strengths/ Opportunities
! Weaknesses/ Threats
{{!}}- valign="top"
{{!}}
*Low-volume transfer from Israel/ increased supply from the Israeli National Water Carrier might be possible in the medium to longer-term (from nearby Ashkelon desalination plant?)
*Data and conclusions from Permanent Status negotiations show that Palestine as a whole has significant rights in the region extending to all of the 6 watercourses shared with Israel (4 aquifers including the Coastal Aquifer Basin and the surface waters of both Wadi Gaza and the Jordan River)
*All three existing points where Gaza can receive flows from Israel could be expanded to receive additional flow
*Possibility of an internationally brokered and sponsored interim agreement with Israel, which will not be easy for Israel to one-sidedly cancel or violate as long as Palestinians do not violate it by not paying the bills
{{!}}
*High volume transfers are very questionable on political grounds; no progress has been made in the negotiation arena on this matter
*Water transfer from Israel is dependent on difficult negotiations with Mekorot, which is controlled by Tel Aviv
*Gaza dependent on Israeli supply
*‘Positive-Sum-Outcome’ whereby Israel could sell more of its desalinated water to the State of Palestine as its own water volumes are not predicted to decrease over time; however Israel has refused to discuss this either during the Permanent Status negotiations or outside of these
*Mekorot selling price is high and will probably increase in the future as more water is produced through very expensive desalination plants
*Supply to consumers of high-quality (and relatively expensive) water arising from Israel will only be successful if the current leakage/ infiltration rates are minimized
*Due to poor political security, Israel could decide to prefer to allocate flows elsewhere
*Physical security of pipelines is challenged: Israeli incursions could affect the parts of the system inside Gaza
{{!}}}

===Transfer from Egypt===

====Fresh Water Transfer====
A natural waters transfer from Egypt to Gaza is technically possible, as surface water flows derived from the Nile River estuary are potentially available to Gaza from a possible extension of the Salaam Canal, which flows into the Sinai. According to different stakeholders working in the State of Palestine, this is politically unattainable because of the ongoing debate between the eleven riparians of the Nile reflecting the tensions over allocations of those flows.

====Desalination Plant in Sinai, Egypt====
There have also been discussions on desalinating water in Egypt and supplying fresh water to Gaza. This option remains highly controversial as it will be a protracted affair (CSO-G, 2011). However, fresh water supply to El-Arish and other parts of the Sinai in Egypt is very poor, with highly saline groundwater being present in many areas (Geriesh et al., 2004; Ghodeif & Geriesh, 2004). This would suggest that the Egyptian authorities may be amenable to a trans-boundary project pertaining to desalination, with shared benefits. However, for that option to materialize, the political landscape in Egypt or Gaza would have to change <ref name="UNICEF nd">UNICEF, personal communication with Christine Buesser, unknown date</ref>.

=====SWOT: Water Transfer from Egypt=====
{{{!}} class="wikitable" width="60%"
{{!}}-
! Strengths/ Opportunities
! Weaknesses/ Threats
{{!}}- valign="top"
{{!}}Fresh Water:
*Technically feasible
*Israelis are pushing for a pipeline from the Nile to Gaza
{{!}}Fresh Water:
*Politically unattainable: ongoing debate between the eleven riparians of the Nile reflects the tensions over allocations of those flows
{{!}}- valign="top"
{{!}}Desalinated water
*Good political security of supply (desalinator and pipelines) as protected under Palestine-Egypt agreement
*Physical security of desalinator is good although the pipeline would need protecting as far as possible
*Moderate to high likelihood of external capital financing assistance
{{!}}Desalinated water:
*If Egyptians give energy, desalination plant can also be constructed in Gaza (will make them independent)
*Politically unattainable; talked to Egyptians and they did not show much interest and are concerned about interfering in outstanding ‘water rights’
*Physical security of pipelines is challenging: Israeli incursions could affect the parts of the system inside Gaza
*Low likelihood of external financing for operation and maintenance costs in the longer-term
{{!}}}

===Transfer from Jordan===
Transfers of fresh water of any significant volume from Jordan to the State of Palestine are feasible, but there are greater political and hydrological considerations than with the Egyptian option (CSO-G, 2011). Given the recent Red Sea-Dead Sea agreement, there is a remote possibility that the three countries involved in the Red Sea-Dead Sea Conduit studies could agree on a ‘wheeling’ arrangement where flows available at one point could be forgone, and replaced by flows elsewhere. This might result in a possibility for additional flows from Israel to Gaza in the future (M. Milner, personal communication, April 24, 2014).

====SWOT: Water Transfer from Jordan====
{{{!}} class="wikitable" width="60%"
{{!}}-
! Strengths/ Opportunities
! Weaknesses/ Threats
{{!}}- valign="top"
{{!}}
*‘Wheeling arrangement’ from the Red Sea-Dead Sea agreement but additional flows for Gaza remain uncertain
{{!}}
*Politically unacceptable given Jordan’s own water shortage
*Hydrological considerations dictate that any such flows would be very expensive after delivery to Gaza due to high pumping costs
*Degree to which the West Bank would be willing to use the flows from the Red Sea-Dead Sea Conduit for Gaza remains questionable; any such flows would be most likely to be utilized in the western Jordan Valley
{{!}}}

===Transfer from Turkey ===
It is noted in this respect that Turkey has negotiated for some time with Israel and other countries for possible exports of fresh water, and while certain parties in Turkey consider this to be shortsighted, the possibility of such transfers still exists at the current time (Israeli/Palestinian Center for Research & Information [IPCRI], 2010). Previous efforts involving ‘medusa bags’ and tankers transfers between Turkey, Israel and Cyprus were utilized in part as the basis for this analysis.

However, transfer of significant volumes of fresh water from Turkey to Gaza using bags or tankers is considered not to be feasible or cost-effective (UNICEF, personal communication, unknown date).

By contrast, the Mini-Peace Pipeline might be worthwhile to look at as a possible long-term solution; while its original route proposed was over land, a subsea route has also been discussed.<ref name="CSO-G 2011">Palestinian National Authority & Palestinian Water Authority, The Gaza Emergency Technical Assistance Programme on Water Supply to the Gaza Strip: the updated final report [Report 7 of the CSO-G] of The Comparative Study of Options for an Additional Supply of Water for the Gaza Strip (CSO-G) (2011, July 31) </ref> This would be most likely dependent on oil and electricity transport also.<ref name="Erdemir 2009">Erdemir, H. (2009). The policies around the BTC pipeline. Turkish Journal of International Relations, 8 (4), 20-44.</ref><ref name="Foley 2010">Foley, S. (2010). Turkey and the Gulf States in the twenty-first century. Middle East Review of International Affairs, 14 (3), 29-37. </ref> It is obvious that such a major engineering program could only be realized in the long-term. Nevertheless, the restricted range of options for realizing ‘new water’ that are available to the State of Palestine and Jordan in particular, suggest that this option should be reconsidered.<ref name="Phillips et al 2009">Phillips, D.J.H., Jägerskog, A., & Turton, A. (2009). The Jordan River Basin: 3. Options for satisfying the current and future water demand of the five riparians. Water International , 34 (2), 170-188.</ref> It would appear likely that there is a restricted political window of opportunity to realize such a major inter-basin transfer from Turkey.<ref name="Rende 2004">Rende, M. (2004). Water transfer from Turkey to water-stressed countries in the Middle East. 2nd Israeli-Palestinian International Conference on Water for Life in the Middle East, Antalya, Turkey, 10-14 October 2004. Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information, Jerusalem.</ref> The completion of a full-scale Feasibility Study would be the preferred first step.

====SWOT: Water Transfer from Turkey====
{{{!}} class="wikitable" width="60%"
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! Strengths/ Opportunities
! Weaknesses/ Threats
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*Mini-Peace Pipeline option in the long-term?
{{!}}
*Questionable on political grounds; as long as Gaza is under blockage, cannot receive the water directly (current port is only for small fishing boats and Israel does not allow any imports of materials/ equipment by sea or air)
*Use of bags towed in seawater for such transfers does not represent proven technology
*Costs for the use of ‘medusa bags’ are estimated to be unacceptably high
*Use of tanker transport would also be prohibitively expensive
{{!}}}
|ASI Keyword=
|User=Christine.Buesser
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Gaza Strip Water Management

2014-06-25T18:26:07Z

Christine.Buesser: Created page with "{{Case Study |Water Use=Agriculture or Irrigation, Domestic/Urban Supply |Land Use=agricultural- cropland and pasture, urban |Climate=Dry-summer |Population=1.67 |Area=360 |Ge..."

Gaza

2014-06-15T15:46:49Z

Christine.Buesser: Created page with "{{Riparian |Located in Region=Western Asia |isastate=major-administrative-unit |Located in Country=Palestinian Territories |Located in Country=Palestinian Territories |Located..."

{{Riparian
|Located in Region=Western Asia
|isastate=major-administrative-unit
|Located in Country=Palestinian Territories
|Located in Country=Palestinian Territories
|Located in Sub Unit=
|Riparian Population=1650000
|Description= 
=Socio-Economic Background, Environment and Land Use=

Gaza is an urban economy, heavily reliant on intensive trade, communication and movement of people; however the area has been essentially isolated since 2005 given land and sea restrictions, which has led to an unviable economy. The Gaza Airport, funded by donor countries and which opened in 1998, and the Gaza Seaport project, which started in 2000, were both destroyed by the Israeli army when the second Palestinian uprising (intifada) against Israeli occupation inflamed.<ref name="Wiki Airport">Yasser Arafat International Airport. (2014, May 31). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 14:17, June 15, 2014, from http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Yasser_Arafat_International_Airport&oldid=610916688</ref><ref name="Wikipedia Gaza Seaport plans">Gaza Seaport plans. (2014, February 26). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 14:22, June 15, 2014, from http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Gaza_Seaport_plans&oldid=597201860</ref> As of 2014, the airport is not operational and the construction of the Gaza seaport has not resumed even though the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA), following the Israel's withdrawal from Gaza, re-announced the start of the works.<ref name="Wiki Airport"/> The transfer of goods to the West Bank and exports to Israel, both traditional markets for Gazan goods, is banned with a few exceptions. For the goods entering Gaza, Israel collects customs and value added tax.<ref name="Gisha2">Gisha Legal Center for Freedom of Movement. (November 2011). Scale of Control: Israel’s Continued Responsibility in the Gaza Strip. Retrieved from http://gisha.org/publication/1660</ref> Restrictions on the movement of people are in place. Citing security concerns, the Israeli military has also imposed restrictions on access to farmland on the Gaza side of the fence, and to fishing areas along the Gaza Strip coast - the Access Restricted Areas (ARAs).<ref name="UNO OCHA 2013">United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Fragmented Lives Humanitarian Overview 2013: report of OCHA in the occupied Palestinian territory (March 2014), available from http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/43B4D427B63C369B85257CB300585957.</ref>

Gaza has been and continues to be kept alive through external funding and the illegal tunnel economy under the Egypt-Gaza border. According to an ILO report, the tunnel economy has benefited Hamas as they have received a considerable share of the benefits from it.<ref name="UN Gaza 2020 2012">United Nations, Gaza in 2020 - A liveable place?: report of the United Nations Country Team in the occupied Palestinian territory (August 2012). </ref> The tunnel economy has taken a sharp hit as Egypt's military has destroyed most of the 1,200 tunnels from June 2013 onwards, which were primarily used to smuggle construction materials for the private sector and subsidized Egyptian fuel.<ref name="Rueters 2014">Court bans activities of Islamist Hamas in Egypt. (2014, March 04). Reuters. Retrieved from: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/04/us-egypt-hamas-idUSBREA230F520140304</ref> According to OCHA, the closure of these tunnels led to a sharp spike in unemployment, an increase in food prices, and chronic electricity shortages resulting from interruptions to the operation of the Gaza Power Plant (GPP), severely disrupting the provision of basic services.<ref name="UNO OCHA 2013">United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Fragmented Lives Humanitarian Overview 2013: report of OCHA in the occupied Palestinian territory (March 2014), available from http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/43B4D427B63C369B85257CB300585957.</ref>

The people of Gaza remain worse off than they were in the 1990s, despite increases in real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita over the past three years<ref name="UN Gaza 2020 2012"/>. One of the main reasons for the economy’s inability to recover to pre-2000 levels is the blockade of Gaza. The Palestinian Ministry of National Economy estimates that the blockade led to costs or unrealized growth worth US$ 1.9 billion in 2010 alone. Moreover, Israel’s Operation ‘Cast Lead’ in the Gaza Strip in December 2008 to January 2009 caused a total of US$ 181 million in direct and US$ 88 million in longer-term costs for Gaza’s agriculture; generated US$ 44 million in environmental costs and almost US$ 6 million in water and sanitation infrastructure damages.<ref name="UN Gaza 2020 2012"/>

Unemployment is high and affects women and youth in particular. High levels of food insecurity persist in the Gaza Strip, with a total of 66% of households classified as food insecure or vulnerable to food insecurity (UN, 2012). The main cause of food insecurity is the affordability of food and non-food items, resulting from the lack of income-earning possibilities for Gaza households.<ref name="Muenchenbach">M. Muenchenbach, personal communication with Christine Buesser, April 25, 2014.</ref> Gaza’s GDP per capita is expected to grow only modestly in the coming years, making it ever more difficult for Gazans to secure a living.<ref name="UN Gaza 2020 2012"/> The current import/ export conditions are unsustainable, putting Gaza’s economy at a competitive disadvantage, and eroding the resiliency of the private sector to create jobs, which is a key component for the affordability of food and non-food basic requirements for families.<ref name="WFP 2010">World Food Programme (WFP) occupied Palestinian territory Country Office. Gaza – eased or uneased? Changes on Gaza Market and Household Conditions following Israel’s 20 June 2010 New Access Regime [PowerPoint Slides]. </ref> If the current political status quo continues, the situation will only become more challenging.

Agriculture plays an important but limited role in Gaza, with about 40% of Gaza under cultivation. The agriculture sector continues to be characterized by small-scale (mainly family-based) farming. Exports of small amounts of strawberries, flowers and cherry tomatoes (mostly to Europe) are too minor to have a substantial impact on the overall economic situation.<ref name="UN Gaza 2020 2012"/> Given the water crisis, there is a trend to use fewer water-intensive and more salt-resistant crops, such as dates, which is in fact a return to the traditional crops of Gaza. The climate vulnerability of residents of Gaza is compounded by the expected environmental impacts of climate change. Increased amounts of precipitation will lead to reduced yields for rain-fed agriculture, and could also mean a greater frequency of flash floods.<ref name="PWA 2014">Palestinian Water Authority. (March 2014). Gaza Strip: No Clean Drinking Water, No Enough Energy, and Threatened Future. Gaza, occupied Palestinian territory: Author. </ref> Reduced amounts of precipitation will lead to increased strain on groundwater resources. According to Clemens Messerschmid, it should not be overlooked however that in former times Gaza was esteemed for its high-quality water resources and regarded as an oasis. The climate did not change over the last thousand years, but the number of inhabitants began to explode with the mass expulsions from Israel in 1948.<ref name="Messerschmid 2011">Messerschmid, C. (2011). Water in Gaza: Problems and Prospects. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1764252</ref>

=Political Environment=

==Peace Negotiations Between Israel and the State of Palestine ==
Direct negotiations between Israel and the State of Palestine began on 29 July 2013 following an attempt by United States Secretary of State John Kerry to restart the peace process. The negotiations were scheduled to last up to nine months to reach a final status to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by mid-2014. A deadline was set for establishing a broad outline for an agreement by April 29, 2014. On the expiry of the deadline, negotiations collapsed (AFP, 2014). The PA confirmed that the continuation of the negotiations depended on Israel agreeing in writing to: recognizing the 1967 borders of the Palestinian state, with East Jerusalem as its capital; releasing 1,200 prisoners; lifting the blockade of Gaza; returning Church of Nativity deportees; ceasing the construction of Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem and other locations; uniting fifteen thousand Palestinian families, giving them full citizenship; and preventing Israelis from entering areas of the PA and Area C.<ref name="GANSO Apr 2014">Gaza Strip Summary - Update on Reconciliation. (2014, April 03-16). Gaza NGO Safety Office (GANSO) Bi-weekly Safety Report, 7(21). </ref>

==Fatah-Hamas Reconciliation==
In April 2014, a reconciliation agreement between Fatah and Hamas was announced, which builds on the talks between Hamas and Fatah first in Doha in February 2012 and expanded later in Cairo in May 2012. <ref name="GANSO Apr 2014"/> This development could see the Palestinian territories under a unified leadership for the first time in years. The next steps would be the announcement of an interim government in the weeks to come, with elections possible by early 2015.<ref name="CNN 2014">Hamas, Fatah announce talks to form Palestinian unity government. (2014, April 23). CNN World. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/23/world/meast/gaza-west-bank-palestinian-reconciliation/</ref>

=Legal Environment=

==Water Rights<ref name="Brookes and Trottier 2012">Brooks, D., & Trottier, J. (March 2012). An agreement to share water between Israelis and Palestinians: The FoEME proposal. EcoPeace/ Friends of the Earth Middle East, 3, 54-61. Retrieved from http://foeme.org/uploads/13411307571~%5E$%5E~Water_Agreement_FINAL.pdf
</ref><ref name="PWA 2014"/>==
In the long-term, Palestinian water rights will be negotiated with Israel and the other riparian countries in accordance with international law and best practice with regard to the management of trans-boundary water resources. In the meantime, the Oslo II Agreement regulates the temporary allocations of water utilization to Palestinians. The Oslo II Agreement was primarily based on actual water abstraction at that time (1995), although it also included a slight increase to allow for population growth. Its aim was to regulate water allocations over a 5-year interim period, until a final agreement was reached between the State of Palestine and Israel. This interim period was not supposed to last 20 years and the Oslo II Agreement did not address what force (if any) it would have beyond the interim period. For this reason, the Oslo II Agreement utilization figures no longer meet the minimal requirements of the Palestinian people. Although there is an urgent need to amend these figures (due to population change and other environmental and socio-economic factors), this agreement is still frequently cited as a reference during discussions at Joint Water Committee (JWC) meetings.

Additional comments from the 2014 PWA report<ref name="PWA 2014"/>:
*Under the Oslo II Interim Agreement, the Israelis are to supply 5 additional MCM/ year to Gaza, and Palestinians are authorized to develop an additional 78 MCM/ year in the West Bank (compared with their water use in 1995);
*The Oslo II Interim Agreement does not clearly deal with abstraction rights on the Coastal aquifer; it does not include any figures on either the Israeli or Palestinian abstraction rate in 1995. It merely states that both sides should maintain the existing utilization.
According to different expert sources, the reasons for the Oslo accords not detailing how much Palestinians and Israelis can extract from the Coastal aquifer are:
*Extractions from the aquifer in Gaza will not affect the aquifer yield in Israel due to the direction the water flows, so Israel is not worried how much it is extracted from Gaza since it will not affect it.
*On the other hand, extractions from the Coastal aquifer from the Israeli side will affect availability in Gaza. Israeli over extraction of the Coastal aquifer affects the yield in Gaza but there is no good data of how much exactly. Even though it might be limited, for Gaza even limited impact of this extraction has big consequences.
*Israel had already embedded in the Oslo accords the separation of Gaza from the West Bank, which is part of the long-term planning of Israel.
According to international law, Israel as the upstream riparian in the shared groundwater flow system is clearly responsible for an "equitable and reasonable" allocation of resources.<ref name="Messerschmid 2011"/> It would therefore have to supply Gaza with considerably more water.<ref name="Messerschmid 2011"/>

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User:Christine.Buesser

2014-04-30T20:44:34Z

Christine.Buesser: Created page with "{{Person |External Links= }}"